Examining the Development of Judicial Independence (with Kirk Randazzo and Rebecca Reid). pdf version
Abstract: Even our best theories of judicial independence do not explain well how the institution develops within the state. Generally thought to be a type of insurance for regimes who fear their majority status is in jeopardy, recent research suggests that insurance theory does not offer an adequate explanation until states democratize. We agree and develop a multidimensional theory of judicial independence that focuses on the interplay of the constraints facing ruling elites that derive from the levels of political competition within the government, the potential for social competition within the state, and the state’s regime type. We test our argument using a dataset of approximately 145 countries over 40 years, and our results support the argument that development of judicial independence is related to the political landscape encountered by the executive. Ethnic fractionalization in the state, political competition, and regime type each has a conditional effect on the observation of judicial independence.
Abstract: Even our best theories of judicial independence do not explain well how the institution develops within the state. Generally thought to be a type of insurance for regimes who fear their majority status is in jeopardy, recent research suggests that insurance theory does not offer an adequate explanation until states democratize. We agree and develop a multidimensional theory of judicial independence that focuses on the interplay of the constraints facing ruling elites that derive from the levels of political competition within the government, the potential for social competition within the state, and the state’s regime type. We test our argument using a dataset of approximately 145 countries over 40 years, and our results support the argument that development of judicial independence is related to the political landscape encountered by the executive. Ethnic fractionalization in the state, political competition, and regime type each has a conditional effect on the observation of judicial independence.