

An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816-2001*

Douglas M. Gibler[†] Steven V. Miller[‡] Erin K. Little[†]

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Abstract

We conducted a five-year study that attempted to replicate and validate the original coding work of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) project. After strictly applying MID coding rules, we recommend dropping 251 cases (or over 10% of the dataset) as we were either unable to find a militarized incident in the historical record or the dispute was already coded elsewhere in the data. We found evidence linking 75 disputes to other cases, and we could not identify 19 cases in the historical record. Among the remaining disputes, we recommend major changes (changes in dispute year, fatality level, and participants) in 234 disputes and minor changes in 1,009 disputes. We use this paper to examine the potential impact of our suggestions on existing studies. Though we are able to identify several systematic problems with the original coding effort, we find that these problems should not affect current understandings of the predictors of interstate conflict onset. However, estimates in our replications of three recent studies of dispute escalation, dispute duration, and dispute reciprocation all witness substantial changes when using corrected data, to the point of reversing previous conclusions in some cases.

Keywords

Militarized Interstate Disputes, Correlates of War, Conflict, Data Replication

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[†]Department of Political Science, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL;

[‡]Department of Political Science, Clemson University, Clemson, SC

The Correlates of War (CoW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set provides scholars with some of the best available data on international conflict between states. Its value to scholars of interstate conflict has been immeasurable since its first release by [Gochman and Maoz \(1984\)](#). The most influential arguments about the relationships between joint democracy, territorial issues, alliances, arms races, rivalry and interstate conflict have all been advanced using this important data set. Expanded and updated further by [Jones, Bremer and Singer \(1996\)](#), [Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer \(2004\)](#), and [Palmer et al. \(Forthcoming\)](#), no other interstate conflict data set available to conflict scholars featured MID's temporal reach, regional inclusiveness, or consideration of interstate disputes at lower levels of hostility. No other conflict data set allowed for thorough comparisons of which disputes escalate toward war and which do not. The scope of MID has made it the standard data set for evaluating important claims of war and peace in the international system.

Nevertheless, there has never been a systematic analysis of the cases that are included in the dataset and whether a review of the cases still support the inferences that have been drawn from studies that use the data. We change that here. We recently concluded a five-year study that attempted to replicate the original coding work of MID for the entirety of the data set through version 3.1 (disputes from 1816 to 2001). After using a strict reading of MID's coding rules, we find that approximately 68% of the data set needs revision. We recommend dropping 251 cases from the data set for not meeting MID coding rules for inclusion and also recommend merging 754 other MIDs with disputes that are connected by militarized incidents in the same area over the same issue. We could not identify 19 MIDs using the sources MID says the project used and after our own searches of the historical record. Of the remaining disputes, we recommend what we believe are major changes to 234 disputes (e.g. change of participants, start and end year, fatalities) and minor changes to 1,009 disputes (e.g. change of start and end days).

The changes we suggest are obviously substantial and are likely to affect many inferences that have been drawn in previous studies. We document several these with replications of recent works on dispute escalation ([Braithwaite and Lemke 2011](#)), dispute duration ([Gibler and Miller 2013](#)), and dispute reciprocation ([Weeks 2008](#)). Our reanalyses of these studies suggest that interpretation of several key relationships depend wholly on improperly coded cases in the original data, and we document how specific change recommendations affect inferences from these studies.¹

¹Since we are suggesting substantial changes to one of the most important datasets in international relations

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we start with a summary of our findings regarding the dispute data and describe the changes we suggest by both temporal domain and region. Next, we discuss how our recommended changes may affect studies of interstate conflict; we include this section as a guide for those interested in revisiting existing studies. We then analyze the revised dataset and present the replications of several recent studies. We conclude with a summary of our contribution to this important data set for conflict scholars. While we laud the original coders for their work in compiling this important data set, we believe our findings and our cleaned data increase faith in analyses of interstate conflict.

Procedures for Confirming Original MID Data

CoW defines a militarized incident as, “a single military action involving an explicit threat, display, or use of force by one system member state towards another system member state” (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 169). A MID or dispute is the aggregation of these incidents over time, space, and issue; or, more formally: “Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.”

Incident coding rules are extensively discussed in the data codebooks and also the published articles releasing the several iterations of the dataset. Similarly, each publication discusses how these incidents are aggregated into a dispute. For example, in Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996, 174-177), these aggregation rules stipulate that incidents that form a dispute must (1) involve the same or overlapping parties, (2) involve the same issue(s), and (3) have identifiable start and end dates. The coding rules also provide information for how wars, civil wars, and other concerns are treated. Together, these rules describe how the dataset is based first on the identification of

research, we provide a great deal of background material on specific cases. These are included in the appendices to this manuscript. Appendix I documents several issues related to the sources the original coders used and how this source information likely led to systematic problems when coding the data set. Appendix IIA provides information about the dispute cases we could not find. Appendix IIB details our drop recommendations by dispute number. Appendix IIC presents information about the cases that should be merged with other disputes. Appendix IID provides summary information for remaining change recommendations. Appendix IIE details our discussions with the CoW Project regarding our review, and, finally, Appendix IIF provides a comprehensive bibliography for all disputes, by dispute number.

militarized incidents between and among states in the CoW international system and then on the method of aggregation of these incidents into unified conflicts over time.

CoW provides incidents for all disputes between 1993 and 2010, but the incident data for disputes prior to 1993 has never been made available. CoW also provides a list of sources for all MID data, available at: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>. The source data for MID3 (covering the years 1993 to 2001) and MID4 (2002-2010) are much more extensive than the original MID2 data; nevertheless, the source information for the cases between 1816 and 1992 was very helpful in assessing the majority of the cases during that time period.

We began the recreation of the more than two thousand cases of disputes between 1816 and 1992 by first finding the source information in the MID bibliography. In most cases this information was not enough to completely code the dispute, and, in a substantial number of cases, we were not able to confirm the existence of a dispute based on the source. For all cases we conducted extensive internet, newspaper, and scholarly literature searches for information on any and all conflicts related to the participant and dispute data provided by CoW, and we have compiled an extensive bibliography of that source information, disaggregated by dispute number. This bibliography is contained in the final Appendix to this manuscript.

The results from our recreation of the dataset can be subdivided among five types of cases—disputes that we could not find in the historical record, cases that were found but for which information suggests no militarized dispute occurred, disputes for which major changes need to be made to the original codings, minor-change cases, and, finally, disputes for which the historical record matches the original coding from MID2. We focus first on the dataset cases that were most difficult to validate.

There were a very small minority of disputes—19 in all—for which neither the original source nor our extensive searches provided information on any type of conflict between the states listed in the MID data on the dates provided or anytime temporally proximate to those dates.² We recommend excluding these cases and provide short narratives of the events in the dyad-dates listed by the MID project for these cases and include these as Appendix IIA to this manuscript.

After our review, we also recommend dropping from the dataset approximately ten percent of

²We consulted the CoW-provided sources for each dispute, and, in many cases, these provided help identifying the likely conflict. Still, there is no mention of a dispute in the labeled sources for these 19 cases. Our meetings with CoW and their examination of dataset files also provided no information on these cases.

the original cases. For each of these 240 cases, we first established the historical event identified by the original coders, and we then applied the MID3 coding rules to the source information we found. We were incredibly conservative in our recreation efforts and accepted existing data whenever possible. However, we believe that the cases we list as drop recommendations cannot be substantiated as MIDs using the CoW coding rules for militarized incidents, and we provide descriptions for our reasoning for each of these cases in Appendix IIB of this manuscript.³

There are also numerous cases in which we discovered new information that linked previously separate disputes. The MID coding rules stipulate that six months of continued inaction ends a dispute, with the last recorded militarized incident coded as the end date (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 175-176). We purposely searched all same-dyad disputes to determine whether there were militarized incidents that were missed by the original coders. In all, we found 74 disputes that should be merged with existing disputes and dropped from the dataset. These cases are described in Appendix IIC of the manuscript.

Of the 1,238 cases for which we recommend changes, 234 involve major changes to the data. We define “major change” according to whether we believe the change may influence inferences in a substantial number of studies. These major changes include corrections to the number of participants in a dispute, the actual parties to the dispute, the dispute start year, or a change in fatalities from zero to one or more, from a fatal to a non-fatal dispute, or from missing data to fatal dispute. Many disputes had multiple major change recommendations. All other change recommendations were, we believe, relatively minor in comparison and include such things as day/month changes, end year changes, highest action, hostility level, outcome, and/or settlement changes. We found minor changes needed for 1009 of the disputes cases we examined. Finally, we were able to recreate the original dispute coding perfectly in 758 cases of disputes, or approximately 32% of the cases between 1816 and 2001.

Summarizing Our Change Recommendations

Table 1 describes our review recommendations by region and time period and shows that we actually find no clear spatial or temporal pattern in these changes. The could-not-find cases were

³We should note that we have had several discussions with MID personnel regarding our drop recommendations. They actually agree with the majority of our recommendations, though not all of them, and we provide an overview of the discussion we have had regarding these disagreements in Appendix IIE of this paper.

most numerous among European dyads, so these missing cases are probably not due to the scarcity of information available to CoW. The post-World War II time period is most numerous in the drop and merge categories, but this time period also has the highest number of disputes. Overall, there seems to be no clear area or time-period prediction for when we had difficulty recreating the original data, and this lack of systematic bias may be good news for existing studies.

A few patterns do emerge when we divide our general recommendations according to the highest action level in the dispute, as we provide in Table 2. We found several issues related to disputes classified as seizures in the dataset, and these cases represent a substantial number of each category. Among other categories, we recommended drops of 35 cases that were originally coded as threats; in most of these cases, the threat was too vague to constitute a militarized incident. Finally, a majority of our merge and major change recommendations concerned cases of attacks and clashes. These were cases in which the original coders found good information about the occurrence of militarized incidents, at intense levels of contestation, but our additional searches provided new information that more properly described the militarized dispute.

Appendix IID provides information about the types of changes we recommend for every dispute in the MID dataset. Our replication data for this manuscript also provides a clean set of confirmed disputes and dyad-years in dispute for the years 1816 to 2001.⁴

Analysis of Recommended Changes

Thus far we have described our review of the MID project and several issues we found with the data. The important point of this review, though, is determining whether the changes we recommend for the dataset are systematic enough to change existing conclusions on the causes of conflict. We do this in two parts. First, in this section we provide an analysis of several predictors of our categories—could not find, drops, merges, and major and minor change recommendations—in order to determine the circumstances under which various studies will be affected. For example, if we find that a particular time period, region, or type of dispute was prone to being poorly coded and should be dropped from the data, then researchers whose work has focused on these cases may want to re-examine their previous studies.

⁴This data is available at the following Dataverse page: xxxx.

Table 1: Significant Changes Recommended, by Region and Time Period

	North America	South America	Europe	Africa	Middle East	Asia	Total by period	Total by Type
Could not find	1816-1899	1	3				4	
	1900-1945	1	6	3			10	
	1946-1992		2	1	2		5	
	1993-							19
Drop	1816-1899	10	4		2	2	25	
	1900-1945	3	40	1	3	9	75	
	1946-1992	5	25	23	29	24	130	
	1993-2001		2	1	3	2	14	245
Merge	1816-1899		4				4	
	1900-1945	2	2	3		5	12	
	1946-1992	2	1	4	4	20	51	
	1993-2001		1	2		2	5	72
Major change	1816-1899	5	7			2	25	
	1900-1945	7	3	22		7	44	
	1946-1992	16	3	19	25	39	143	
	1993-2001	2		2	4	7	17	229
Total by region	52	76	134	63	115	124		

Table 2: Significant Changes Recommended, by Highest Action Level

	Threats	Shows/ Alerts	Seizures	Attacks/ Clashes	Declare/ Join War	Other	Total
Could not find	3	2	6	6	1	1	19
Drop	35	28	53	85	8	36	245
Merge	2	5	11	44	2	8	72
Major change	6	24	19	143	16	21	229

Table 3 presents the results of five logistic regressions in which we used the issues we found as predictors of the various categories. Each of the models uses the entire dataset of dispute cases we analyzed, 2,330 in all, and each predictor was included in each of the models analyzed. Table 3 provides a + sign when the predictor is a positive predictor of the category and a – sign when the variable predicts fewer of the category; only predictors that are statistically significant from zero at $p < 0.05$ are included.

Several interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. In the first column, Table 3 shows that seizures and disputes that were coded as lasting for only one day were difficult for us to find. Eleven of the 19 cases in this category were coded as lasting one day, and there were six seizures, two of which lasted longer than one day. Again, we consulted the original sources from CoW and conducted extensive searches of the historical record, but we still found no information regarding these events.

The second column suggests that there may be systematic patterns in the cases we recommend dropping. Seizures and threats to use force are highest action levels that suggest a drop recommendation was more likely; disputes coded as clashes were unlikely to be dropped. Among the clustering variables, those cases that were related to the Tanker War and during the 1900 to 1945 time period were more likely to be dropped, and, regionally, cases in the Middle East had a higher drop rate. The original source information was also a consistent predictor for this category. Cases using Langer (1972), Facts on File, or Keesings, were much less likely to be dropped; this is most likely due to the fact that these sources were used for coding major international events over time.

We found only positive predictors of the cases that should be merged. Attacks and clashes were likely separated by the six-month rule in the original data, but, even controlling for those cases, we were able to find continuous action in many instances. Our searches were also more likely

to find information that merge disputes in Asia and the Middle East as well as events that were sourced using newspapers or daily and weekly bulletins. We believe this last finding underscores our argument in Appendix I that caution should be used when aggregating incidents based solely on news reports.

Table 3: Predictors of Recommended Changes

<u>Dispute Characteristics</u>	Could Not Find	Drop	Merge	Major Change	Minor Change	No Change
Seizure	+	+		-		-
Threat		+			-	
Attack			+	+		
Clash		-	+	+	-	
Join ongoing war				+		
One-day dispute	+	+			+	+
Six-month rule			+			
All democracies						
<u>Temporal and/or Spatial Clustering</u>						
Tanker War		+				
1816 to 1899					+	-
1900 to 1945		+			+	-
1946 to 1992					+	-
Africa (sub-Saharan)					-	
Asia			+			
Middle East		+	+	+		
North America						
South America						
World War I		+				
World War II						-
<u>Source Information</u>						
Dupuy and Dupuy				+	-	
Langer		-				
New York Times			+		+	-
Facts on File		-	+			
Keesings		-		+		
Number of sources					+	

The predictors of major and minor changes were quite different, as would be expected. We found major changes necessary in attacks, clashes, and joins ongoing war cases, and the Middle East proved to be difficult to recreate without substantial coding changes. Cases coded using Keesings or Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) also were likely to need major recoding. The pattern for seizures is striking here when compared to the other categories: these cases are less likely to be found and more likely to be dropped, but, if found and correctly coded, no major changes are likely.

Minor changes were likely in all time periods except those cases covered by MID3, the base

category, which again makes sense considering the data and funding available to the project coding 1993 to 2001. Minor changes were also less likely for threats and clashes and for cases in Africa, but changes were more likely for disputes sourced with only the New York Times. Very strangely, we found that the number of sources given by the CoW project for the 1816 to 1992 disputes were a predictor of minor changes needed. Perhaps this results from the tendency to name several standard sources when a certain region or time period is coded.

When Our Recommended Changes May Affect Conflict Studies

We have identified several patterns among the change suggestions we offer, and we use this section to examine whether—or, more properly, when—these changes will matter to a given study. We begin by returning to the “dangerous dyads” framework first offered by [Bremer \(1992\)](#) and analyze the predictors of dispute onset at the dyadic level. We then reanalyze three recent studies that focus on events that occur within a dispute. As we demonstrate, there are substantial inferential differences in the latter type of analyses when using our revised data.

Dangerous Dyads and Dispute Onset

We use several known predictors of interstate conflict in our analysis of conflict onset. First, the presence of land contiguity in the dyad signals an opportunity for conflict, increased interactions, or the presence of territorial issues. We use the [Stinnett et al. \(2002\)](#) data for this measure. We measure parity as the smaller CINC score divided by the total CINC scores in the dyad, using ([Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972](#)) data. We include a measure for the presence of a major state in the dyad, and we code whether the states were in a formal alliance ([Gibler and Sarkees 2004](#)). Joint democracy is included in the models, with democracy defined as a Polity IV score between 6 and 10 ([Marshall and Jaggers 2002](#)). Each of these independent variables is lagged by one year from the dyad-year observation. Finally, we estimate each model using general estimation equations (GEE) with a binomial distribution and a one-year time lag to control for autocorrelation, and we use all non-directed dyad-years for which independent variable data was available for the years 1816 to 2001.⁵

⁵The most recent iteration of the MID dataset, from 2002 to 2010, was released as we were finishing our review. We have not yet examined this data.

Table 4 presents the results of these analyses. The dependent variable of dispute onset in each analysis is the presence of two dispute originators in the first year of conflict, with all subsequent years of conflict set to zero. The first column uses the currently available MID data from the CoW project.⁶ This estimation demonstrates that our basic model of conflict conforms well to general expectations from the literature. Contiguity, parity, and the presence of a major state is each associated with an increased likelihood of dispute onset; joint democracy and the presence of an alliance in the dyad decreases the risk of dispute onset, though the presence of an alliance is not statistically significant.

Table 4: Analysis of MID predictors following dispute sample changes, 1816-2001

	Current CoW MID	After Year Corrections	After Drop Recommendations	Omissions for Robustness†
Contiguity	3.073*** (0.168)	3.069*** (0.167)	3.130*** (0.168)	3.339*** (0.171)
Joint Democracy	-0.861*** (0.147)	-0.862*** (0.147)	-0.919*** (0.158)	-0.888*** (0.169)
Capability Ratio	1.891*** (0.406)	1.867*** (0.403)	1.866*** (0.409)	1.742*** (0.413)
Allied	-0.189 (0.141)	-0.180 (0.141)	-0.203 (0.144)	-0.234 (0.146)
Major State Present	1.763*** (0.175)	1.760*** (0.174)	1.727*** (0.176)	1.640*** (0.181)
Constant	-6.794*** (0.105)	-6.795*** (0.105)	-6.941*** (0.106)	-7.157*** (0.108)
<i>N</i>	654,513	654,513	654,513	654,513

† This model excludes cases of seizures, joins ongoing war, and disputes related to the Tanker War. Standard errors in parentheses;

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Columns two and three introduce our recommended changes to the data. Column two applies the corrected dispute years to the CoW MID onsets, and column three applies our drop recommendations. The fourth column applies all changes and treats as peaceful the dyad-years that had a seizure, joined an ongoing war, or had a dispute related to the Tanker War between Iraq and Iran.

Evident across these models is that our suggested changes make little difference in the estimation of conflict onset. There are no changes in the direction of relationships, there are no other changes

⁶Downloaded on October 28, 2014, from <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID40.html>.

in statistical significance, and there is very little change in the relative strength of relationships between the independent variables and dispute onset. Not even the omission of several large groups of dispute cases affect these findings. Seizures and war joins are in many ways dissimilar to the rest of the dataset, as we detail in Appendix I, and the often unreciprocated shipping strikes of the Tanker War are so numerous and strongly clustered they could bias several relationships. Nevertheless, these omissions produce estimates that are quite similar to the other models.

The lack of change across models is most likely due to the large number of dyad-years in the analysis and the large number of event observations (over 650,000 and over 2,000, respectively). These sample and event sizes make it difficult for any of our recommended changes to substantially alter found relationships in the data. This changes, however, when analyses concern mostly what took place once fighting began in the dyad.

Replication 1: Dispute Escalation

A recent study by Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) provides an analysis of all bilateral MIDs to determine the correlates of dispute escalation. They define escalation based upon the level of severity that a dispute reached, measured in terms of reciprocation by the target, uses of force by one or both sides, and various fatality levels. The predictors of escalation include the presence of joint democracy, whether the dispute was a territorial issue, the share of capabilities held by the initiator, the presence of a defense pact, and the status quo evaluation of both states. Braithwaite and Lemke structure the escalation process with common predictors of dispute onset and use a censored probit to jointly estimate onset and escalation. The dependent variables in the outcome equation (escalation) include whether the dispute was reciprocated by the target, whether the dispute reached a hostility level that included the use of force, whether both sides reached use of force, and three different dispute fatality levels (any military deaths, more than 250 military deaths, and 1,000 or more military deaths).⁷

Fatality and hostility levels are primary variables of interest in the MID project, and the esca-

⁷The independent variables used in the estimates are well described in Braithwaite and Lemke (2011). Dispute onset is predicted by the presence of contiguity (Stinnett et al. 2002), the presence of a rivalry (Thompson 2001), joint minor status in the dyad, the presence of a territorial claim (Huth and Allee 2002), the share of capabilities of the initiator (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972), joint satisfaction with the status quo (Signorino and Ritter 1999), the presence of a defense pact (Gibler and Sarkees 2004), and temporal controls for duration dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). The escalation equation omits several of these variables but adds whether one of the states in the dyadic dispute is fighting over a territorial issue (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).

Table 5: Re-analysis of Braithwaite and Lemke (2011, Table 1)

	(Model 1) Reciprocation	(Model 2) Use of Force	(Model 3) Mutual Force	(Model 4) Fatalities > 0	(Model 5) Fatalities > 250	(Model 6) Fatalities War
Joint democracy	0.240 (0.141)	-0.029 (0.162)	0.296 (0.161)	0.104 (0.156)	0.382 (0.255)	0.365 (0.261)
Territorial MID	0.549*** (0.115)	0.010 (0.127)	0.544*** (0.132)	0.413*** (0.116)	0.682*** (0.195)	0.635** (0.198)
Joint satisfaction	-0.043 (0.146)	-0.288 (0.171)	-0.488** (0.182)	-0.489** (0.181)	-0.055 (0.358)	0.265 (0.357)
Power preponderance	-0.345 (0.315)	0.089 (0.343)	0.127 (0.355)	-0.118 (0.356)	-0.257 (0.575)	0.016 (0.735)
Defense pact	-0.000 (0.124)	-0.018 (0.151)	0.321* (0.137)	0.171 (0.141)	-0.121 (0.369)	-0.475 (0.469)
Constant	0.881** (0.322)	0.433 (0.321)	-0.236 (0.353)	-0.325 (0.324)	-1.304** (0.460)	-1.751** (0.591)
Contiguous	1.080*** (0.060)	1.076*** (0.060)	1.077*** (0.060)	1.076*** (0.060)	1.072*** (0.060)	1.072*** (0.060)
Rivalry	0.733*** (0.083)	0.737*** (0.084)	0.737*** (0.083)	0.737*** (0.083)	0.739*** (0.083)	0.736*** (0.084)
Minor-minor	-0.632*** (0.051)	-0.645*** (0.051)	-0.635*** (0.051)	-0.637*** (0.051)	-0.645*** (0.051)	-0.645*** (0.051)
Joint democracy	-0.238*** (0.062)	-0.238*** (0.063)	-0.238*** (0.063)	-0.238*** (0.063)	-0.238*** (0.063)	-0.238*** (0.063)
Joint satisfaction	-0.014 (0.056)	-0.017 (0.056)	-0.015 (0.056)	-0.015 (0.056)	-0.017 (0.056)	-0.017 (0.056)
Territorial claim	0.476*** (0.071)	0.474*** (0.072)	0.477*** (0.071)	0.477*** (0.071)	0.476*** (0.071)	0.479*** (0.071)
Power preponderance	-0.326* (0.152)	-0.342* (0.153)	-0.329* (0.153)	-0.332* (0.153)	-0.342* (0.153)	-0.343* (0.153)
Defense pact	0.006 (0.063)	0.008 (0.064)	0.007 (0.064)	0.007 (0.064)	0.009 (0.064)	0.009 (0.064)
Peace years	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.150*** (0.157)	-2.128*** (0.158)	-2.146*** (0.158)	-2.142*** (0.158)	-2.128*** (0.158)	-2.127*** (0.158)
Rho	-0.373*** (0.071)	0.144* (0.072)	-0.241** (0.076)	-0.214** (0.071)	-0.345* (0.145)	-0.306 (0.181)
Stage 1 <i>N</i>	499,185	499,185	499,185	499,185	499,185	499,185
Stage 2 <i>N</i>	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

tion study provides an excellent vehicle for exploring whether our recommended changes are likely to alter findings related to these variables. In Table 5 we list the estimates of the same models as Braithwaite and Lemke (2011, Table 1) using the dispute data with our recommended changes. We highlight with shaded boxes any estimates that changed sign or gained or lost statistical significance (at $p < 0.05$) in the re-analysis.

Consistent with our earlier findings, there were no substantive changes from the original models predicting bilateral dispute onset. However, there were numerous changes across the outcome equations. Joint democracy was a statistically significant promoter of the use of force, mutual

use of force, and the escalation to war in Braithwaite and Lemke (2011, Table 1). That changes when using our revisions—the new estimates show no statistically significant result in either revised model. In the war equation the standard error is now almost as large as the coefficient. Very little theory suggests why joint democracy would escalate disputes to war, and our analyses are consistent with a selection effect in which democracies are unlikely to fight but have no consequential effect should fighting begin (Reed 2000).

Joint satisfaction is no longer statistically significant in three of the models—reciprocation, use of force by the initiator, and fatalities of 250 or more. Now, only mutual uses of force and fatal disputes are less likely when both states are satisfied with the status quo. Our changes also eliminate the statistical significance of power preponderance in one model (250+) but give defense pacts statistical significance in another model (mutual force).

We find important changes in the joint estimation of two models—the initial use of force and war outcome variables—and believe both changes are due to the elimination of several disputes from the dataset. First, the ρ estimate in Table 5 suggests that initiators are more likely to use force if the state does decide to start a dispute. We eliminated many cases that were not disputes but were originally coded as low-level threats and displays of force. Historical coverage was originally poor for many of these cases, and our expanded searches corrected the cases as lacking any militarized action. With these low-level cases omitted from the analyses, dispute initiations are relatively more likely to involve the use of force should disputes occur.

The second changed ρ also results from altering the treatment of several cases. The original data had nine cases of fatalities between democracies that reached 1,000 or more deaths; however, our bilateral data suggest only four cases should be present. Two changes were made by our data—MID#1293 between Poland and Lithuania should be merged with their earlier conflict because of continuous action, and MID#1786 double counts a British declaration of war on Finland and should be dropped. Two cases involve 1974 disputes between Greece and Turkey that did not end in war, though the Cyprus War is already in the data for that year. Similarly, Hungary declared war on Romania in 1944, but the fatalities are missing data in this dispute. Both were fighting in World War II, and that dispute was coded as having fatalities that crossed the war threshold. Changing the treatment of these cases eliminates the effect of joint democracy on escalation.

Our recommended changes alter the empirical predictors of escalation in a manner consistent

with existing theories of conflict. Though dyadic predictions of onset remain unchanged, we have evidence that relationships involving several different dispute characteristics may be altered, even among primary variables like fatality and hostility level. We explore the effects of our changes on other variables in the next replication when we re-examine the predictors of dispute duration.

Replication 2: Dispute Duration

Dispute end dates are one of the variables we found most likely to be either missing or miscoded, followed closely by start dates, so it makes sense to assess whether these changes affect our understanding of dispute duration. We do that in this section with a reanalysis of the [Gibler and Miller \(2013\)](#) study that examined the effects of contiguity, territory, and democracy on the length of a dispute. Their study was a response to the many arguments suggesting that democracies are good at selecting the disputes they escalate and fight shorter conflicts overall (see, for example, [Reiter and Stam 2002](#)).

Their estimation strategy used Ordinary Least Squares estimates of directed, dispute dyads from 1816 to 2001. The dependent variable was the length of each dispute, in days, and the predictors included dummy variables for the presence of a democratic initiator, a democratic target, contiguity, an alliance in the dyad, and whether the issue was territorial. They also included a continuous measure of capability share held by the initiator and two interaction terms—an interaction of democratic initiator and capabilities and an interaction of democratic initiator and contiguity.

We should note that we made one significant set of changes in how dates were treated in our reanalysis. Disputes with missing dates were omitted in the original study, but, based on our analysis of the dispute data, we were able to infer likely durations in these missing-day cases. There are 653 dyadic-dispute cases with at least one missing day: 234 cases have a missing start day, 187 have a missing end day, and 232 have both days listed as missing in disputes lasting less than one month. Based on our searches of historical records, we are confident that the cases in which both days are missing are cases in which an exact day could not be determined for when the militarized action occurred; we coded all these cases as one-day disputes. We coded disputes with missing start days as beginning on the first of the month, and we coded cases with missing end days as ending on the 30th of each month. As in the original study, we continued to omit the eight

cases that had missing start or end months.⁸ Our reanalysis of this study is presented in Table 6.

Consistent with the primary findings of [Gibler and Miller \(2013\)](#) our new estimates suggest that territorial disputes last much longer—an average of 70 days or thirty percent longer than other disputes, all else equal. This is actually a stronger result than what was found in the original study, which had a territorial dispute average of approximately 54 days. Again, too, the presence of a democratic initiator in the dispute has no effect. However, we do find three important changes in the new estimates. First, contiguity reverses signs (in two models) and is now a statistically significant—and negative—predictor of dispute length in all four models. Second, a challenge by a hegemon is now statistically significant and also negative; in the [Gibler and Miller \(2013\)](#) this variable was not significant at any conventional level. Third, the contiguity X democratic initiator interaction term is no longer statistically significant in the fourth model.

Our revised treatment of missing start and end days added 645 directed dispute dyads for analysis that were of very short duration. The vast majority of these cases, too, were disputes involving contiguous states, often in regions and time periods that had spotty contemporary coverage. Including these cases is important for understanding the effects of contiguity on dispute duration since their omission inflated the length of time contiguous states seemingly fought in the data.

None of the cases involving a hegemon had missing days. Instead, the changes resulted directly from our recommended changes to several US-initiated cases that proved highly influential in the [Gibler and Miller \(2013\)](#) study. The United States was on Side A for 94 disputes since 1945; Britain was also Side A for 94 disputes between 1816 and 1939. Our date changes actually increased the duration in 28 of the US cases and decreased the duration of only nine US cases. However, the changes for the latter nine were more substantial, including an end-date change of three years (MID#3551).⁹ Meanwhile, twenty-four British dispute durations increased for the period when they were considered hegemon (1816-1939), and twenty-five disputes shortened. However, the

⁸This treatment of missing dates re-introduces almost 650 additional dyadic-dispute cases into the analysis. Two hundred and thirty-two were already coded by CoW as being less than one month, and their exclusion can introduce important biases in the analysis as we demonstrate below. The remaining cases will, at worst, only be slightly altered (30 or fewer days duration) from the actual duration of the event, and we can find no correlation between this treatment and any variables of interest in the original study.

⁹CoW codes the end date for MID#3551 (a response to Yugoslav involvement in the Bosnian Civil War) as the 1996 passage of UN Resolution 1074 which declared an end to the blockade of Yugoslavia. However, blockades should be coded as six-month counts according to [Jones, Bremer and Singer \(1996, 176\)](#). A separate blockade by the United States started on May 1, 1993, and is coded by CoW as ending by a six-month count on November 1, 1993. That date should be the end date for the dispute. (Also, CoW erred when coding the year of the blockade in the incident data; the blockade began on November 21, 1992, not 1993.)

Table 6: Re-analysis of [Gibler and Miller \(2013, Table 3\)](#)

	Duration (days) of MID Initiated by State A			
	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)	(Model 4)
State A is democracy	7.158 (17.406)	6.214 (22.339)	53.043 (34.845)	53.059 (38.091)
State B is democracy	-67.323*** (16.252)	-67.441*** (16.348)	-68.067*** (16.256)	-68.065*** (16.349)
Territorial dispute	69.812*** (17.343)	69.788*** (17.350)	69.777*** (17.339)	69.777*** (17.346)
Contiguous dyad	-46.734** (16.292)	-47.312* (18.411)	-48.941** (16.353)	-48.932** (18.438)
Allied dyad	-83.280*** (20.032)	-83.266*** (20.036)	-82.195*** (20.040)	-82.195*** (20.044)
Initiator's capability share	18.048 (22.612)	18.149 (22.665)	36.945 (25.800)	36.944 (25.822)
Initiator is hegemon	-105.282** (34.615)	-104.809** (35.325)	-95.491** (35.202)	-95.498** (35.846)
Interaction Contiguity X State A is democracy		2.413 (35.779)		-0.037 (35.808)
Interaction Initiator capabilities X State A is democracy			-78.702 (51.779)	-78.705 (51.840)
Constant	239.611*** (17.603)	239.857*** (17.981)	230.903*** (18.509)	230.899*** (18.921)
<i>N</i>	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

changes were very similar in both types of cases, so we believe the sign change for the hegemon variable is due primarily to the changes made to the American dispute initiations, especially the revision of MID#3551 to be consistent with CoW MID coding rules.

These results demonstrate well the impact that changes in just a few cases can have on our inferences. We have also shown that how the data is treated matters greatly as well. Our final replication takes these points one step further by examining the studies that use dispute reciprocation as a dependent variable.

Replication 3: Reciprocation

During our research we consistently found the reciprocation variable to be poorly coded in the original data. This is important because several studies use reciprocation as a dependent variable to identify the potential for audience costs, which is one of the leading explanations for why democracies do not fight each other. In this final replication we revisit the [Weeks \(2008\)](#) study which itself is an extension of prior work by [Schultz \(2001a\)](#). Both of these studies argue that (1) disputes initiated by democracies are less likely to be reciprocated because they can credibly signal their intentions. Weeks takes this argument a step further and claims that (2) certain forms of non-democratic governments can credibly signal as well, and their disputes are also unlikely to be reciprocated.

The dependent variable in [Weeks \(2008\)](#) is reciprocation by the target of a dispute in a directed-dyad sample, and the period analyzed includes the years 1946 to 1999. The base predictor is the presence of a challenger that has been a democracy for at least two years. This variable is then compared to different types of autocratic regimes, as defined by [Geddes \(2004\)](#). The control variables include dummy variables for various status differentials in the dyad (major-major, minor-major, and major-minor), the share of capabilities held by the initiator, contiguity, an alliance in the dyad, the similarity of alliance portfolios between the two states, and the status quo evaluations of the challenger and target. Dummy variables for the revision type of the dispute are also included. The overall sample, predictors, and estimation strategy closely mirror the research design developed by [Schultz \(2001a\)](#), with the exception of the dummy variables for the many types of non-democratic governments. [Weeks \(2008\)](#) argues that comparing the reciprocation results for each of these categories to the base category of democracy, which is statistically significant, can establish whether

other forms of government also have audience costs. We replicated [Weeks \(2008\)](#) perfectly using her data, and below, in [Table 7](#), we present the re-analysis using our suggested MID changes.

Our MID changes alter three important results. First, the presence of a democratic challenger no longer has an effect. If audience costs are identified well by reciprocation, then democracies would seemingly have no signaling advantage over other types of regimes. The standard error of the democratic challenger variable is actually twenty times greater than the coefficient. Similarly, personalist regimes and the governments labeled by Polity IV as nondemocratic interregna both exhibit no differences when compared to the baseline of democracy in the second model. In fact, no regime type consistently predicts the likelihood of reciprocation by the target. Finally, contrary to the original study, the presence of a territorial issue is now statistically significant in both of the full-dispute models. Territorial disputes are more likely to be reciprocated by the target than other types of disputes, which is consistent with the numerous studies that establish the domestic salience of territorial issues.

We estimated additional models that constrained the original [Weeks \(2008\)](#) data to only those dispute cases in both datasets and found that our drop suggestions cause the change in the democratic initiator variable (the standard error becomes the same size as the coefficient). This finding echoes recent work by [Gibler and Hutchison \(2013\)](#) that found democratic audience costs in the reciprocation model were not consistent across dispute type. Clashes are more likely among less-developed non-democracies and are reciprocated by definition; meanwhile, seizures are often initiated by strong naval powers and are more often unreciprocated. Controlling for these two dispute types eliminated the effect of democracy in [Gibler and Hutchison \(2013, Table 1\)](#). Our research found that many cases originally coded as seizures were never protested. Clashes also tend to be information-poor cases, and our expanded research suggest a number of drops for these cases. Thus, either controlling for these cases or correctly applying MID coding rules produces the same effect, and democratic challengers have no reciprocation advantage.

While other regime-type variables also lost statistical significance due to the drop suggestions, personalist regimes remained more likely to be reciprocated in our smaller sample of disputes using original reciprocation coding. There are a total of 13 cases of personalist challengers with reciprocation coding changes in our sample; we suggest changing eight cases of no reciprocation and five cases of reciprocation. However, there is no ready category that easily describes these

Table 7: Re-analysis of Weeks (2008, Table 4)

	(Model 1) Nondemocracies base category	(Model 2) Democracies base category	(Model 3) Bilateral disputes only	(Model 4) Nondemocracies; personalists base
Democratic (<2 years)	-0.018 (0.210)			
Personalist		0.407 (0.249)	0.441 (0.232)	
Single-party		-0.179 (0.273)	0.130 (0.289)	-0.729** (0.268)
Military		0.254 (0.395)	0.373 (0.400)	-0.159 (0.386)
Hybrid		0.137 (1.281)	0.371 (0.978)	-0.281 (1.324)
Mixed nondemocratic		-0.430 (0.285)	-0.323 (0.256)	-0.782** (0.247)
Dynastic Monarchy		-0.052 (0.642)	0.075 (0.660)	-0.535 (0.625)
Nondynastic Monarchy		0.359 (0.453)	0.670 (0.462)	-0.124 (0.429)
Nondemocratic interregna		0.092 (0.248)	0.154 (0.236)	-0.344 (0.208)
New democracy		0.519 (0.364)	0.545 (0.370)	
Polity score				-0.008 (0.016)
Major-Major	-0.102 (0.325)	0.165 (0.355)	0.048 (0.397)	0.394 (0.431)
Minor-Major	-0.243 (0.259)	-0.168 (0.263)	0.162 (0.268)	0.075 (0.290)
Major-Minor	0.224 (0.225)	0.414 (0.259)	0.266 (0.277)	0.475 (0.321)
Initiator capabilities share	-0.297 (0.255)	-0.264 (0.260)	-0.312 (0.282)	-0.335 (0.306)
Contiguity	0.421** (0.158)	0.442** (0.167)	0.683*** (0.178)	0.710*** (0.191)
Ally	0.035 (0.175)	-0.009 (0.177)	0.014 (0.188)	-0.088 (0.196)
Alliance portfolio similarity	0.266 (0.241)	0.335 (0.241)	0.474 (0.265)	0.338 (0.306)
SQ evaluation initiator	0.416 (0.300)	0.448 (0.329)	0.560 (0.362)	0.316 (0.451)
SQ evaluation target	-0.224 (0.290)	-0.179 (0.290)	-0.362 (0.330)	-0.224 (0.363)
Territory	0.475* (0.189)	0.452* (0.189)	0.179 (0.194)	0.291 (0.215)
Government/ regime	0.606 (0.372)	0.575 (0.368)	-0.008 (0.404)	0.618 (0.397)
Policy	-0.973*** (0.174)	-0.930*** (0.177)	-1.210*** (0.171)	-1.109*** (0.187)
Other	-1.082** (0.346)	-1.054** (0.359)	-1.313*** (0.365)	-0.937* (0.397)
Constant	0.162 (0.293)	-0.046 (0.363)	-0.392 (0.357)	0.333 (0.377)
N	1,361	1,361	1,086	1,064

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

cases. One dispute was originally coded incorrectly as an unreciprocated clash (MID#1382),¹⁰ but we found no evidence of reciprocation in two other cases coded originally as clashes and change their highest action to shows of force. Overall, the thirteen cases seem to all be cases of incorrect original coding of information-poor cases. These are the cases that alter the inferences we drew from the original study.

Finally, for the territorial dispute variable, there are 23 reciprocation changes in the sample. Eighteen no reciprocation cases change, and five reciprocation cases actually had no response from the challenger. Most numerous among these changes are shows of force and threats that were actually part of larger conflicts that included responses from the target—this accounts for nine cases recoded as reciprocated. Two cases again had clashes that were coded as unreciprocated, but there were no other patterns across changes. There were also no patterns among the action categories that can describe the changes to no reciprocation.

Audience cost is an elusive concept to identify empirically (Schultz 2001b), and both Schultz (2001a) and Weeks (2008) were incredibly creative to use dispute reciprocation as a possible measure. However, our re-analysis suggests that there are no regime-based differences in dispute reciprocation, and prior findings may be based largely on poorly coded data. Reciprocation never seemed to be a primary variable for the MID project, and these results confirm that. Nevertheless, we want to still emphasize that our results do not necessarily invalidate the work using other measures of audience costs. Weeks (2014), for example, has demonstrated in numerous ways that there may be differences across regime types in how domestic politics affects the ability of leaders to challenge and signal internationally. Instead, our results suggest that reciprocation is governed mostly by issue type and the types of challenges that are made.

Summary and Moving Forward

We remain amazed that the original coders were able to develop such an incredibly useful dataset of interstate conflict in an era without access to internet searches, electronic newspaper databases, or powerful personal computers. The original coders systematically captured over 2,000 instances of

¹⁰As per Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004, 173), clashes are “outbreak(s) of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members, in which the initiator may or may not be clearly identified.” That the initiator cannot be determined implies that both states are fighting, and the dispute is reciprocated.

militarized conflict since 1816, most often providing enough detailed and extensive information for us to deconstruct their coding decisions. Nevertheless, this replication process has revealed several noteworthy issues with the dataset.

Our replication attempts have forced us to recommend coding changes to a large majority of the dispute cases in the dataset, approximately a fifth of which require major changes to the data. These changes may have substantial effects on existing studies, as we have documented. The predictors of interstate conflict seem to be unchanged after introducing our many revisions. This is the structure of conflict that is largely determined by the number of observations and the care that CoW used in identifying its primary variable—the existence of an interstate conflict. What does change, however, is our understanding of what goes on once a dispute begins. We found substantial changes in studies that examine dispute escalation, dispute duration, and dispute reciprocation; in the last case, our revisions actually eliminate the statistical significance of the primary variables of interest—regime differences in the likelihood of dispute challenges being reciprocated.

For the sake of transparency, we summarize all recommended changes and disaggregate the most severe changes concerning conflict intensity and dispute ending measures in Appendix IID to this article. We provide detailed narratives for all cases we could not be found (Appendix IIA), cases we recommend to drop (Appendix IIB), and cases for which new information substantiated a merge of two or more disputes (Appendix IIC). We also provide, in Appendix I, a discussion of several issues we identified when replicating and coding the original dataset. All of these are available as part of this manuscript, and we also provide a new dataset that incorporates all of our suggested changes.

We also provide, with release of this work, several new variables for interested users to more easily account for potentially problematic groups of disputes in the data and to gain more utility from the dataset. We include whether the dispute involved a seizure, had a six-month count to end the dispute, or involved the Tanker War. Our data also disaggregates each dispute according to which states were actively fighting each other. Finally, we have compiled a comprehensive bibliography for the dataset, with entries for each dispute case (Appendix IIF). We provide this data with the hope that scholars will carefully use the dataset and consider the different types of cases that meet the definition of militarized incidents according to CoW coding rules.

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Appendix I—Unpacking the Coding of the Original MID Dataset

We use this appendix to briefly discuss some of the issues we encountered when replicating the original MID data. We first discuss issues related to source information and then turn to several issues related to implementation of the MID coding rules. In each section we highlight how these issues may affect various uses of the final dataset.

Reliance on Introductory Texts

MIDs that occurred later in the 20th century were typically coded with the assistance of the *New York Times*, Keesings or resources like Lexis-Nexis in MID3. Earlier cases often relied on single sources—mostly introductory history books. After looking through the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set for some time, it becomes fairly easy to predict which sources were used, given the MID participants and the time frame.

For example, if a MID involved borders in a South American state in the 19th century, it was likely covered exclusively by Gordon Ireland (1938).¹ Brazil and Great Britain had several disputes through the 19th century over the slave trade. Alan Manchester (1964) covered all those cases. If the unification of Italy was the broader topic, Bolton King (1934) is the source. Disputes related to the Ottoman Empire’s status as “the sick man of Europe” in the 19th century were almost always covered by William Miller (1913, later recompiled in 1966). This source is used to code most of the MIDs in the Greece-Turkey dyad that coincided with the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire. Langer’s famous encyclopedia (1972) is cited for a variety of disputes, often becoming an important source for affairs involving European powers in the Middle East and Central Asia. Robert Burr (1965) covered almost all Chilean disputes that led to and included the War of the Pacific. Disputes over debt obligations in the Caribbean, a conspicuous dispute type in early 20th century foreign policy in the Caribbean, were coded using Munro (1964).

There are plenty of citations to what appear to be introductory history books beyond these general historical textbooks. CoW used Akagi’s (1936) “short history” of Japanese foreign relations from 1542 to 1936 to source several disputes involving Japan, especially those concerning Japan’s imperial ambitions in the early 20th century. Munro (1960) has a “brief” history of the Latin American states that the MID project cites for several Latin American disputes. Venezuelan disputes, typically not involving the Aves Island (see: Ireland 1938), are cited using Guillermo Moron’s (1964) brief book simply titled *A History of Venezuela*.

That is not to say that these sources are useless. To the contrary, scholars like Gordon Ireland have been indispensable to our project. However, overuse of specific sources can be problematic. Gordon Ireland is useful for detail in cases involving borders in Central and South America. Yet, as rich in detail as Ireland is, he lacks scope and makes little progress toward synthesizing the wealth of information he has.² Use of sources such as Ireland (1938) or MacKerras’s (1982) chronology of Chinese history comes at the expense of scope. The exclusive use of a source that is little more than a deluge of dates and facts may leave a coder unable to see the larger context of interstate relations, including the duration of the dispute, its outcome and settlement, and the issue(s) under contention. These sources also tend to provide broad historical trends, jumping around the timeline of the events, rather than focusing on specific information about the conflicts themselves.

This is especially for true several cases that use the *New York Times* exclusively to code a dispute. The *New York Times* is fantastic for pinpointing specific dates. However, the more

¹The same author was likely the exclusive source for similar disputes in Central America (Ireland 1941).

²This same comment also holds for some cases involving William Langer’s encyclopedia. Such condensed information can be misleading in a case like MID#0163.

protracted and complicated the dispute is, the less useful the *New York Times* is. Consider the case of MID#1262. CoW-MID says MID#1262 is a Serbian/Greek/Italian occupation of Albania near the end of World War I. However, this was part of the broader World War I effort, for which several of the occupying powers already had a presence in Albania. Coding it as a yield in one month by Albania ignores how the topic of Albania was important at the Paris Peace Conference and how the United States played an important role in saving Albania as an independent state. The only winner from this was Serbia, which began a colonization of Kosovo. France eventually left and the Italians were forcibly expelled by the Albanians by 1920. This broader context is difficult to discern when using the *New York Times*.

Roy Akagi's (1936) book on Japanese foreign relations provides another illustration of the problem that comes from using a single source to code a dispute or a series of disputes in a dyad. Akagi is cited 24 times for MIDs involving Japan in version 2.1 of the MID data set.³ Akagi makes little reference to the 1872 "Maria Luz incident". Herein, Japan impounded a Peruvian slavership that docked in Yokohama following a storm. Additional sources consulted corroborated our idea that this is a MID, and one involving a politically irrelevant dyad. Japan detained the ship after discovering it was engaging in the slave trade, reasoning that it fell under their jurisdiction by docking in Yokohama. Peru later responded with a threat to support their claims for indemnity with force, but ultimately acquiesced when the British informed the Peruvians that they were in the area and would be waiting for their warships. Peru yielded, choosing a diplomatic option that ultimately made Peru the first South American state to open relations with Japan (Ward, Prothero and Leathes 1910, Gardiner 1975, Edstrom 2002, Meagher 2008). Akagi (1936, 74-77) also mentions this incident, but spares the necessary details that would make this incident constitute a MID. This demonstrates another pitfall of relying on a single source, often introductory history books, for coding disputes for a state system member. If an incident is not omitted outright, it may not be given the appropriate treatment in a single book and can lead us to make an incorrect decision regarding data points.

Heterogeneity of Source Information; or, Trusting the China-Russia Dyad

Several dyads in the MID data set are complicated. Many of these, such as the Poland-Lithuania and Poland-Russia dyads in the wake of World War I, had coding decisions that did not withstand further scrutiny. The Italy-Ethiopia dyad tends to lack quality information, even when it is obvious what both sides are disputing. Nevertheless, one dyad was conspicuous from beginning to end: the China-Russia dyad. Simply put, this dyad had far more bizarre coding decisions than any other dyad in the data set.

Unlike several other countries and dyads, disputes involving China featured quality scholarship from multiple sources on the history of China vis-a-vis Japan and the European powers. However, two books in particular were cited indiscriminately in coding Chinese relations with Russia and create multiple problems when evaluating the conflict data for that particular dyad. Both are books written in Chinese and are rare finds in libraries across the United States. They are given in the MID2.1.SpecificSources.csv file as Fu Sunming's (1982) *A Brief History of Russian Aggression of China* and Guo Tingyi's (1955) *A Outline History of the Russian Imperialist Aggression of China*.⁴ Despite the plethora of other books used to code other disputes involving China, these two books were often exclusive sources for much of the Sino-Russian dyad, especially disputes in Xinjiang.

³These cases are often listed as being complemented by other sources. However, our review suggests that, while multiple sources can be listed as supportive information, usually only one source was used for coding the dispute.

⁴These serve as more examples of the previous point about use of introductory history books.

Our translations of these texts revealed several peculiarities. First, disputes that listed these books just did not have the available information to corroborate the details of the corollary data that has been made available to the public. In several cases we recommended dropping entire disputes or merging them with other related MIDs that are coded as separate but occurring at the same time and over the same issue. Second, both sources were politically charged. The Fu Sunming source, which was published after the Sino-Soviet split, was particularly egregious in its treatment of events, but both sources had strong pro-Chinese biases which the coders did not seem to balance with available Russian or Soviet sources. Regardless, the first problem was more extensive since even much of the biased historical accounts contained little corroboration of the events that had been coded for the dyad.

The variety of issues contested by both sides is a peculiar difficulty in evaluating disputes in the China-Russia dyad. Disputes erupted between China and Russia over the area of the Ili Valley in Xinjiang in the latter parts of the nineteenth century. Likewise, China's northern hinterland (areas like Mongolia and Tuva) became important foreign policy issues for both states around the time the Qing Dynasty collapsed. Russia gradually encroached in Manchuria, establishing the Chinese Eastern Railway. This issue in Manchuria led to several peculiar coding decisions. For example, it was difficult to dissociate MID#1142 from MID#1143. Both are apparently over issues in Manchuria and occur when China had used the aftermath of the Russian Revolution to expel the Russians from its northeastern territories and from the railway zone. However, MID#1142 had the effect of demilitarizing the Russian presence and evicting them from the important city of Harbin. MID#1143, which follows it, appears to be China seizing the assets of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Thankfully, these are two disputes that cite additional sources, but both books cited by the MID project for these two disputes (Pollard 1970, Leong 1976) do not support the coding of an independent MID between China and Russia on this issue after the conclusion of MID#1142.

While the lack of quality information in the more remote conflicts in Sino-Russian relations is a problem for the MID data, the prevalence of quality information in some of the more prominent MIDs led to a new problem. Consider again MID#1142 and also MID#2182. MID#1142 cites Pollard (1970) and Leong (1976) while MID#2182 cites Akagi (1936), MacKerras (1982) and the New York Times.⁵ They have no overlapping sources even though the time period, issues, and events likely overlap. Upon further inspection, MID#1142 and MID#2182 are most likely the same dispute: the Harbin Crisis of 1917. Here, the Chinese used the pretext of the Russian Revolution a month preceding the dispute to force the Russian military out of Harbin. The only difference in these two disputes is that MID#2182 does not have exact dates and codes the dispute as a clash, whereas MID#1142 assumes it is a one-sided attack. In this case, using multiple sources led to a different problem: coding the same dispute twice.⁶

Overall, we believe there is substantial spatial and temporal clustering in the quality of coding decisions in the original data. These are not necessarily determined by time period, Western versus non-Western states, or any other predictor besides information consulted. When the original coders had several quality sources available, the original dataset was easily replicated.

Six-Month Counts and Information-Poor MIDs

Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) detail several coding rules for how to determine the end dates of disputes. One of these coding rules concerns what CoW-MID calls "continuous military actions" (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 175-176). Per CoW-MID, sub-war militarized interstate

⁵Akagi does not actually reference this dispute at all.

⁶We actually found quite a few cases of the same dispute being counted two or even three times. This may happen when different sources are used or when regions and dyads are divided among coders.

disputes involving “continuous military actions”—like a blockade, a seizure of personnel, or a show of force—end six months after the start of the continuous military action in the absence of additional militarized incidents. This coding rule makes sense at first glance. A continuous action like a blockade or a seizure of disputed personnel becomes a new status quo after some point—six months according to CoW. The Anglo-French blockade of the Río de la Plata lasted for five years (1845-1850), though the nature of the blockade becomes a new status quo for Argentina as it works for other means to restore Manuel Oribe to power in Uruguay. Thus, MID#0123, which captures this dispute, lasts just six months from the start of the blockade rather than extend for over five years. This coding rule for “continuous military actions” allows CoW to isolate active belligerence in ongoing disputes from the status quo.

Our review suggests this coding rule also gave rise to the prominence of what we call the “six-month count”. These disputes have a duration equal to six-months, as outlined in Jones, Bremer and Singer’s (1996) coding procedures. They do not always have unknown start and end dates, but in many cases they do. These “six-month counts” are conspicuous in the data set for being information-poor or questionable cases for inclusion in the data set. They are class of observations in the MID data set with just one militarized incident, broadly labeled as a “continuous military action” with an incident as vague as a show of force (for example). They typically rely on just one source, which is usually light on details. Ultimately, many of these “six-month counts” are difficult to replicate with the use of additional sources and their inclusion into the data set is difficult to justify.

We provide MID#1597 as a case in point. MID#1597 is a Peruvian invasion of Colombian-held Tarapaca, lasting from an unknown date in April, 1899 to an unknown date in October of that same year. Amid growing unrest in Bogota, the Colombian troops in Tarapaca (in Colombia’s Amazonian region) were recalled and redirected to Bogota. With the Colombian garrison gone, Peru occupied the disputed territory. Given the area, the time frame, and the events in Bogota, it is highly unlikely the Colombians even knew about this when it happened. The fact that MID cites Galvez (1920, 82-83) *exclusively* for this MID makes it all the more problematic. Galvez does not provide a single date in his three sentences on the dispute. Since the civil conflict referenced is the “Thousand Days War”, the more likely start date is sometime in October 1899. The incident is decidedly obscure, minor, in a forlorn part of the globe and with only three sentences available to describe it.⁷ Thus, it becomes a six-month count, albeit one with possibly flipped start/end dates and no specific days.

On a related point, disputes with unknown start/end dates tend to be information-poor even if the dispute is not coded as a six-month count. Consider MID#1162, another Colombia-Peru MID that again relies on a few sentences from Galvez (1920, 75) as the sole source for the dispute. This is a two month dispute in 1913 with unknown days, where a retreat of Peruvian troops from settlements in the Putumayo region seems to constitute a Colombian victory in a MID. However, Galvez’ wording is vague and scarce with details. His account could not be corroborated elsewhere. A reading into the broader situation at the time leaves open the possibility that Peru recalled its garrison there as part of ongoing diplomatic efforts with Colombia (De La Pedraja 2006, 89-92). This is not just a problem for MIDs citing such an obscure source originally published in Spanish. Disputes with no given start/end dates tend to lack quality information. It is difficult to correct even with the information glut we have now.

⁷The quality of the MID data deteriorates appreciably when the conflict is in a more remote part of the globe. MID#1128 involving the expanding Saudi state and North Yemen is a perfect example of this.

Coding Criteria for Seizures and State Self-Selection from Disputes

Coding seizures is largely an application of the sixth incident-coding rule provided in Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996, 169-170). Careful to isolate militarized incidents involving official forces of at least two state system members (the first incident-coding rule), incidents that solely concern private property are generally not included in the data set. Exceptions are made, however, for seizures in disputed territory or when the “targeted” state responds to the seizure with its own militarized incident or files a diplomatic protest. Table 3 in Jones et al. (1996) introduces another coding rule for seizures that was not elaborated in the rest of their article: seizures must last at least twenty-four hours in order to be included in the data set.⁸

There are 305 disputes in the MID dataset for which the highest action coded is a seizure—that is over 13% of the entire dataset from 1816 to 2001. Our review encountered several issues surrounding these cases, and we recommend that 53 of them be dropped from the data set for not meeting MID criteria for militarized incidents. Six of the twenty cases we could not find were also seizures. In total, then, we believe that approximately 20% of the seizures should not be in the dataset according to the MID coding rules.⁹

We can infer the original coders’ likely goal was to include seizures that become militarized interstate disputes—the seizures of the USS *Pueblo* (MID#0347) and the HMS *Trent* (MID#0225), for example—with other, similar cases of international, militarized conflict that brought states to the brink of further escalation. Not included in the concept are those many seizures that are never an issue between the involved states. A recent impounding of over 300 American and Canadian ships by the Mexican government on November 26, 2013, provides a nice example of these cases. These seizures by the Mexican Hacienda (its version of the American Internal Revenue Service) were of boats that largely belonged to retirees and boating enthusiasts who did not have proper identification numbers on their vessels. The boat owners protested for being held in a state of limbo for several months, but the United States and Canada never protested these seizures as violations of any treaty or law. The MID dataset does not include these cases because they are a domestic, civil matter in Mexico and not a form of international conflict.

In our review we found several cases that resemble the recent boating seizures in Mexico, rather than the seizure of the HMS *Trent* that almost brought the United Kingdom to war with the United States. For example, MID#0601 was a case in which an American fishing boat accidentally drifted into Peruvian territorial waters. It was escorted into Talara by two Peruvian gunboats but released without fines and without protest from the United States government. Similarly, MID#1164 was a case in which a ship of Catholic missionaries from Brazil was detained by Peru for five days. We found no evidence of diplomatic protest by Brazil, and our analysis of the historical record of the case suggested a protest over such a minor issue by Brazil would have been unlikely. MID#2813 codes an Argentinian seizure of a Japanese fishing boat proximate to the Falklands in 1987. Japan’s government took the position that it was wrong to have been in Argentina’s economic zone without permission and apologized for the illegal fishing. Without protest by Side B, disputes like these are

⁸An additional coding rule concerns the overall length of the dispute. Seizures are understood by Jones et al. Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996, 175-176) to be “continuous actions” subject to a six-month count from the date of the incident if the seizure lasts longer than six months. If, for example, a ship from State B was seized by State A and held for a year, the MID between State A and State B lasts six months from the date of the seizure. Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004, 148) change this duration to three days when no further information about the seizure is available.

⁹We also recommend that analyses of international conflict should still include controls for the presence of a seizure in the dispute. The original coders were obviously correct that many of these are similar to the vast majority of militarized disputes, but there are also a large number of seizures that are qualitatively different from the rest of the dataset.

not codeable incidents and entail no foreign policy implications for either state. These were not seizures that merit inclusion according to MID coding rules.

With advances in technology since the original coding decisions were made, we were also often better able to determine the total duration of a seizure. For example, we recommend dropping MID#1417 because Togo's arrest of two Ghanaian police officers did not last twenty-four hours, nor was Ghana's response (a border-closing) a blockade as originally coded. We were able to determine that a Guinean seizure of a U.S. diplomat (Robinson McIlvaine) in 1966 lasted less than 24 hours and recommended dropping the case from the data set. The 1959 Danish boarding of the Red Crusader (MID#2883) did not last twenty-four hours, and several disputes coded as Israeli seizures of materiel or citizens reported en route to Palestine or otherwise entering airspace during tense relations with Egypt (e.g. MID#2327, MID#2831, MID#2917) did not last twenty-four hours, nor were they protested or reciprocated by target governments like Turkey, Cyprus, or Spain.

One final issue with seizures involves state self-selection out of disputes. The Russia-Japan dyad from 1952 to 1967 offers a prime example of this as we recommend dropping four disputes involving Russian seizures of Japanese fishing vessels (MID#2882, MID#2893, MID#2903, MID#2911). The issue was the same across all four cases: territorial control of the Kuril Islands that Japan lost to Russia at the end of World War II. In each case, Russia impounded one or more Japanese fishing boats caught fishing in what was previously Japanese territory, and Japan offered no militarized response and gave no diplomatic protest of these seizures.

Though Japan has long held that the interpretations of the post-war order drawn at Yalta and San Francisco did not apply to Japanese sovereignty over this chain of islands, it also was aware of its military weaknesses. Hamstrung by American diplomatic pressure, a U.S. military presence remaining in Japan, and the terms of the 1947 constitution imposed on it by the United States, Japan had few resources to revise the status quo or even militarize these incidents. Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that Japan would not militarize minor incidents. By not protesting or even responding to these, Japan self-selected itself out of militarized disputes. These examples are just several of the many cases in which seizures were never officially protested, and we recommend dropping these cases to ensure consistency with the MID coding rules.

Submarine Attack MIDs and World War II

We noticed a pattern emerge among MIDs involving Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy during World War II. These MIDs, approximately 34 total, were characterized by submarine attacks by the two Axis powers against pro-British shipping interests in the Mediterranean off Italy, off Palestine, and, especially, the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of the United States. There were several curiosities evident in our evaluation of the source material used by the MID project and the coding decisions that followed.

First, in a manner similar to disputes involving seizures, we rarely observed evidence of protest. There were a few reasons for this. For one, these MIDs were coded almost exclusively using the *New York Times*, with coverage that mentioned these incidents only in passing. The news reports documenting these incidents were confined to a few sentences, leaving open the important question of whether Side B in the incident protested Germany or Italy's actions. Per the sixth incident coding-rule in [Jones, Bremer and Singer \(1996\)](#), this is a necessary condition for attacks on international shipping. It was difficult to find evidence of diplomatic protest outside the sources the MID project used. The *New York Times* almost always was light on detail.

We believe there is also a decision-making calculus by Side B in these cases that can account for the rare observation of militarized response or diplomatic protest by Side B. Like the curious

case of ship seizures involving Russia and Japan in the Kuriles shortly after Japan's re-entry into the international system in 1952, we suspect that Side B in these disputes is making conscious decisions to select itself *from* a militarized confrontation with the Axis powers. Consider the case of Portugal, which was most frequently coded as the target of the submarine attacks during World War II. Portugal was cross-pressured at the time. The Estado Novo regime governing Portugal at the time was pro-fascist but also a long-standing strategic ally of Britain. As a result, Portugal vowed neutrality during the conduct of World War II to the point of shipping resources to both its ally and Nazi Germany.

The submarine attacks by Germany that followed against Portuguese shipments to the United Kingdom put Salazar in the difficult spot of having to make a diplomatic issue of a series of attacks intended to coerce more pro-Nazi behavior from his regime. If Salazar yielded to German pressure to stop shipping goods to Portugal's longstanding strategic ally, it invited a reprisal from the British and the possible termination of its centuries-old alliance. If Salazar opted to sever ties with Germany as a response to these Uboat attacks, he may risk a German invasion. If Salazar protested, or responded militarily in any respect, he could expect a further escalation of these incidents from Hitler.

As a result, Portugal took no action each time in order to avoid a militarized dispute. A diligent application of CoW's own coding rules would capture what Salazar was trying to do. Salazar was selecting Portugal *from* a dispute with Nazi Germany. However, an inconsistent application of CoW's coding rules over attacks on international shipping would include a series of incidents that Portugal (Side B) never entertained escalating toward active combat.

This same decision-making process can be inferred in Panama, itself a frequent target of these submarine attacks ostensibly because of how valuable the Panama Canal was to international commerce for the Allied states. If Panama made an issue of these incidents, it could only expect more of them. In every application, we could not find evidence of a militarized response if it was not coded as such in the data set. Only Brazil seemed to make an issue of these submarine attacks on its international shipping interests, which precipitated its foray into active combat in World War II. Other states, like the aforementioned cases of Portugal and Panama, seemed too reluctant to follow Brazil's lead.

This class of MIDs raised another issue about accepting a source like the *New York Times* at face value in coding MIDs during the world wars. Our other reservations about newspaper sources concern how light newspapers are on details and how they make us unable to see the forest for the trees, no matter how objective and politically neutral newspaper sources are. In this case, we do question the objectivity and political neutrality of the *New York Times*. Consider the case of MID#3837 as an illustration. MID#3837 is coded as an Italian submarine attack on the Spanish ship Monte Moncayo on October 1, 1940. The British source used in the *New York Times* report, which spoke "authoritatively" of this Italian attack, was doing so during a time when the Axis states were trying to negotiate Spanish entry into World War II on their side. We now know that there were no Allied or Axis submarines in the vicinity of the Monte Moncayo when it was sunk and that it is much more likely the ship was sunk by a mine. In this case, the Allies were using newspapers as a form of propaganda to make Franco reconsider Spanish entry into World War II. We recommend dropping this particular MID. We also recommend dropping all attacks on shipping that were not protested, which is consistent with the coding rules described by Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) (again, see Appendix B for a discussion of our drop recommendations).

Joins Ongoing War and War Declaration MIDs

MIDs for which the highest level of action coded was “joins ongoing war” or “declaration of war” constitute another conspicuous pattern in the data. There were 86 of these in the dataset, almost all of them coinciding with World War II. Our comment about these MIDs is not that they were incorrectly coded, per the terms of Jones, Bremer and Singer’s (1996) article. Rather, many of these disputes do not seem to be MIDs as we would consider them when conceptualizing militarized interstate conflict short of war. Most of these disputes, definitely the “declaration of war” MIDs largely associated with World War II, do little to capture the concept of active belligerence and are instead more akin to broken diplomatic relations.

These disputes follow deliberate coding rules given in Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996). The fourth dispute-coding rule given by the authors treats the aggregation of incidents into disputes differently for disputes that end in war. This allows for “joins ongoing war” to be the highest level of action for dispute participants. Thus, a dispute like MID#0339 ends in “joins ongoing war” because an American-Japanese dispute over Japanese incursions into Thailand, then the last independent country in Southeast Asia, was followed over a year and a half later by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This led to the entry of the United States into the ongoing World War II.

The presence of “declaration of war” MIDs associated with World War II, and World War I to a lesser extent, appear to follow a particular wording of part of this same dispute-coding rule.¹⁰

In cases when war intervention occurs six months or more after the start of the war, a separate militarized interstate dispute exists between the war belligerent and the other state up to its official entry in the ongoing war; thereafter, all actions are coded as part of the ongoing war (p. 176).

This coding rule could be interpreted in multiple ways, but CoW-MID’s intent can be inferred from an evaluation of the data set. CoW-MID understands a declaration of war from a country like Panama against Germany, Italy, and Japan (MID#3525) as starting a separate dispute and not as Panama joining the ongoing MID (MID#0258) with a token declaration of war. In reality, a host of Latin American countries “joined” World War II in the immediate wake of the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base but took no militarized action against the Axis thereafter and did not actively participate in the war. We would not interpret these countries as each, individually, starting new disputes with the Axis Powers (or even separate disputes with each Axis Power in some cases). Nonetheless, this coding rule creates the interesting case of multiple disputes surrounding decisions to enter World War II, even if entering the war meant diplomatic shows of support.

Finally, these war-declaration disputes feature other characteristics that make them less a militarized interstate dispute as we would understand it. For example, a country like Liberia was not actually at war with Germany, let alone Japan, in 1944 (MID#3526). With no material issue between Liberia and these two Axis countries, or experiencing any direct threat to its sovereignty from Germany or Japan, Liberia instead positioned itself as a waiting recipient of American aid and the development of Liberian naval ports if it made a token declaration of war. Almost all of the declarations of war from the Latin American states against the Axis came the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rather than actively signaling an intent to join the war against the Axis, the Latin American states appear to be following the lead of the United States so as to not provoke the American government. The nine declarations of war in 1945 from countries in other

¹⁰It is not clear from our reading of Jones, Bremer, and Singer’s article why a declaration of war should be understood as a “continuous action”. Many of these war-declaration disputes are six-month counts that follow the observation of a “continuous military action”, or are disputes that would be six-month counts if not for the conclusion of the war in 1945.

regions came on the heels of communication from the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, that only those countries actively “at war” with the remnants of the Axis would be allowed to participate in the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, which chartered the United Nations in April 1945. Based on our review of the data, we believe that dataset users should conduct robustness checks of their analyses by either omitting cases that are coded as ‘joins ongoing war’ or “declaration of war”, or by included dummies for each category in the analysis.

The Iran-Iraq Tanker War

We should highlight one last set of peculiar cases in the dataset—those cases involving Iranian or Iraqi attacks on oil tankers during their war in the 1980s. We identified 90 disputes that involved Iraq or Iran firing on suspected oil shipments, and almost two-thirds of these cases (59 in all) last only for the day of attack. Side B of the disputes were coded based on the registries of these ships, so countries such as Liberia, India, Norway, Cyprus, the Bahamas, Panama, etc, are all coded as actively engaged in conflict with either Iraq or Iran.

In most cases these disputes were coded properly according to Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) rules: there was an attack on shipping that was protested by Side B. Nevertheless, the sheer number of Tanker-War cases—4.4% of disputes in the pre-1993 data are Iraqi or Iranian tanker attacks—may introduce certain pathologies into the data. We strove to be consistent with the original coding rules, and we, therefore, recommend keeping these cases in the dataset. However, we have also added a dummy variable to our own dataset that is coded positively when Iraq or Iran attacks an oil tanker registered to a non-participant during their bilateral war. We believe users of the data should control for these peculiar cases.

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Appendix IIA—Cases that could not be found

Report on Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) that could not be replicated. In most cases, we provide a short narrative as it relates to the countries and dates described in the MID data.

MID#1058

There is no record of a seizure by Thailand against Italy. Italy withdrew from the Axis powers in early September of 1943, and it is possible that Thai forces responded with some sort of seizure of Italian property or personnel. However, there is no historical evidence of this available.

MID#1684

This case grew out of Italy's concern, beginning in early August of 1939, about the growing German and Russian influence in the Balkan states, as well as Hungary and Danzig, at the beginning of the Second World War. Concerns appeared to be quelled in February 1940, when cultural accords were signed between the two countries, and the accords were "couched in the warmest tones heard since the war apparently caused some discord in the Axis." There is no evidence of a show of force by Italy targeting Germany during the period of this case, August 1939 to February 1940. The two states were allied and fighting together.

MID#1726

Moreno (listed CoW source) does not mention this dispute. There actually does not seem to be any reference to Argentina at all (since the book covers Central America). This is the only CoW source for this dispute, and there is no other evidence of a dispute in 1916 between France and Argentina.

If the dispute is anything, it is a momentary seizure of Argentinean cargo en route to Germany during World War I. Argentina was an important player in the world market for some grains and beef and was a trading partner of Germany in particular. However, it is unclear how France could be in a position to detain Argentinean cargo en route for Germany unless the detention occurred in Morocco. A search for that did not produce results. CoW's source citation did not apply to this dispute. Finally, even if there is evidence of a detention, additional coding rules about seizures still apply (24 hour rule, protest, et cetera).

MID#1735

CoW's source, the annual register, provides no information on this dispute. There are hostilities in Greece during this time, and Canning comes to Greece to discuss the conflict in September. However, there is no information about a possible dispute between the Ottomans and any of the Italian territories during this period.

MID#1900

The details of this case mirror those of the Red Crusader seizure (MID#2883), except the month is listed as March instead of May. No information could be found regarding any Danish seizures of British shipping on or around this date. Too, the reports of the Red Crusader incident do not mention a previous seizure anytime near this date.

MID#2012

MID#2012 is a bilateral dispute between Argentina and Paraguay from unknown days in December 1850 to January 1851. It is coded as a blockade by Argentina (Side A), reciprocated with an occupation of territory by Argentina. It ends in a yield by Paraguay. It is coded using Gilbert Phelps' (1975) *Tragedy of Paraguay* and Harris G. Warren's (1949) *Paraguay: An Informal History*. However, there is no discernible evidence to corroborate the coding of this dispute as originally presented. Though Warren (1949) is listed as a source, the passage in question comes from Phelps (1975, 44).

The Paraguayan President, desperate to break the blockade, again sent an army under his eldest son's command, temporarily to occupy the left bank of the Parana, in the hope of bringing pressure to bear on Rosas. On Christmas Day, 1850, he also entered into an alliance with Brazil, whereby both countries promised to help each other if either was attacked by the Argentine Confederation.

The problems with the coding of this dispute are multiple. First, we cannot corroborate a start date of December 1850. Though Phelps says this is the date when Brazil and Paraguay entered into a defensive alliance against Argentina, it does not mean this is the date of the incident. As a lot of these "informal" or "introductory" history books are wont to do, the narrative skips across years and actors without adequately situating proposed militarized incidents within a specific window of time.

Second, we question the coding of Argentina as Side A in this militarized incident. The blockade described as a militarized incident is actually a blockade started several years earlier. This is MID#1586, not a new militarized incident.

Third, Argentina had multiple blockades in effect against both Paraguay and Uruguay. This led to reprisals from both the United Kingdom and France (MID#0123). Adequately isolating militarized incidents described in these sources and distinguishing them from other militarized disputes (with CoW's coding rules) are difficult. Information is scarce and overlapping.

Fourth, we are unsure if Phelps is actually describing a show of force according to CoW's coding rules.

Fifth, we find the outcome of a yield by Paraguay to be questionable. If anything, Argentina's fortunes sink shortly after this proposed MID. Urquiza (Rosas' top general) turns on him (Rosas) during the intermittent civil wars in Argentina in the 19th century. This happens days after that Paraguayan show of force. Brazil signs an anti-Rosas alliance with Paraguay and Rosas is gone from Argentina in a year after this incident.

All told, we have very little to no codeable evidence of this MID independent of other MIDs currently in the data set. We moved it to the "could not find" category as a result.

MID#2056

There is no evidence of an attack by the Soviets on Germany on November 12, 1936. The Soviets did round up several German citizens in Soviet Russia for trials of espionage, from November 10th to November 16th. There is also some tension regarding shipping lanes near Spain during the Spanish Civil War. However, there is no evidence of a militarized dispute on this date, in November of 1936, or even the surrounding months.

MID#2078

Specific sources listed as the London Times, New York Times, and Moraga. The only mentions of an event in July of 1909 in the London Times and the New York Times involving both Argentina and Chile, is a conference in which Argentina was chosen to arbitrate and award the disputed area of Acre to either Bolivia or Peru. Argentina awarded the land to Peru, at which point Bolivia severed diplomatic ties with Argentina. Chile was on the side of Bolivia in this dispute and advised them to mobilize troops.

While Chile advised Bolivia to mobilize troops they wanted to make sure that Argentina was not part of the dispute. Another source states that says the accusations of Chile sending arms, etc. to Bolivia is false (even if true, this would not necessarily be a militarized dispute). The main issue here is between Bolivia and Peru/Argentina. Chile while having sympathies for Bolivia, remained neutral. Chile denies any claims that they were going to war and/or taking Bolivia's side militarily.

MID#2148

This case is coded as a clash between South Africa and Zaire on April 26, 1977. The specific CoW source suggests Facts on File was used to code this incident. However, we can find no evidence for a clash between these two countries in that source or in any others.

Zaire was battling Shaba rebels at this time according to Facts on File. The conflict was internal. Adamson Mushala, the leader of the rebels, had been given asylum in South Africa in 1975, but he was kicked out of the country in December of that year. Newspaper sources speculate that Zambian villages might have been sympathetic to Mushala, but, again, there were no clashes.

MID#2368

In January of 1887, both France and Germany were building and fortifying barracks and garrisons. With rumors of possible war, the German prince asserted that statements made in January regarding the build up of French armaments was intended as a warning, one that, though mild, would be enforced with greater strength if necessary (St. Louis Post). However, this was not a threat to declare war.

MID#2702

MID#2702 is a bilateral dispute between Russia and Japan. It is coded as occurring between August 1919, and October 25, 1919. It consists of one militarized incident, which was a Japanese seizure that was unrequited by Russia.

There is no real historical record for what this incident actually is. It is worth noting that the two sources cited for this MID are Leong (1976) and Pollard (1970), who are authors of works on Chinese foreign relations. These sources are very useful for MIDs involving China since the fall of the Qing Dynasty (and to the 1930s or so), but these books have never documented a MID for which China is not a participant. Regardless, there is no description of these disputes in either source. Nothing was found in Fischer (1951) or Unterberger (1956) that documented this incident either.

MID#2722

MID#2722 is a bilateral dispute between Russia and Japan. It is coded as occurring between the dates of April 28, 1920, and September 23, 1921. It is coded as a Japanese occupation of territory that was unrequited by Russia. It ends in a negotiated stalemate.

This dispute is likely connected to MID#0510 in some way and probably concerns the continued intervention by the Japanese in Siberia after the World War I Allies conceded defeat on the issue. However, there is no record of any incidents separate from that dispute.

MID#3116

This case is listed as a threat to use force by Yugoslavia against Soviet Russia, one day after the death of Tito. There is no evidence of such a threat. Yugoslavia pledged to continue non-alignment, and the Soviets gave many reassuring messages that it would respect Yugoslav policies. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#3321

There were two circumstances heightening tensions between Russia and Turkey during this time period, resulting in speculations of possible war in the future (though no such incident ultimately ensued.) The first is a territorial dispute between Russia and Turkey, particularly over the city of Parga. The dispute dates back to two treaties from 1800 and 1815, respectively. The Treaty of 1800 between Turkey and Russia, in part, left Parga to the Turks, though its people resisted, keeping Turkish attempts to occupy the territory at bay. The Allied Powers in the Treaty of 1815 reexamined the circumstance, placing Parga and a few other territories in the protection of England, who in May 1817 consented to hand the territory over to Turkey. However, a clause stated that every inhabitant of Parga could elect to quit their territory and Turkey would have to pay them the value of the land in order to attain and occupy it. All of the population chose this option. The value of the land came to far greater than what Turkey was willing to pay for it. Russia agreed to the conditions of the dispute arranged between Turkey and England and no directly-related militarized incidents occurred. The second was another territorial dispute over the demarcation line between Russia and Turkey, which was resolved diplomatically.

There were reports from August 6, 1817, which is probably what the original coders must have been referring to. They state that Russia had united its sixth and seventh corps and was reinforcing its troops in Volhynia, and also that Turkey was at the same time fortifying key posts along its border frontier with Russia. It is unclear whether these actions were explicitly directed towards the other state. There is no sign of protest from either state regarding these actions, and one source affirmed that the states had agreed to amicably resolve their discord and that the actions had nothing to do with preexisting tensions (Morning Post 8/6). Another source, also from August 6th, stated that the disputes between Turkey and Russia were terminated with no threat of war on the horizon (Caledonian Mercury). Even the source that described the militarized actions spoke of Turkey's fortifications saying that it was "taking advantage of the present state of peace" (Morning Post 8/6).

MID#3420

MID#3420 describes an Israeli seizure against Egypt/Syria/UAR beginning on September 14, 1958 and released on September 18, 1958. The specific sources list Haaretz and the New York Times

as sources, but no evidence of this seizure could be found in either source. If there is an incident here, it also occurred less than two months prior to a 2-year dispute between Israel and Syria/UAR (MID#3419) and in the middle of a 4-year dispute between the same states, Israel and Egypt/UAR (MID#3375).

MID#3716

On September 3rd 1943, Canadian and British troops crossed the Strait of Messina and landed on the Italian mainland. That same day Italy and the Allies signed an armistice, which was an unconditional surrender. It was not announced until September 8th when the Allies deemed it was a better time to publicize it. A threat to use force seems unlikely, and, regardless, this case officially occurs during World War II and should be subsumed by it.

MID#3810

MID#3810 is coded as a one-day attack by Spain on France on January 10, 1940. No evidence of this attack can be found in the New York Times, which is the specific source listed by CoW for this dispute. Further, we have reason to doubt this attack occurred given that both countries were in the midst of finalizing a trade pact (on January 14th) that took three months to negotiate.

MID#3862

This case is coded as an attack by Germany four days after the Hungarians joined the Tripartite Pact (they joined on 11/20/1940, and the incident is coded as 11/24/1940). There is simply no evidence of this attack.

MID#3867

MID#3867 is coded as a one-day British seizure against Greece on January 31, 1941. New York Times is listed as the source, but no information is available for this event in that paper or any of the other sources we searched. Further, the British and Greeks were actively cooperating during this time against the Italians in World War II, which makes the likelihood of this event occurring doubtful, at least as it is currently coded.

Appendix IIB—Cases that should be dropped

MID#0072

An Italian fleet visited Durazzo, but it was not a display of force. According to Keesing's, it was typical for the Italian fleet to make cruises in the Adriatic during this time and the visit to Durazzo on June 23, 1934 was normal and routine. Furthermore, an article from the Winnipeg Press from June 27, 1934 notes that Italian authorities on Tuesday, June 26 announced that a delayed telegraph accounted for the unexpected visit of the Italian fleet.

MID#0216

MID#0216 is the Vixen Affair between Britain and Russia. Following successful Russian campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, Lord Ponsonby (the British Ambassador to Constantinople) and David Urquhart (First Secretary of the British Embassy at Constantinople) became alarmed by Russian occupation of Circassia and, thus, suspicious of Russia. Together, the two persuaded George Bell & Co, a British shipping company, to send a schooner (the Vixen) to trade on the Circassian port at Sudjuk-Kale. It was intercepted on November 26, 1836, and held on the ground that it had violated customs regulations by selling salt without passing through customs. Ponsonby and Urquhart felt this would be enough to get the UK to wage war with Russia.

However, Lord Palmerston was unwilling to press the issue. When Palmerston made a formal inquiry to the nature of the seizure (on May 6), Russian diplomat Nesselrode replied that the Vixen was confiscated for carrying illegal cargo into territory given to Russia following the Treaty of Adrianople. On May 23, Palmerston deemed the confiscation of the private vessel to be just and asked for no compensation.

Absent formal protest or militarized response, this is not a MID. We recommended dropping it from the data set.

MID#0217

France disagreed with the other European powers over how to handle the dispute between the Porte and Mohammed Ali of Egypt. There is no evidence in Langer or Anderson's "The Eastern Question" of any codeable action by France.

MID#0239

A combined British, French, American, and Dutch naval force bombarded Chosu positions in Shimoseki. The Chosu were an anti-foreigner faction that had tried to seize control of the government and failed. The government at Edo did not protest and, in fact, paid an indemnity to the coalition.

MID#0406

The Italians had built fortified positions at Welwel in 1930, staffing the outpost with Somalis and Italian commanders. There was no protest from either Ethiopia or the international community. Ethiopia did not contest the Italian garrison until 1934.

MID#0508

France said that it would not interfere in the war between Austria and Italy as long as Austria did not advance farther than Milan. France offered to arbitrate in Austria's favor if Austria agreed to this. There was no militarized incident.

MID#0601

This was a one-day seizure. There was no protest from the US. From the New York Times: "Peru released without fines two U.S. tuna boats which gunboats seized Thursday about 30 miles from the South American coast, the manager of the boats said Friday. The boats, the Mary Elizabeth, and the Anna Maria, were taken to the Peruvian port Talara. Art Sousa said Peruvian authorities agreed the vessels apparently had drifted into their claimed waters and weren't fishing."

MID#1022

MID#1022 is a double-count of MID#1021—it is within the same temporal domain of MID#1021 and also concerns the same issue and location, namely control of Netherlands' colony of New Guinea.

MID#1028

MID#1028, is coded (inexplicably) as a one-day clash between the two countries. We found the original New York Times article (10/6/1936) used to code this incident. The text states:

President Toro's announcement said the continuance of the Paraguayan occupation of the Villa Monies-Santa Cruz road might easily lead to armed clashes between between Bolivian and Paraguayan troops and thus endanger peace. Certain diplomatic observers interpreted this statement as a threat to renew hostilities unless Paraguay accedes to the Bolivian demand and withdraws from the road.

This is a vague threat at best and is not a militarized incident per Correlates of War coding rules.

MID#1042

The original coding of MID#1042 describes a clash between Jordanian and Egyptian forces as they were getting routed by Israel in June of the 1948 war. The coding is based on the following source (translated): "These conflicts and moreover, the defeat in Eretz Israel, led to armed incidents between the armies of Egypt and Jordan in the areas of Hebron and Bethlehem during the war, 1948, and a mutual defamation sequence where both sides accused each other for the joint defeat in Eretz Israel and even betrayal defamations that escalated to the level of a very severe cold war for many weeks."

There are several problems with this coding. First, it would have been impossible for these forces to come in contact with each other in June. Jordanian forces were not in the area. So, the incidents must have occurred around October, when Jordanian forces (Arab Legion) under Major Geoffrey Lockett went in to Bethlehem and Hebron with about 300 men to aid Egyptian forces. The cease fire took hold, and Israel did not continue an attack against the Egyptians as they withdrew. Jordan's King Abdullah wanted to represent the PLO following the war, and the Arab Legion's movements were an attempt at a land grab, which the Egyptians were aware of. However, there's no indication of any type of clash between the two forces.

MID#1082

With MID#2135 and MID#1082, the original MID coders are referencing a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over a road between Villa Montes and Boyuibe (or Santa Cruz – sources suggest they may be the same thing). It occurs in the aftermath of the Chaco War between these two states (MID#1027), which left Paraguay as the clear winner of a war that Bolivia initiated. Paraguay occupied the road as a result of the war that concluded two years earlier, which was a source of frustration for the Bolivians. The road was Bolivia's main source for communication with the outside world, making Paraguay's occupation of that road problematic. However, coding this dispute as a Paraguayan occupation of territory (in a 6-month count) is incorrect. Paraguay had occupied this territory since the end of the war. The peace talks aimed at settling the war before this point did little more than affirm the new status quo that Bolivia, not surprisingly, wanted to rectify.

So, the current coding suggests that Paraguay occupied this road in this region in the month of May 1937. This is not what happened. MID coders most likely used a New York Times article dated on June 10, 1937 to start this as a six-month count. This article talks about "last month's agreement by which control of Bolivia's main-line road between Villa Montes and Boyuibe was taken from Paraguay and put in control of the International Police under the supervision of the neutral military officers representing the authority of the Chaco Peace Conference at Buenos Aires." It mentions this in the context of Paraguay discussing the terms of the agreement publicly, which defied the obligations of the participants of the conference and started a diplomatic row. This prompted Bolivia to abort the restoration of relations with Paraguay and led to Paraguay to cite the armistice that ended the conflict. This armistice affirmed the new status quo.

Even then, it is technically incorrect to say this agreement was made in May. The agreement was signed on January 9, 1937. The terms of implementation were signed in an undated day in May 1937 (Zook 1960, 249) but not ratified by Paraguay. The army would not allow it, and popular opinion was decidedly against it. From here, domestic turmoil in both countries intervened, stopping this issue from spiraling out of control. In Paraguay, the army toppled the provisional government of Rafael Franco in order to prevent the terms of the Chaco Peace Conference (signed on June 12, 1935) from coming into effect. In Bolivia, German Busch finally overthrew his friend and confidante David Toro in July 1937. The status quo remained until 1938.

In March 1938, Argentina again forced the issue of settling the Chaco War. In fact, it was Argentina's determination to end this issue that got Paraguay, who enjoyed the favorable status quo, to begin the peace process in earnest. On May 27, 1938, a proposal was finalized that redrew the border in the Chaco (Zook 1960, 250, is used for these details). Paraguay got most of what it wanted, reflecting their victory in war. Herein, a line was drawn from Esmeralda on the Rio Pilcomayo, northeast to a point called '27 November', southwest of Ingavi. From there, the line passed between Ravelo and Ingavi to Rio Paraguay, 7500 meters north of Bahia Negra. In the understanding of the conference participants, the desert region between 61 degrees and 63 degrees was a natural border between Paraguay and Bolivia. Bolivia was also obliged to pay 200,000 pounds in war indemnity. Bolivia accepted on May 31st; Paraguay was reticent.

Though Bolivia genuinely wanted peace, German Busch mobilized troops (MID#1029) as a response to Paraguay's refusal (sometime before June 24th, 1938). Paraguay gave a counterproposal, resulting in more negotiations. A draft treaty was reached on July 9, 1938, and a peace treaty was

signed on July 21st, 1938, that ultimately concludes the war. It outlines an arbitration process to be followed, resulting in an award later in October.

MID#1130

MID#1130 is the Iranian recapture of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, in the Gilan province. The ephemeral republic in the north of Iran had fallen under Soviet influence and, after a successful revolt in 1920 with Soviet assistance, declared independence from Iran and allegiance to the Soviet Union. However, a February 1921 friendship pact signed between Persia and Soviet Russia turned the tide against the Socialist Republic of Gilan. The Soviets promised to withdraw its troops from the area. Combined with British preferences for the Soviets to stop supporting the republic, they withdrew moral support as well. Reza Khan, with Soviet blessing, reclaimed the area and defeated the movement responsible for the republic by the end of October, 1921. The Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, beset with problems from its inception, dies here. The leader responsible, Kuchek Khan, was eventually caught and decapitated in December.

There's no MID here. Gilan does not appear to be in the COW state system as a nominally independent state and, further, the Soviets abandoned the republic, declared its leader Kuchek Khan (of the Jangali movement) an "outlaw... [who] raided the most fertile part of Persia, the Gilan province, and caused misery, lamentable events and tragedies in order to establish his rule" (Chaqueri 1995, 360), and otherwise assisted Persia in retaking it. This follows from agreements signed with Britain, and later Persia, that was vital to the survival of the new Soviet state in Russia (Afary 1995, 20-21). There is no conflict between the Persians and the Soviets here, just a conflict between Tehran and a renegade northern province.

MID#1143

Pollard (1933) is cited by the MID project, though his book contains no information to corroborate the dispute coding. Leong (1976) provides the most information, but his research does not support the coding as it is. The coding and the resources available strongly suggest this is a dispute in Harbin, Manchuria and very likely indicates the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese. The most support for this account comes from Leong (1976, 100-102). He talks of a dispute through February 1920, where the Chinese disbanded the local police force and gradually supplanted more and more CER Administration institutions with Chinese institutions. However, MID#1142 concludes with the abandonment of the Russian military forces in Harbin. The Chinese appear to be disputing with a company. Leong (1976, 107-109) talks about the process being basically complete by February 1921. Beyond that, it is not clear there is a dispute here. The Russians did not have a military personnel in Harbin to support CER, and there is no evidence of a show of force. This is a coding error based off reading the Leong (1976, 26-27) passage about MID#1142.

MID#1149

The original code sheet lists Zook (presumably Zook, 1964) as the source for this bilateral MID between Ecuador and Peru from November (-9), 1914 to January (-9), 1916. Peru is coded as engaging in a border violation, which was unreciprocated by Ecuador. The MID ends in a non-negotiated stalemate.

The closest description of anything involving an Ecuador/Peru dispute in Zook (1964) concerns this passage on p. 110. This is from Chapter 4, which details the period after Spanish attempts at arbitration.

The irreconcilable character of the positions, especially after the fall of the conciliatory Billinghurst government, brought to a standstill any progress toward a solution. The succeeding years were marked by Peru's continued advance and development in her area of jurisdiction, invariably with impotent objections from Quito. Ecuador protested violations of the status quo—a status quo whose very existence Valverde had denied a decade before. Lima continually replied with denials and assertions of her respect for the status quo, which she interpreted as within the limits of her possessions. While Ecuador thus relied upon languid diplomacy, Peru trusted in aggressive action. All the while, each voiced good intentions and paid lip service to the need for a final solution.

This paragraph concludes with the 32nd footnote to Chapter 4, which seems to source everything mentioned in this paragraph to “Memorias y documentos” of Peru. The next few paragraphs discuss Ecuador and Colombia, not Ecuador and Peru, and does not return to the Ecuador-Peru story in Zook's narrative until the year is 1917.

Since we have found the original codesheet, and the source listed for the case does not include a dispute, our recommendation is to drop this MID.

MID#1150

The original code sheet lists Zook (presumably Zook, 1964) as the source for this bilateral MID between Ecuador and Peru from February (-9), 1917 to May (-9), 1918. Peru is coded as engaging in a border violation, which was unreciprocated by Ecuador. The MID ends in a non-negotiated stalemate.

There is just nothing in Zook to corroborate there being a dispute here. Zook's discussion of Ecuador and Peru's dispute on p. 110 (see: MID#1149), proximate to this time, pauses while Zook describes relations between Ecuador and Colombia. Zook then starts the bottom paragraph of p. 111 with the following.

In an interesting note, Ecuadorian Minister to Peru Jose Peralta charged 6 December 1917 that while no one denied that the first evidence of territorial dominion was occupation, it lacked value when it was arbitrary, unjust, and founded upon conquest and usurpation [ed. huh?]. The reply agreed but pointed out that the allegations were inapplicable to Peru, who proceeded in accordance with her own valid titles. The Ecuadorian scorned these views, incisively attributing Peruvian enterprise to the cloak of armed force and military rule.

The next date is April 22, 1919, in which Peralta “lamented Ecuador's timid, weak, shameful diplomacy of ‘protests for the usurpation of our territories.’ ”

Since we have found the original codesheet, and the source listed for the case does not include a dispute, our recommendation is to drop this case.

MID#1157

Ecuador accused Peru of massing 20,000-30,000 troops on the border. However, aerial reconnaissance proved the allegations to be baseless.

MID#1162

There is little evidence of a meaningful dispute here, but the sources consulted suggest that Colombia likely evicted Peru from the contested Putumayo region during this time. This followed from an October 23, 1911 agreement whereby Peru signaled its willingness to relinquish claims to Putumayo. On the Peruvian side, the territory was clearly distant from Lima and required great effort to control against competing claims from Colombia. The area was rich in rubber, which initially provided opportunity. However, a rubber bust brought down the value of the territory (De La Pedraja 2006, 89).

Galvez (1920, 58-75) mentions that Colombia discovered a persistent Peruvian presence in Puerto Pizarro and Las Delicias, establishments in the contested territory that Colombia claimed. Their presence was discovered in 1913, as can be seen by the communications of the Colombian Minister in Lima during the year 1913 (Galvez 1920, 75). Galvez then mentions that the Peruvian troops, who arrived in order to re-establish claims to the area, were recalled. This does not really say whether they were forcibly evicted or Peru had to reiterate its orders to relevant soldiers that they were pursuing a diplomatic option to this issue. Making matters worse, Galvez (1920) is the only source cited for this. A fairly thorough search reveals nothing of interest regarding Las Delicias, Puerto Pizarro or the broader Putumayo region in 1913.

MID#1164

This is a seizure of a Brazilian ship—the Yaquirana—with Catholic missionaries that was seized by a Peruvian gunboat on some day in August of 1918. It was held for five days. This is all according to a 1919 source (Galvez) that does not mention a protest by the Brazilian government, though it does mention protests by the ship's captain. We can find no mention of a government protest in other sources, and, given the nature of the missionaries trip, it is unlikely that Brazil would have protested on their behalf. Therefore, our recommendation is that this seizure be dropped.

MID#1176

This case describes actions by El Salvador against Salvadoran revolutionaries who had invaded from Honduras. There is no evidence that Honduras was supporting the revolutionaries.

MID#1177

Siberian partisans wiped out a Japanese unit that was part of the Allied intervention in Siberia. Japanese troops destroyed a village in response. The Russian government was cooperating with Japan, and the partisans were rebelling against local, repressive policies.

MID#1183

The construction of the fortines, including Fortin Saavedra, occurred two years later, from August to December 1924. This is according to Rout (1970: 13) and Zook (1960: 37-38). That fortification is already a dispute (MID#2131). Our recommendation is to drop this double count.

MID#1187

The NYT describes this event: “Bolivia broke off diplomatic relations with Chile on April 16 following a dispute between the two countries over the waters of the Lauca River, which flows from

Chile into Bolivia. Negotiations had been in progress for several months on the use of the Lauca River waters, which had been the subject of dispute for many years. On March 22 Bolivia had warned Chile that she would regard the diversion of water as an act of aggression, on the ground that this could not be done without the agreement of both countries. President Alessandri of Chile, however, ordered on April 14 that the sluice-gates of a new dam should be opened to supply an irrigation scheme and a hydroelectric project, thus, according to the Bolivian contention, reducing the flow of Lauca River waters into Bolivia. On April 20 the Bolivian Government requested a meeting of the Organization of American States to consider her complaint against Chile.” The threat was vague, and there was no response by Chile.

MID#1255

MID#1255 is coded as clashes between Serbia and Albania that lasted from June 12, 1915 to sometime in February of 1916. However, there is no evidence of a dispute between Albania and Serbia during this period. Montenegro (not a CoW state until 2006) invaded Albania on June 11, 1915. Serbia responded on June 12th by helping the Albanians drive out the Montenegrins and routing Albanian rebels (not Albanian government forces).

Albania was in a state of civil war by July of 1914. Austro-Hungary asked the Albanian monarch, Prince William, for Albanian troops, but he refused due to the unrest. William finally fled Albania on September 3, 1914. Essad Pasha, an officer who had plotted with the Greeks to allow them to annex southern Albania, was arrested by Prince William in May of 1914 and fled the country with Greek help. He was invited to return by the Albanian Senate and signed an alliance with Serbia prior to his return. The secret Serbo-Albanian alliance (The Treaty of Nish), signed on September 17, 1914, allowed a close friendship and defensive alliance between the two countries. With help from the Serbians, in the form of troops and a subsidy, Pasha was able to capture much of the renegade territories in central Albania.

Later in the year, Serbia retreated from Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian forces, with strategic aid from both France and Italy, and the Serbs were severely harassed by Albanian tribesmen. However, there does not seem to be a dispute between any official Albanian entity and the Serbs during this retreat. The rebels were instead successfully harassing Serbian troops during the withdrawal.

The New York Times—the only source listed by the Correlates of War does not provide information regarding any codeable incidents.

At a January 2014 workshop at UC Davis, CoW found the following newspaper article in the *Atlanta Journal Constitution* (6/12/1915):

INVASION OF ALBANIA DEFENDED' BY SERBIA Nish. Serbia June 12 Via London
The Serbian press bureau issued a statement today defending the incursion of Serbian troops into Albania and concluding as follows. Serbia realizes the Albanian question will be definitely settled by Europe but, she also is conscious of the fact that measures such as she is now taking are as much in the interest of the great powers as her own. The reasons for the present expedition the statement says are that Albania has been a hotbed of Austro-Turkish intrigue, resulting in Albanian raids in Serbia, and that Serbia realized long since that its fighting front against Austria would include the entire Albanian frontier. The statement recites that Serbia, during the Balkan war, reached

the open sea through Albania only to be forced to relinquish this territory through Austrian Influence.

Rome. June 12 Via Chlue and Paris. It Is understood that Italy Is, In accord with the allies upon the friendly representations from Belgrade concerning the Serbian advance into Albania, expressing the desire that the question be left for solution by the peace conference after the war. It Is stated that neither Italy nor the allies oppose the Serbian military advance toward the Adriatia across Albania but prefer that Serbia should not divert part of her forces from the main objective of the campaign, namely to fight Austria.

CoW concludes:

Serbias incursion into Albania is documented (see supplemental pdfs: "Invasion of Albania Defended by Serbia" The Atlanta Constitution June 13, 1915). The dates are likely incorrect, and we recommend a change based on this document, but the actors and action (clash) seem reasonable. This MID should be kept.

However, this article does not support the coding of a dispute—far from it. The Serbians were defending themselves to their allies in World War I; their aid of Albania against rebels would not divert their attention from fighting Austro-Hungary. The Serbians were in Albania at the request of their central government to put down rebels in the civil war, and the Serbians were justifying this aid because the Albanian rebels were harassing Serbian troops.

MID#1278

Rioting Turkish Cypriots clashed with British troops on the island. The Turkish press responded by putting pressure on the many Greeks living in Istanbul. Plans were discussed by the Greeks, Turks, and even the United States, about what to do with the 30,000 Greeks in the Turkish capital, but no direct threats to use force were ever made. There is no militarized incident here.

MID#1309

This dispute is coded as a threat to use force directed towards Pakistan. However, the threat is too vague to be considered a militarized incident. India states that a fresh attack on Kashmir "will not be tolerated," but there is no mention of force.

MID#1329

This dispute is coded as the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) threat to use force against the Congo on August 15, 1963. The DRC stated it would take "measures of extreme necessity," but no identification of an explicit use of force was made.

MID#1332

A white mercenary force invaded the southern part of the Congo from Portuguese Angola. Portugal denied the reports. The US protested to Portugal, but the group was comprised of mercenaries and was not directed by Lisbon. This is not a militarized incident by Portugal.

MID#1335

Botswana placed an embargo on trade between itself and Rhodesia. This was not a blockade of Rhodesia and, therefore, not a militarized incident.

MID#1388

Senegal accused Portugal of bombing a border village. Portugal denied the charge and asked that the UN Security Council investigate the charge. There is no independent evidence of the bombing besides Senegal's claim.

MID#1398

The South African Prime Minister, Vorster, made the following statement: "No country can allow Communist-trained terrorists to violate its territory without being punished or to injure or kill its citizens in such a cowardly manner. This is therefore being done in this case and, if the pursuers are attacked, they will defend themselves. The responsibility in this case rests squarely on the shoulders of the country making available its territory for this sort of aggression." Local newspapers reported the statement as a threat against Zambia. However, Vorster later stated that the newspapers were highly irresponsible and overreached by claiming there was a threat against Zambia. Without explicit mention of Zambia in the threat, and given Vorster's claims that the threat was not directed at Zambia, this does not qualify as a militarized incident.

MID#1409

The Guinean president provided a villa to the ousted Ghanaian president. On March 13, 1966, the new Ghanaian leader asserted that the Guinean president had boasted to the former Ghanaian leader that "Guinea's army would invade Ghana and restore Mr. Nkrumah to power." This was a private statement and, even if it were public, would not be specific enough to be considered a militarized incident.

MID#1415

A South African airliner was struck by gunfire while landing in Angola. It was unclear who the attacker was. Further, it was suspected that the plane was accidentally hit, with the attackers mistaking the aircraft for the private plane of a President Neto, head of Angola's Popular Movement. The attacker was unknown, the attack was likely a mistake, and no protest was cited.

MID#1417

When Togo declared its independence from France in 1956, a campaign was undertaken by Ghana (previously British Togoland), to unite the two former colonies under one flag. This quickly became a point of contention between the two nations. In November 1961 Ghana President Nkrumah felt that public opinion was on his side, and he stepped up efforts for reunification. Relations quickly deteriorated between the states, however. In the same month, Togo police held two Ghanaian police officers briefly when they went to secure the release of a fellow officer who had been arrested in Lome. The Ghanaian government responded by closing the Ghana-Togo border. The seizure was less than 24 hours, and the closing of the border did not constitute a blockade.

MID#1446

From Keesing's: In an interview with *Le Monde* published in its issue of Feb. 3-4, 1974, President Mohammed Daud declared that "we support in every way the right of our brothers in Pakhtoonistan to self-determination", and when asked whether the phrase "in every way" covered military support replied: "I cannot answer precisely, but I can tell you that when bombs are falling on our brothers, when they are being murdered, if they ask for our aid we shall not remain indifferent." After expressing the hope that the problem would be settled "In a friendly and peaceful way", he claimed that the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan had "always formed an Integral part of Afghanistan", from which they had been separated by "unequal and unjust trestles". He also alleged that the recent plot against the republican regime [in September 1973, see 26217 B] had been "financed by certain foreign countries", apparently alluding to Pakistan. There was no specific threat to use force against Pakistan.

MID#1449

Nepal demanded the withdrawal of Indian military liaisons and wireless operators from posts on Nepal's Chinese border. India threatened to close the border in response. Nepal never threatened India's military, and India's threat was economic, not military. This is not a MID.

MID#1496

MID#1496 is another diplomatic incident between the United States and Chile involving the seizure of a ship. The American vessel *Sportsman* was docked in Santa Maria and was offloading copper there. The Chilean ship *Esmeralda* noticed it and ordered the *Sportsman* to cease operations until it got a license from Chile. The commander of the *Esmeralda* then ordered the *Sportsman* to proceed to Caldera to obtain a license. The crew of the *Sportsman* refused and the ship was promptly boarded and taken to Caldera.

The American crew was allowed to leave over a week later under the provision that the ship not enter a Chilean port, but this was protested by the captain of the *Sportsman*. He filed a protest with the U.S. Minister in Chile, though no official action by the U.S. could be taken for the meantime. Diplomatic maneuvering was further complicated because the port at Santa Maria lay within a gray area delineating Bolivia and Chile. The *Sportsman* was also loading ore, which was a violation of Chilean customs laws but not a violation of Bolivian customs laws. The captain confessed to loading ore but thought he was in Bolivia.

On December 7th, the captain of the *Sportsman* filed a grievance seeking reparations of USD 35,593.75 with six-percent interest. The captain's claim was the seizure did not occur with Chilean jurisdiction and the seizure occurred with no justification or warrant. However, the United States and Chilean Claims Commission ruled in favor of dismissing the case several years later, arguing that A) the port was within Chilean territory in a manner consistent with international law of the day and B) the confiscation was legal. Because there was no fiscal penalty imposed on the *Sportsman* (only a dismissal and an admonition), no indemnity was necessary. With no protest and acknowledgement of the U.S. that the seizure was legal, this is not a MID.

MID#1501

The original coders misinterpreted their Spanish source for this case (Barros, 1970, [follow this link to pages 261-262](#)). The coders believed that Bolivian troops were sent to Cobija to dismantle the Chilean guano processing plant there in 1861 and that Chile responded with a warship (show of force) followed by a request from the Bolivian president of his congress to declare war if necessary. In actuality, these events happened in 1863 and are already captured in MID#1502. Our recommendation is to drop this double count.

MID#1509

The original Correlates of War codesheet suggests an Argentine show of troops in September of 1877 and a Chilean threat to use force in December 1877. Neither event qualifies as a militarized incident. First, Argentines prevented an American ship, the “Thomas Hunt”, from loading salt. Note that the original coding translates Encina (1959, 187) as the ship being licensed to Chile; in actuality, the schooner was American flagged with license to load salt by Chile. In either case there was no seizure or show of force, and there was also no protest by the United States.

The second event in December codes Chilean orders to fire on any Argentine sailors that tried to detain them during transit. We could find no mention of this event in Encina (1959, 190). Barros, (1970: 316) describes relations between Chile and Bolivia, not Chile and Argentina, and no such order is discussed. Moreno (1961, 224) is also silent on this event. Finally, even if we could substantiate that these orders were given, it is unclear that giving orders to your own military personnel to fire if provoked constitutes a threat to use force against Argentina.

Our recommendation is to drop this case.

MID#1525

The American warship the Wasp was dispatched to retrieve the US ambassador in Paraguay during the War of the Triple Alliance. The Wasp was delayed when Brazil refused to allow the ship to proceed up the Parana River to Asuncion. Brazil eventually agreed that it would let the ship pass once all other options were exhausted. This was not a show of force by the United States and not a dispute.

MID#1526

This is a bilateral dispute between Argentina and Brazil from 9/29/1873 to 4/23/1874. The original coders argued that Argentine occupation of Villa Occidental (in Paraguay) during peace talks after the War of the Triple Alliance created a dispute with Brazil. The quote from Burr (1965: 127) is:

But in the midst of the final Asuncion peace talks Buenos Aires changed its mind, ordering Mitre to insist upon Villa Occidental. Argentine armed forces invaded and occupied the area. Peace negotiations collapsed, and Argentina and Brazil were again on the point of an open break.

Paraguay was not a system member at this time, and Brazil was in no position to protest on behalf of Paraguayan interests. Regardless, we found no evidence of Brazilian protest or show of force (their coded highest action). Further, in October of 1873, again according to Burr (1965: 128), Brazil asked for and received assurances from Argentina. See also Peterson (1964) for a discussion

of American mediation during the dispute, with a good review of the overall events. The Warren (1978, 207ff) source provides no mention of a militarized incident and instead focuses on the armed revolt in the area.

Argentina was aiding Paraguayan rebels throughout this time period, but the actual occupation of Paraguayan land does not seem to be a militarized incident according to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) coding rules. Both countries were occupying Paraguayan lands at the time and were trying to decide peace terms. Our recommendation is to drop this case.

MID#1558

The US Senate began debating a resolution condemning Spanish rule in Cuba. There was no explicit threat to use force.

MID#1559

From Clarke (2013): President Grant, accepting his explanations, declared (Dec. 7, 1875) that “he failed to find in the insurrection conditions that would take it out of the category of mere rebellion... To accord belligerent rights would therefore be unwise, premature and indefensible as a matter of right.” The end of his message, however, contained a definite threat: “I shall feel it my duty, should the hope of a satisfactory adjustment, an early restoration of peace, and the removal of further causes of complaint be disappointed, to recommend to Congress at some not remote period during the present session what may then seem necessary.” Grant’s statement to Cuba about telling Congress to “take whatever steps it deemed necessary” is not a threat to use force.

MID#1604

MID#1604 codes an Indonesia protest over a Dutch move to send reinforcements to Netherlands New Guinea. Dutch forces captured several Indonesian infiltrators who staged a raid on the territory.

These incidents should already be included in MID#1021, which codes conflict over the same issue, between the same participants, and fought over the same location, lasting from two weeks prior to this set of incidents and lasting two years after the end date of these incidents. MID#1604 should be dropped.

MID#1611

There was a warning by Rhodesia toward Zambia against harboring Rhodesian rebels. However, the warning likely concerned economic sanctions. There was definitely no threat to use force.

MID#1641

This was a threat by the Italian Prime Minister (Crispi) to bomb Benghazi for “some imagined slight,” according to Lowe and Marzari. It is not a dispute, though, because this threat was made in private correspondence to the British Prime Minister (Salisbury). The Ottomans never knew of the threat, and Salisbury took great pains to remind Crispi that the goal of the powers was to maintain the Ottoman Empire.

MID#1652

The US threatened to intervene if Cuba did not heed American advice on granting a concession to reclaim the Zapata Swamp. The exact phrasing of the threat is that US Secretary of State Knox would assert the right of the US to take measures “peaceful or otherwise”. The threat is too vague to be considered a militarized incident.

MID#1655

Denmark’s troop mobilization was specifically not directed toward any state in particular and was instead meant to guard against use of its territory by belligerents. This is not a dispute.

MID#1659

MID#1659 is a multilateral MID during World War I pitting Sweden against five of the World War I participants on Side B (United Kingdom, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Germany). It is coded with a HIACT of a Swedish threat to use force that was not reciprocated by any member of Side B. The MID lasts from November 6, 1915 to an unknown day in July 1916. It ends in a non-negotiated stalemate.

Specific Sources says this MID was coded using New York Times.

Our review of New York Times sources involving Sweden, as well as additional reports from other newspapers and various books and academic articles covering Sweden during World War I, does not lend support to having this MID in the data set. The start date corresponds with an announcement from Sweden to hold a peace conference done in part to address the ongoing naval pressure from Great Britain. This conference was eventually held in January of the next year. At that conference, Sweden announced that it was prepared to use force during the war if its territory were violated. This was followed by an announcement by Sweden of a substantial increase in military spending.

However, it would be a mistake to interpret this as a Swedish threat to use force against *all* the primary World War I participants (minus Italy). These measures, more a tacit threat against the United Kingdom if anyone, are vague by CoW’s understanding and do not constitute codeable incidents.

We recommend dropping this MID.

MID#1681

MID#1681 was coded as an American threat to use force against Haiti in February 1881. The statement of threat only indicated that the U.S. threatened to “demand satisfaction.” There was no mention of a use of force, and no other militarized incident took place between the participants for the six months before and after the incident over the same issue. Specific sources from CoW confirmed this report.

MID#1687

MID#1687 is a bilateral dispute between Thailand and Japan. Japan is Side A. The MID begins on July 29, 1940 and ends on August 7, 1940 in a non-negotiated stalemate. Japan is coded as

engaging in a border violation against Thailand. Thailand responds with a threat to use force.

CoW-MID's Specific Sources file says this was coded using the New York Times.

Our review used every search term imaginable from a week before the start date to the week after it and found no evidence for a dispute between Thailand (Siam) and Japan in the New York Times. We did find a New York Times report on the start date of MID#1687 that mentioned that Japan's advances against China in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the developments of World War II in Europe put Thailand in a position where it could not defend itself. The report corresponds to the start date of MID#1687 but it is not specifically about Thailand. It's about Japan's "Greater East Asia" aspirations in light of recent developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War and France and Great Britain's weakened state in Southeast Asia. The comment about Thailand reads more like foreshadowing the events of next year given Thailand's status as the lone independent country in Southeast Asia.

Japan violating Thailand's border is not inconceivable in the context of a lower-level incident. It is inconceivable that a border violation would be the correct coding, though. Japan had yet to acquire territory in French Indochina that would make it land-contiguous with Thailand. That would come shortly in September of 1940. For both Thailand and Japan, France, or Vichy France, was the bigger issue for the time being. A war between France and Thailand (MID#0613), and a conflict between Japan and French Indochina, followed in the fall of 1940 that ultimately made Thailand and Japan land-contiguous.

Thailand threatening to use force against Japan is also not inconceivable, but it would be particularly foolish for Thailand to provoke Japan. Theoretically, if Japan violated Thailand's border because of what would eventually follow in 1941, a threat to use force to defend itself is inconsistent with CoW's understanding of a "threat to use force". That would also be mostly inconsistent with Thai foreign policy at the time.

If we adjust the search terms to 1941, the dispute makes more sense. More New York Times reports are available that would underscore ongoing issues between Japan and Thailand that both precipitated Thailand falling under Japanese domain and the Pacific Theater of World War II. However, this bilateral Thailand-Japan dispute would be captured in MID#1785. Nothing else between both sides would be independent of that.

MID#1696

Portugal had tried to remain neutral during World War II, but was supplying wolfram to Germany. In Spring 1944, the Allies pressured Portugal to end this supply. In an effort to dissuade Portugal from buckling under Allied pressure, Germany sent a signal of its own, seizing the Portuguese refugee ship Serpa Pinto, and threatening attack on May 26, 1944. No attack occurred, and the ship was released. The entire incident lasted only 12 hours. The threat to use force was not targeting armed forces, and, since the incident lasted less than 24 hours, it should be dropped.

MID#1705

A US fishing boat, the Substreak, had engine problems, and the boat drifted into Ecuadorian waters. The engine was fixed, and the boat attempted to flee but could not do so before being

seized by an Ecuadorian navy patrol. The US never protested the incident.

MID#1725

German U-boats attacked at least three Argentine ships and probably four. However, there was no protest by Argentina, and Argentina remained neutral. Argentine President Hipolyto Irigoyen was sympathetic to Germany, and Argentina was profiting from selling war materials. They demurred when the US asked all Western Hemisphere states to declare war on Germany. When the U-boats attacked German shipping, domestic protests increased, but Germany offered to apologize, salute the Argentine flag at sea, and launch an investigation. There was no protest of the sinkings and no militarized response by Argentina.

MID#1728

A North Vietnamese Army journal published an article on the need to defend North Vietnam's claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. A Chinese paper printed an article detailing China's claim to the islands in response. No threats were made in this event and neither actor was an official representative of their government.

MID#1734

All USA/UKG actions were directed against rebels who never took the capital. There was a non-specific warning by the United States against Guatemala, but it did not meet the criteria for a threat.

MID#1737

On August 16, 1916 (Mid#1737), and on April 25, 1917, and October 17, 1917 (MID#1776), a British government minister in The Hague threatened war with Dr. J.C.K. Van Aalst, the head of the Netherlands Overseas Trust, if he did not comply with British economic interests. Note that this declaration was against the Netherlands Overseas Trust (N.O.T.) and not against the Dutch government directly. As per Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 170), this is not a militarized dispute: "Actions taken by the official forces of one state against private citizens of another state are generally not coded as militarized incidents. Exceptions include seizures (of personnel or material) within the confines of disputed territory, attacks on international shipping, and the pursuit (by air, land or sea) of rebel forces across international boundaries. Further, such incidents are included only when the targeted state responded militarily or protested diplomatically."

MID#1742

Fidel Castro threatened that if the US landed troops in Cuba then there would be "200,000 dead gringos." Castro recanted on the broad threat the next day.

MID#1745

Bands of Tibetans had been carrying out attacks on Nepal. The Nepalese government dispatched officers to investigate. The forces were not official Chinese troops but were instead insurgents.

MID#1761

The American secretary of state informed the Spanish minister in Washington that the US would resist any Spanish attempts to increase its influence in Central or South America. Specifically, Seward stated the US President would be, “obliged to regard them as manifesting an unfriendly spirit toward the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican republic or any other part of the American continent or islands with a prompt, persistent, and if possible, effective resistance.” The U.S. attitude toward Spanish attempts to increase influence in South America does not qualify as a specific threat or militarized incident.

MID#1767

The United States’ “Great White Fleet” arrived in Yokohama, Japan on its circumnavigation tour. The fleet was most definitely a statement regarding the strength of the US navy and came amid assurances to Roosevelt that the Japanese were drained from war with Russia and could offer no resistance. However, the fleet itself was not necessarily a direct threat to Japan – it was more a statement to the world – and Japanese ships were friendly to the fleet and offered escort to their harbor. This is not a militarized incident as CoW would code it.

MID#1769

The German fleet was ordered to assemble off the coast of Norway at the start of WWI in order to transport the German Emperor who was visiting there. There was no evidence of a Norwegian protest. Norway also partly mobilized its military during the outbreak of the war, but this mobilization was not directed at Germany as it had declared itself neutral. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#1776

On August 16, 1916 (Mid#1737), and on April 25, 1917, and October 17, 1917 (MID#1776), a British government minister in The Hague threatened war with Dr. J.C.K. Van Aalst, the head of the Netherlands Overseas Trust, if he did not comply with British economic interests. Note that this declaration was against the Netherlands Overseas Trust (N.O.T.) and not against the Dutch government directly. As per Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 170), this is not a militarized dispute: “Actions taken by the official forces of one state against private citizens of another state are generally not coded as militarized incidents. Exceptions include seizures (of personnel or material) within the confines of disputed territory, attacks on international shipping, and the pursuit (by air, land or sea) of rebel forces across international boundaries. Further, such incidents are included only when the targeted state responded militarily or protested diplomatically.”

MID#1786

This one-day dispute is when Britain declared war on Finland after Finland did not comply with British demands to cease hostilities against the Soviet Union. Finland and Britain are already taking part in MID#0258, World War II, with Finland fighting for the Axis powers and Britain coordinating with the Soviets. This is not a separate dispute but is part of the larger war.

MID#1787

This declaration of war—Brazil against Germany—is already part of MID#3503, and this dispute should be dropped from the dataset.

MID#1790

The Soviet Union established a new provisional government that would be cooperative with the Allied forces in Hungary on December 23rd 1944. On December 30th 1944 this government declared war on Germany. However, the Hungarian army ignored this and continued to fight along with the Germans against the Soviets. The remaining German and Hungarian units surrendered in Budapest on February 13, 1945. From March to mid-April, 1945, Bulgarian and Soviet units were conducting mop up operations of the last Hungarian units. The last Germans were finally expelled from Hungary on April 4, 1945.

This dispute is supposed to be a clash between Germany and Hungary from December of 1944 to July 1945 (the end of the war). The Hungarian army was fighting with the Germans until they were unable to fight anymore.

MID#2003

In 1866, the American Secretary of State issued a statement stating that the US attitude would not remain neutral if Spain occupied Peruvian territory. The Secretary of State's statement is much too vague to qualify as a threat to use force. This is not a dispute.

MID#2015

MID#2015 suggests an attack by Thailand on Laos on June 12, 1966. No primary sources suggest any such action and instead point to an unstable peace in Laos. The United States, at the invitation of Laos, did bomb insurgents in Laotian territory on this date.

MID#2016

In response to increasing numbers of communist insurgents in territory controlled by the Laotian government, the Thai army increased patrols on its border with Laos. The Thai government border buildup was an effort to protect itself from insurgents. There is no evidence in the source to suggest that the Laotian government protested against this buildup or that the buildup was intended as a show of force directed at the Laotian government itself.

MID#2019

Indonesia warned of possible "irresponsible acts" against Dutch nationals in Indonesia unless the Netherlands resolved the dispute over Dutch New Guinea. The threat was not specific and also not directed at the Netherlands or the Dutch government.

MID#2027

On 26 November 1961 the Philippines detained two Taiwanese fishing vessels and their seventeen crew members in the Sulu Sea. However, there is no evidence of an official Taiwanese protest.

MID#2041

MID#2041 was originally coded as a Dominican border violation into Haiti on 16 February 1949. The start date refers to Haitian charges that the Dominican President Rafael Trujillo was involved in a plot to overthrow the Haitian government and that Colonel Aster Roland of the Haitian Army was using Dominican radio to broadcast subversive messages. No border violation was reported or alleged. The dispute was resolved diplomatically through the Organization of American States on 25 February 1949—the originally coded end date. There was no militarized incident contemporaneous to the original coding. Specific sources from CoW confirmed this report.

MID#2048

Both Chile and Peru, the only combatants in this case, denied that an attack, clash, or other action occurred. Both countries stated that reports from Bolivia were false.

MID#2051

Ecuador told the US State Department in a memorandum that it would go to war to “protect her Amazonian rights in the pending conflict between Colombia and Peru.” There is no indication that Ecuador was targeting any one country, and they were certainly not targeting both Colombia and Peru in tandem.

MID#2076

This case involves the coding of two incursions by Chilean forces into Argentine territory in 1891. As per Moreno (1961: 195-196), which is the source cited by the original codesheets, these were de-armed rebels from the Chilean civil war that were fleeing the conflict, being rounded up by Argentine forces, and then returned to Chile. Chilean officials thanked the Argentines for returning the prisoners to Chile. Our recommendation is to drop this case.

MID#2077

The original coders suggests a show of ships by Argentina in March of 1905 that was not reciprocated by Chile. Specifically, a navigational buoy was placed on or near Navarino Island. Moraga (1969, 192) details the incident in which the Argentine navy **secretly** dispatched a group of sailors to replace the “Spar Buey” near Puerto Williams, on Navarino, with their own marker. The Argentines then used it as evidence of ownership for a map of the area. The Director of the Hydrographic Office of the Chilean Navy reported the situation to superiors in July, and Argentina argued that the buoy was placed to aid navigation. Chile reviewed the situation in December, argued that the Argentine position was absurd, but agreed to negotiate a solution.

The placement of the buoy was obviously not a show of force since it was done secretly, and no land was seized. There was outrage by Chilean citizens at the printing of the map, but there was no protest by the government, which did not even act within six months following the discovery of the marker. In short, there is no militarized incident here. Our recommendation is to drop this case.

MID#2091

On April 28, 1956, 12 Chinese soldiers equipped with tommy guns and telescopes crossed the border into India east of Nilang at the area right up to Chang Chokla pass within Indian Territory. In response, the Indian government instructed its officer commanding its border security force to instruct the Chinese forces to leave Indian Territory immediately. India noted that they assumed that the crossing was due to ignorance and not a border violation. There was no protest for this incident; both sides considered it a misunderstanding.

MID#2093

MID#2093 is a border dispute between India and China in August and September of 1958. It wholly overlaps the larger border dispute coded in MID#1707. The location of conflict, the issues, and the participants are the same in these two disputes, and, thus, MID#2093 should be dropped.

MID#2104

Iran protested to Iraq that Iraqi tribesmen (“bandits” according to the Iranians) killed an Iranian tribesman and stole 500 sheep and cattle in the Kermanshah area on February 6th. The protest occurred on February 10th. There is no indication that the Iraqi government sponsored these actions or even had control over the tribesmen. This is not a dispute.

MID#2105

Shatt al-Arab connects the Iraqi port of Basra and the Iranian ports of Khorramshahr and Abadan to the Persian Gulf. Under a 1936 agreement Iraq was responsible for piloting tankers in the river and Iran was responsible for assigning berths, but for several years Iraqis had also handled the berthing assignments. On 16 February Iran announced that its nationals would once again handle berthing arrangements, but the Iraqi pilots opposed the decision. They refused to pilot the tankers, stranding several in the water. By the end of the month the oil refinery at Abadan had to slow production because it had no way to move the oil, and by early March the refinery stopped production altogether. “Intense diplomatic activity” (Middle East Record, 1961, 293) took place between Iraq and Iran in March. On 27 March Iraq announced construction of a new port at Umm Qasr to reduce its dependence on the Shatt al-Arab. On 8 April Iran agreed to send any unresolved issues to the ICJ. On 23 April Iraqi leader General Kassim and Iranian ambassador to Baghdad Gholam Abbas Aram agreed that tanker traffic would resume with Iraqi pilots and that an Iraqi mission would visit Tehran the following month to continue discussions. The talks did not take place. There was no actual militarized incident during this impasse; the refusal to pilot tankers is not a show of force. This a diplomatic dispute but not a MID.

MID#2108

This case is based on a report by Baghdad Radio that a clash between Iraqi and Iranian army units killed 30 Iranians soldiers and captured 14. There was no information about Iraqi casualties. Iran denied the event, and there are simply no other reports that the event occurred. Baghdad radio was an arm of the Iraqi regime and often engaged in propaganda and incitement of the public. Iran had denounced a 33-year old agreement between the two states over navigation of the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates (the Shatt al Arab). Further, the Iraqis were smarting from their recent swift defeat by the Israelis. Without corroboration from another source, there is not enough evidence that this event occurred.

MID#2134

The original coders considered this an 8-month-long bilateral dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia, starting on March 1, 1936. In the timeline we were given there were two possible militarized incidents: the Paraguayan harassment of truck convoys on the international road (Villa Montes-Boyube road) in March of 1936 and the “thinly veiled threat” by Bolivia on October 1936. The dispute was coded as ending on January 9, 1937, with the signing of an agreement.

The harassment of trucks on the international road took place in territory by the Paraguayan military following the Chaco War. Both countries were in negotiations over several issues, and the Paraguayans were using the harassment as leverage in the disputes. They also did not allow the Bolivians to repair the road. Since the Paraguay military, though behaving badly, had some authorization to be on that road, it is not a militarized incident. A later agreement (in August) between the two countries outlined proper behavior for the military forces in the region and curtailed the harassment. This is all contained in Rout (1970: 158-159), which is the original source for the incident.

The second incident is already included in the dataset as MID#1028, which is coded (inexplicably) as a one-day clash between the two countries. We found the original New York Times article (10/6/1936) used to code this incident. The text states:

President Toro’s announcement said the continuance of the Paraguayan occupation of the Villa Montes-Santa Cruz road might easily lead to armed clashes between Bolivian and Paraguayan troops and thus endanger peace. Certain diplomatic observers interpreted this statement as a threat to renew hostilities unless Paraguay accedes to the Bolivian demand and withdraws from the road.

This is a vague threat at best and is not a militarized incident per Correlates of War coding rules, and Paraguay did not respond. Since there are no militarized incidents during this time period, our recommendation is to drop this case and MID#1028, which was also previously listed as a dispute we could not find.

MID#2135

With MID#2135 and MID#1082, the original MID coders are referencing a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay over a road between Villa Montes and Boyube (or Santa Cruz – sources suggest they may be the same thing). It occurs in the aftermath of the Chaco War between these two states (MID#1027), which left Paraguay as the clear winner of a war that Bolivia initiated. Paraguay occupied the road as a result of the war that concluded two years earlier, which was a source of frustration for the Bolivians. The road was Bolivia’s main source for communication with the outside world, making Paraguay’s occupation of that road problematic. However, coding this dispute as a Paraguayan occupation of territory (in a 6-month count) is incorrect. Paraguay had occupied this territory since the end of the war. The peace talks aimed at settling the war before this point did little more than affirm the new status quo that Bolivia, not surprisingly, wanted to rectify.

So, the current coding suggests that Paraguay occupied this road in this region in the month of May 1937. This is not what happened. MID coders most likely used a New York Times article dated on June 10, 1937 to start this as a six-month count. This article talks about “last month’s

agreement by which control of Bolivia's main-line road between Villa Montes and Boyuibe was taken from Paraguay and put in control of the International Police under the supervision of the neutral military officers representing the authority of the Chaco Peace Conference at Buenos Aires." It mentions this in the context of Paraguay discussing the terms of the agreement publicly, which defied the obligations of the participants of the conference and started a diplomatic row. This prompted Bolivia to abort the restoration of relations with Paraguay and led to Paraguay to cite the armistice that ended the conflict. This armistice affirmed the new status quo.

Even then, it is technically incorrect to say this agreement was made in May. The agreement was signed on January 9, 1937. The terms of implementation were signed in an undated day in May 1937 (Zook 1960, 249) but not ratified by Paraguay. The army would not allow it, and popular opinion was decidedly against it. From here, domestic turmoil in both countries intervened, stopping this issue from spiraling out of control. In Paraguay, the army toppled the provisional government of Rafael Franco in order to prevent the terms of the Chaco Peace Conference (signed on June 12, 1935) from coming into effect. In Bolivia, German Busch finally overthrew his friend and confidante David Toro in July 1937. The status quo remained until 1938.

In March 1938, Argentina again forced the issue of settling the Chaco War. In fact, it was Argentina's determination to end this issue that got Paraguay, who enjoyed the favorable status quo, to begin the peace process in earnest. On May 27, 1938, a proposal was finalized that redrew the border in the Chaco (Zook 1960, 250, is used for these details). Paraguay got most of what it wanted, reflecting their victory in war. Herein, a line was drawn from Esmeralda on the Rio Pilcomayo, northeast to a point called '27 November', southwest of Ingavi. From there, the line passed between Ravelo and Ingavi to Rio Paraguay, 7500 meters north of Bahia Negra. In the understanding of the conference participants, the desert region between 61 degrees and 63 degrees was a natural border between Paraguay and Bolivia. Bolivia was also obliged to pay 200,000 pounds in war indemnity. Bolivia accepted on May 31st; Paraguay was reticent.

Though Bolivia genuinely wanted peace, German Busch mobilized troops (MID#1029) as a response to Paraguay's refusal (sometime before June 24th, 1938). Paraguay gave a counterproposal, resulting in more negotiations. A draft treaty was reached on July 9, 1938, and a peace treaty was signed on July 21st, 1938, that ultimately concludes the war. It outlines an arbitration process to be followed, resulting in an award later in October.

MID#2137

Between March and June 1975, Ethiopian troops were battling the Eritrean secessionist movement. This case is coded as an attack by Ethiopia on Sudan sometime in March of 1975. However, the only attack by Ethiopian troops during this month or the next concerned the Eritrean town of Umm Hagar, which Eritrean guerrillas had occupied in the previous week. There is also an Umm Hagar in Sudan, and this confusion probably accounts for the mistaken attack coding. Eritrea was not a member of the state system until 1993, so this is a domestic dispute and not a MID.

MID#2145

This was part of MID#1026 between Paraguay and Bolivia. Forces from both countries fought each other, but the battle took place on Brazilian territory. However, Brazil never protested the incursion, and Brazil was definitely not the target of either state. The original CoW coding was

two separate incursions into Brazilian territory (MID#2145 and MID#2146), but both of these should be dropped.

MID#2146

This was part of MID#1026 between Paraguay and Bolivia. Forces from both countries fought each other, but the battle took place on Brazilian territory. However, Brazil never protested the incursion, and Brazil was definitely not the target of either state. The original CoW coding was two separate incursions into Brazilian territory (MID#2145 and MID#2146), but both of these should be dropped.

MID#2147

As Bolivia and Paraguay prepared to go to war due to a border dispute, the Argentinean president was rumored to have told both governments that he would not permit the war to happen. Unofficial observers were the source for the Argentine statement, and the actual statement does not constitute a threat that would comprise a militarized incident.

MID#2172

During the first week of November 1965, violence erupted between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. On the evening of November 5, when the Security Council called for a halt in the violence, a member of Turkey's delegation suggested that, if the Cyprus government was not able to prevent further attacks on Turkish Cypriots in the Famagusta area, the Turkish military may retaliate against the Greek Cypriots. This was not an explicit threat directed towards Cyprus and does not specify a use of force.

MID#2182

This is a double count of MID#1142, the Harbin Crisis between Russia and China in December of 1917.

MID#2217

MID#2217 is a duplicate of MID#0027—the Berlin Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. It has the same start dates, but the end date is one month prior to the end date listed in MID#0027. MID#0027 also has West Germany as a participant, but MID#2217 does not.

MID#2227

Upon Tito's death, U.S. President Jimmy Carter stated, "I reaffirm today that America will continue its long-standing policy of support for Yugoslavia and do what it must to provide that support." CoW coded this as a threat to use force against the Soviet Union, but it really is too vague to be considered such a threat.

MID#2309

French and Spanish troops quartered in the port of Casablanca exchanged fire. The Spanish troops supposedly fired first and the French troops responded. 1 Spanish soldier was killed. 2 French soldiers were injured. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War said the

incident would not affect relations between the countries and the Spanish War Minister described the incident as a “drunken brawl”. French officials similarly agreed that the incident would not affect relations between the countries. Spanish soldiers were beating an unarmed Algerian sharpshooter. The sergeant in charge of the city gate and a French subaltern who were both unarmed tried to intervene. Then, Spanish forces opened fire and French soldiers fired back. This was clearly not authorized from the state-level down and does not seem to be taken at least by the Spanish government as a clash. 5 of the soldiers involved in the exchange of fire were arrested and handed over to French officials. Therefore, I do not think this is a dispute.

MID#2314

MID#2314 is coded as a joint, German-Russian dispute with a highest action of clash against China in 1900. It is coded as separate from the Boxer Rebellion (MID#0031), with the rebellion-coded dispute ending when the Dowager Empress fled Beijing on August 15, 1900.

There are several problems with this interpretation. First, Germany and Russia were not coordinating together against China, and separately from the other Allied partners, though both states were actively raiding Boxers after the fall of Beijing. (MID#3250 codes the Manchurian war between Russia and China during this time.)

Second, the troops and navies of the Allied forces remained in China well past the August 16, 1900 end date of MID#0031, which is the beginning date for this dispute. In short, there is no reason to think that the Allied intervention in China during the Boxer Rebellion should be two separate disputes.

MID#0031 should be recoded as follows:

- End date changed to 9/07/1901, with the signing of the protocol ending the conflict
- Settlement changed to negotiation

MID#2327

MID#2327 is a bilateral MID between Israel and Turkey occurring on one day on August 10, 1976. Israel is Side A, coded as having seized something from Turkey. Turkey did not reciprocate. The MID ends in a non-negotiated released.

Specific Sources says this MID is coded using Facts on File and New York Times.

This MID refers to an Israeli seizure of a 700-ton Turkish freighter called *Caferokam*. The boat and crew of seven were seized after leaving the Lebanese port of Tyre. Reports differed on whether the boat was in international or Israeli waters. The former is more likely the case.

A follow-up report says the Turkish freighter was carrying a large cargo of arms destined for Palestinians in Lebanon.

We were not able to prove the seizure lasted more than 24 hours. More importantly, we did not find evidence of a protest by the Turkish government.

MID#2356

On June 5, 1986, the Venezuelan foreign minister stated that “as long as Venezuela exists as a state” it would continue to exercise rights over the islands within its gulf and the gulf up to the north of the Guajira Peninsula. He labeled as “absurd” a “draft amendment on the status of the islands” devised by a Colombian magistrate. There was no explicit mention of any specific threat to use force directed towards Colombia.

MID#2365

MID#2365 is most likely the Allied intervention in Southern Russia and Ukraine. It has a start date of November 23, 1918 and an end date of April 6, 1919. The United Kingdom, France, and Russia are originators. Romania and Greece join on December 17, 1918. The United Kingdom had a HIACT of 7. The other members of Side A had a HIACT of 14. Russia has a HIACT of 16. The MID ends in a non-negotiated victory for Side B. The start date is not entirely clear. Coincidentally, it does happen to be a year to the day after the Russian Civil War MID (#0197) originally started in November 23, 1917, with the threat from the Allies over Bolshevik attempts to pursue a separate peace with Germany. This campaign in Southern Russia is actually connected to other interventions by the Allies in Siberia and North Russia. The end date coincides with the French retreat from Odessa (Fischer 1951, 180-182). France’s goal was to occupy Odessa, and its hinterlands, in order to provide food and ammunition to the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the vicinity. France never entertained the idea of combat in this capacity.

When, in March 1919, the Red Army was advancing on Odessa, the original cause for France was lost. Parliament in France ordered the evacuation on April 2, 1919. The French had vacated the area on April 6, 1919. Fischer says that, from that point forward, French involvement in the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War took on a strictly non-combat role. Effectively, France exits the Russian Civil War MID (#0197) on this date. The Allied campaign in Southern Russia represents one part of a multifaceted Allied campaign to prevent the Russians from making peace with Germany during the end of World War I, and to overthrow the Bolshevik government. Per the terms of a December 23, 1917 agreement between the two, leading the effort against Russia in North Russia, the Baltic and the Caucasus was the responsibility of the United Kingdom. France, in exchange, would be able to lead the charge in Ukraine and Crimea (Fischer 1951, 154-155, 836). In short, this was France’s “domain” during the Allied intervention, whereas Great Britain took the lead on North Russia.

MID#2366

MID#2366 is the Allied intervention in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, for which the start date is the landing at Murmansk on June 28, 1918 (Strakhovsky 1944, 43-44). The United States, France, Italy, and Serbia are on Side A. Russia is on Side B. HIACT for all is 14, excluding Russia, for which the HIACT is 16. End date is October 12, 1919. The end date coincides with the Anglo-British retreat from Murmansk (Arnot 1967, 158). The campaign in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk was a core theater of the Allied intervention in Russia, which is already captured in MID#0197. It is not a stand-alone MID, per the Correlates of War’s understanding of what is a “militarized interstate dispute”, or dispute coding rule #2 (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 169, 175). See: Fischer 1951, 143-144.

MID#2542

Irish fishing patrol boats fired on a Spanish trawler that had entered Irish waters. However, Spanish ambassador ordered the captain of the Spanish trawler to surrender to the Irish before the Irish ever opened fire on the Spanish trawler. The Spanish also sided with the Irish authorities against the fishing boats illegally fishing in Irish waters.

MID#2558

This case is coded as an attack by Iran on an Italian tanker on September 7, 1985. However, no shots were fired, and the seizure or “inspection” of the cargo lasted only five hours. This is not a militarized incident since seizures must last at least twenty-four hours.

MID#2561

On October 8, 1985, a missile or rocket hit a West German container ship traveling from North Yemen to Kuwait. This incident occurred about the same time as the Iraqi government announced that it had hit a “large naval target” in the Gulf, a term it used to refer to oil tankers and merchant ships that it had attacked. Normally, these ships belonged to supporters of the Iranian government, but this time the ship was destined for Kuwait, an Iraqi ally which makes it unclear as to whether Iran or Iraq launched the attack. Without a clear initiator or no evidence of protest from West Germany, this is not a dispute and should be dropped.

MID#2567

Two Southern Yemeni jets forced an Air Djibouti (airline owned by the Djibouti government) plane to land in Southern Lebanon. The plane was kept in Southern Lebanon for 4 hours while officials searched for opponents of the Southern Yemeni government. The seizure did not meet the 24-hour rule.

MID#2606

Given the participants, the start date, and the sources used, MID#2606 is a double count of MID#0197. MID#0197 already captures all the participants and first and last militarized incidents. This is not a separate dispute.

MID#2608

MID#2608 refers to the house arrest of Robinson McIlvaine, a US diplomat in Guinea, on 30 October 1966. The Guinean government believed that the US was responsible for a series of Guinean arrests by Ghana earlier in the week. When it was proven that the US had no hand in the arrests, McIlvaine was released on 31 October 1966. One-day seizure. Less than 24 hours. (see MID#2608.source1.pdf - “Mr. McIlvaine was ordered held under house arrest for almost 24 hours...”)

MID#2620

MID#2620 is coded as a Zairean seizure of Congolese property, which was required with a threat to use force. The MID occurs between August 21, 1971 and August 19, 1972. The MID ends in a negotiated compromise.

Specific Sources says this MID is coded using the Africa Research Bulletin and the African Contemporary Record.

Our review of these sources do not support coding a MID here. We found no evidence of a Congolese threat to use force. Further, Zaire did not seize Congolese diplomats but rather declared them persona non grata and asked them to leave. It appears as if the original MID coders misread the ongoing trial of these diplomats as a seizure when these diplomats were being tried in abstentia for allegedly aiding a coup plot orchestrated by students of a university in Kinshasa.

We recommend dropping this MID.

MID#2621

On July 7, 1971, Idi Amin ordered the border with Tanzania and Rwanda closed and any aircraft violating Ugandan airspace shot down. Amin said that guerrillas from Zambia were entering Uganda through Rwanda. Rwanda's minister of Commerce, Mines, and Industry, Anastase Makusa, was in Kampala when Amin gave the order and protested vigorously. Rwanda's major export agricultural product, coffee, was in season, and most of Rwanda's trade passed through Kampala. But Amin kept the border closed.

Amin met Rwanda's ambassador in Kampala, Alphonse-Marie Kagenza. Soon after, on 4 August, Amin reopened the border with Rwanda, but he made three demands: "(i) The Rwandan Government must stop immediately activities by anti-Ugandan guerrillas in its country. (ii) It should prevent Tanzania carrying out any anti-Ugandan military activities through Rwanda. (iii) It should prevent any subversive activities in Rwanda against Uganda" (Africa Research Bulletin, 1971, 2193).

The closing of the border was directed at guerillas, not the Rwandan government. A border closing is also not a show of force.

MID#2637

MID#2637 is a bilateral MID between India and Pakistan occurring on July 15, 1970. It is coded as one-day threat to use force from India against Pakistan, which was unreciprocated. The MID ends in a non-negotiated stalemate.

Specific Sources says this MID was coded using *Facts on File* and *New York Times*.

This dispute is about Kashmir. Indira Gandhi was quoted as saying the following:

"We shall deal with them with a strong hand."

She later followed that with this statement in the same public meeting.

"I am not saying this as a threat to anyone. I am not in the habit of giving threats; you all know what great responsibility devolves on us. We have to maintain the territorial integrity of Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of the country, and work for their economic development."

This is not specific enough to count as a threat to use force.

MID#2701

With the Allied intervention in Russia, China seized the opportunity to recover the right of navigation through the Amur. The Russians threatened the Chinese with violence but on August 20th four Chinese vessels followed by Japanese torpedo boats sailed north toward the Amur. On September 17th the Russians allowed the ships to take shelter at Nikolaevsk but warned not to go further. The Chinese decided to go against the Russian request and sailed north on October 18th. They were fired upon on October 25th by one of Kalmykov's Ussuri Cossack units and had to go back to Nikolaevsk. This is another MID that has to do with the Allied Intervention in Russia, but the MID is not between Japan and China. Due to Japanese intervention, the Chinese seize an opportunity to go North. The dispute occurs between the Russians and the Chinese (which is MID#2700). The Japanese are really just bystanders.

MID#2703

After signing a Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty in August, China demanded that the Soviet union had to hand Manchuria over to the KMT government to keep the peace and its obligations under the treaty. On September 14th 1945, Soviet military commanders landed in a military aircraft in Yen-an, China to discuss future actions in Manchuria with the communist party. This was the first official visit of a representative of the USSR government to the headquarters of the CCP. On September 16th 1945, the Soviet-Mongolian headquarters of the Transbikal Military Region which was responsible for Manchuria, informed the CCP that 'the main forces of the Eighth Route Army should be urgently ordered to move northward immediately.' This was to ensure the take over of the regions that the Soviet Union occupied in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. The goal was to maintain the connection to Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union believed that it could establish better relations with with Chinese communists than the KMT government. There was no show of force on either side of this diplomatic dispute.

MID#2706

There is no evidence of this dispute between China and Russia in 1962, especially a clash. There is nothing in Day, Tsien-hua, or Clubb. ProQuest, Google Scholar, Google Books, etc. There is instead two different sources that suggest "a significant detente in the Sino-Soviet dispute appeared to develop" during spring through September of 1962.

MID#2712

The Soviets charged that China had engaged in several border violations across the Mongolian border. However, China vehemently denied these accusations, and contemporary analysts suggested they were fabricated by the Soviets. The violations themselves also did not make sense strategically for the Chinese. Without additional evidence, this seems nothing more than Soviet propaganda.

MID#2726

The Soviet Union engaged in global naval exercises in April 1975. There was no specific target, and other states did not allege they were being targeted but cautiously acknowledged that the Soviet Union was presenting its capabilities to the world.

The original end date of this case, in June 1975, corresponds to a note the Soviet Union gave Japan cautioning them not to sign a treaty with China. The note did not threaten any particular type of action if Japan did sign the treaty. There is no militarized incident here.

MID#2737

Canada said it would seize any French fishermen caught fishing in the Burgeo Bank area, south of Newfoundland. Canada claimed France had exceeded its cod quota. This threat to use force was directed against civilians, not the French government.

MID#2756

An Angolan jet mistook a plane carrying the Botswanan president for an enemy aircraft and fired on it. The plane was able to land, and there were only a few minor injuries. The firing was accidental, and there was no protest.

MID#2761

A Turkish soldier shot two Greek Cypriot national guardsmen, wounding one and killing the other. He then broke into the home of a Greek Cypriot woman and attempted to rape her. Greek Cypriot policemen arrived and killed the soldier. This was not sanctioned by Turkey. The soldier was not representing official Turkish policy. This is not a militarized dispute.

MID#2787

After an attack on a Turkish village near the Syrian border by Kurdish rebels, the Turkish Foreign Ministry told Syria to tighten border security. Turkey said it may retaliate against the Kurdish rebels next time. This was not a threat to use force against Syria, and any threat made was not specific.

MID#2795

A United Arab Emirates flagged tanker, the Anita, struck what was likely an Iranian mine in the Gulf of Oman and sunk with only a handful of crew member surviving. There is no way of proving that Iran placed the mine or deliberately aimed to attack the UAE, and, as such, this is not a militarized incident.

MID#2813

The waters around the Falkland Islands were in dispute between Argentina and Britain. A Japanese fishing vessel was seized by the Argentinian coast guard on February 13th 1987. The Japanese admitted that they had been in the economic zone without permission. On March 24th another Japanese fishing boat was seized in the same waters for illegal fishing. There was no protest from Japan.

MID#2814

The Dutch and Belgians sent mine sweeping vessels as a part of a coalition of countries clearing the Persian Gulf of mines. This was not a show of force against Iran and not a militarized incident.

MID#2829

This is coded as a threat to use force by Turkey against Bulgaria on October 3, 1987. The event is coded based on a summary New York Times report from October, but the coding references a statement by the Turkish Prime Minister in August. His statement: “we shall not abandon the case of 'Turks' in Bulgaria. We shall settle it as we did in Cyprus. After the operation in Cyprus there is no trace of Greek Cypriots and Greeks.” This statement is obviously too vague to justify a threat to use force according to CoW’s coding rules.

MID#2830

Bulgaria claimed a Turkish fishing boat sunk when it collided with a Bulgarian patrol boat inside Bulgarian waters. Turkey disputed the claim, and there is no other evidence of the incident.

MID#2831

The Israeli navy intercepted a Cypriot ferry and told it to return to Cyprus. It was suspected of ferrying Palestinian guerillas. There was no seizure, and, regardless, the incident lasted less than 24 hours.

MID#2837

This case is coded as a show of force by Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, and Russia, on May 18, 1896, against Greece, and lasting until July 6, 1896. However, the Great Powers sent a contingent of 450 troops and ships in February of 1897 (not 1896) and eventually launched a blockade until Crete was pacified. This show of force is described in MID#0056. This case probably refers to the increasing pressure placed on the Sultan to resolve the Cretan Crisis in 1896 – the Great Powers had fleets in the Mediterranean. However, that pressure never constituted a codeable militarized incident.

MID#2842

India accused Portugal of violating Indian airspace multiple times during the year by aircraft flying to Goa and stated that “actions would be taken” if the practice continued. Portugal denied all accusations, and the threat by India was not specific and did not necessarily imply militarized actions.

MID#2843

A DC-3 transport plane was forced to land in the Suez Canal Zone by an Egyptian military plane. It may have been off course. Regardless, it was on the ground for forty-five minutes according to reports. The plane was not attacked, and the seizure was less than 24 hours, with no protest of a border violation by Egypt. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#2845

MID#2845 was coded as the Chilean seizure of American fishing boats and the American threat to use force that followed. On 13 December 1957, the originally coded start date, Chile fired warning shots across the bows of 23 American fishing boats as a show of force when the boats refused to leave Chilean territorial waters. No boats were seized in the incident, and the U.S. did not deliver a

note of protest. The end date, 18 December 1957, corresponds to comments from the U.S. warning Chile not to interfere with U.S. fishing vessels. There was no seizure and no threat of force by the United States. Normally, this would be considered a show of force if it were against a military vessel, but a show of force against private citizens is not a militarized incident. Chilean representatives confirmed there was no protest from the United States.

MID#2846

Albania machine gunned an Italian fishing boat that had drifted into its waters. One fisherman died. However, there was no protest from the Italians.

MID#2848

The Norwegian navy seized a Soviet trawler fishing within Norwegian territorial waters. There is no evidence of protest from the Soviets.

MID#2856

Syrian anti-aircraft guns fired on four Italian and three French private planes that were flying from Lebanon to Turkey to help fight locust swarms. None were damaged, and there was no protest from Italy or France. Without protest, this attack on private planes is not a militarized incident.

MID#2864

The Soviet Navy seized two Danish salmon fishing cutters and took them to the port of Liepaja. There was no protest from Denmark.

MID#2866

Israeli policemen seized a Lebanese fishing boat and arrested five crew members for illegal fishing. Lebanon did not protest.

MID#2867

The Dominican Republic forced down a US C-47 transport carrying a military attache. The US asked for an explanation, and the Dominican Air Force commander apologized. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#2882

On June 11, 1961, a Soviet patrol vessel seized and detained several Japanese fishing vessels off Hokkaido, Northern Japan, alleging that the fishermen had violated Soviet territorial waters. On July 15, the Soviet government announced that the vessels would be released. There is no evidence of any protest by Japan.

MID#2883

The British and Danish governments had signed an agreement in 1959 that granted British fishing rights off the Faroe islands but reserved the six miles of water that surround the Faroe islands for local fishermen. This dispute began on 29 May when the Danish frigate Niels Ebbesen allegedly

found the Red Crusader, a British fishing trawler, within six miles of the Faroe islands. The Niels Ebbesen stopped the Red Crusader and sent an unarmed boarding party to the British fishing ship, but once the Danish party had come aboard the Red Crusader raced for Scotland with the Niels Ebbesen in chase. A Royal Navy frigate, HMS Troubridge, and a British fishing-protection vessel, Wotton, met the Red Crusader on its way. On 30 May officers from the Wotton met with the commanding officer of the Niels Ebbesen at sea and negotiated the release of the boarding party. The boarding by the Danes was less than 24 hours long. The Red Crusader was a private boat, and so its actions did not constitute the acts of the British government. The British and Danish military forces negotiated the release of the boarding party. This is not a militarized incident. The British foreign secretary explicitly stated that this was a private incident with diplomatic overtones and not a militarized incident.

MID#2893

Soviet authorities seized a Japanese fishing boat for violating Soviet territorial waters. Three of the sailors were eventually released, but there was no protest by Japan.

MID#2896

The Soviets seized two Finnish trawlers and a speedboat. Finland did not protest but “awaited explanation” for the Soviet actions. One of the trawlers confirmed to the Finnish coast guard that it had found a place for alcohol smugglers on the boat. This is not a militarized incident without a protest.

MID#2900

A British cutter strayed into Chinese waters and was seized. The boat and the crew were released the next day unharmed, and the British stated that the crew was well treated. Britain made no protest. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#2902

The Polish navy seized eight Danish and two West German fishing vessels within Polish territorial waters. There were no protests of the incident, but the Danish embassy in Poland was asked by their government to provide assistance. This is not a militarized incident without a protest.

MID#2903

A Soviet patrol boat seized a Japanese fishing boat in disputed waters. There was no protest by Japan.

MID#2909

This case is a duplicate of MID#2220 in which Soviet fighters shot down an American training jet after it strayed over the East German border, killing 3 American officers. Another American plane was shot down over East Germany by Soviet fighters, and its two crew were detained. They were released 17 days later. The dates overlap, and the issue is the same in both cases.

MID#2910

The official Soviet press agency claimed US military planes buzzed a Soviet tourist ship in the Mediterranean. This was not a show of force against a tourist ship, and there was no formal protest.

MID#2911

A six-ton Japanese fishing boat was seized by a Soviet patrol boat in disputed waters. There was no protest by Japan.

MID#2912

South Vietnam seized two Taiwanese fishing boats and their 40 crew for violating Vietnamese waters. There was no protest.

MID#2917

This case refers to the interception of a Spanish passenger plane over Israeli airspace on 4 April 1965. After ignoring orders to land, an Israeli Air Force jet fired warning shots and forced a Spanish passenger plane to land. The crew was questioned and released on 5 April 1965, less than 24 hours from the first interception by the Israelis. The pilot apologized for the incursion, and there was no protest on either side of the incident.

MID#2939

Norway seized trawlers from the Soviet Union, Denmark, and East Germany after they entered restricted waters near a Norwegian military base. Several other boats escaped. There were no protests.

MID#2945

The South Vietnamese Navy detained and released Taiwanese fishermen after they landed on one of the Paracels. Both South Vietnam and Taiwan claim the islands. The fishermen were only detained for about two hours, and, hence, this does not qualify as a militarized incident.

MID#2952

The US Coast Guard seized 5 Canadian trawlers for illegally fishing within US territorial waters off of Washington. There was no protest from the Canadian government.

MID#2953

This refers to an American seizure of a Canadian fishing vessel near Seattle. There was no evidence of protest by the Canadian government.

MID#2954

This case refers to the US seizure of a Cuban fishing boat near Cape Cod on 17 August 1975. The boat was found in violation of the Coastal Fisheries Act but was released without fines on 22 August 1975. Cuba did not protest.

MID#2957

This case refers to the Panamanian seizure of two U.S. tuna boats on 26 April 1976 in the Canal Zone waters. The boats were released on 6 May 1976. There is no indication of a formal protest. The US was said to be studying the note given by Panama.

MID#2966

Thirty-eight Chinese boats, many of them armed, anchored around the Senkaku Islands and began shouting pro-China slogans about how the islands belonged to China. These boats were not official Chinese forces and were not representing the Chinese government. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#2970

The Norwegian navy boarded 6 Danish fishing boats and told them to leave an area in the North Sea claimed by both countries. The boardings lasted less than 24 hours.

MID#2978

Libya accused two American fighters of buzzing a Libyan jetliner. This was not a show of force by the United States government.

MID#2983

Argentina stopped a Brazilian research vessel in the disputed Beagle Channel. A reporter for Jornal do Brasil actually spoke by telephone with the commander of the Brazilian ship, and quotes him as saying (a) that the Argentines demanded that he wait 13 hours for an Argentine pilot to arrive, which he refused to do, and (b) that he tried negotiating with the Argentines for 15 minutes, at which point he shifted his course (the Argentine ship had stopped in front of the Brazilian one's prow and refused to budge) and left the scene.

MID#2985

On June 1, 1954, the Chinese government seized a British naval vessel passing by the Sanman Island in border to "conduct an inquiry into what the craft was doing." The vessel and crew were released on July 10, 1954. There is no evidence of any protest by Britain.

MID#2990

Three Chinese Nationalist junks fired upon one British freighter and stripped two others of their cargo. There was no formal protest from the British.

MID#2994

The Soviets seized four Japanese schooners for poaching in Soviet waters. There was no formal protest by Japan.

MID#3008

The Soviet Union forced a South Korean airliner to land after it entered Soviet airspace. There was no hostile action against the plane and no protest from the South Koreans.

MID#3012

A Moroccan expeditionary force with French logistical support assisted Zairean troops in fighting rebels attacking from Angola. These were not Angolan forces.

MID#3023

On October 26, 1979, Burma seized four Thai fishing trawlers along with 10 Thai fishermen for violating Burmese territorial waters in the districts of Polbia and Kawthaung in the Andaman Sea. There is no evidence of an official protest from Thailand.

MID#3039

MID#3039 codes a one-day attack on a Liberian tanker by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. The October 9, 1984, attack is consistent in location and issue with all the other Iraqi attacks on Liberian tankers during 1984 and 1985; these are coded in MID#3046. The only difference in the October 9th incident is that British military personnel were on board, and two British officers died in this attack.

Rather than having separate disputes, we recommend dropping MID#3039 since the incident is consistent with all other Iraqi activity against Liberian ships. Britain should be a joiner to MID#3046 for one day since they protested that attack.

MID#3060

On September 21st, 1983 Zairean "bandits" ambushed and attacked near the border town of Mulira. Two Zambian workers were killed, and two more were injured. Following this incident, Zambian troops were deployed along the border with Zaire. This movement of troops was announced by Zambia's President Kaunda on September 26th at a provincial conference. The troops were said to be stationed there until the situation was under control. Talks were held on the border disputes on January 16th 1984 and both sides decided to talk about the issue more often. In no instance was Zaire targeted by Zambian actions, and news reports suggest that Zaire was cooperative in trying to limit the bandit incursions.

MID#3077

Three Argentinean fishing vessels were intercepted by British warships near the Falkland Islands and told to leave the area. The fishing vessels complied and there was no violence. Argentina protested, but the interception lasted less than 24 hours. There was no attack on the boats.

MID#3081

The speaker of Iran's parliament said they would take action against any Gulf state supplying arms to Iraq: "if truckloads of arms continued to go to Iraq then Iran will have the right to an appropriate response." The article makes reference to past incidents between Kuwait and Iran. In this particular case the threat is vague and does not constitute a militarized incident.

MID#3084

The Prime Minister of the Philippines stated that they would not allow encroachment on the Spratly Islands by China. Specifically, the PM was quoted as saying, “the Philippines would defend these strategically important places with their rich underground resources and would not allow encroachment by China or any other countries.” This is not a specific threat.

MID#3087

Pakistani military sources claimed that Soviet and Afghan troops had destroyed Iranian border posts. However, the Iranian military denied the claims. There is no militarized incident if all the participants deny the event occurred.

MID#3094

Moroccan jets pursued guerrillas into Mauritania. There was no protest from the Mauritanian government.

MID#3103

MID#3103 is coded as a dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria. Sources indicate “molestations” by Cameroonian gendarmes against Nigerian fishermen. However, the nature of these molestations is not clear, no official Nigerian protest is ever reported, and no location was described that might indicate a clear violation of Nigerian territory. An earlier incident from May did occur but is represented in MID#3104.

These states had contested their territorial and maritime borders around the Bakassi Peninsula, which was believed to have rich oil deposits. Nigeria administered the peninsula, but Cameroon claimed it. On 10 December the governor of Cross Rivers State (Nigeria), Clement Isong, “alerted the nation of a renewed wave of molestation of Nigerian fishermen by Cameroonian gendarmes.” The Cameroonians, he said, were attempting to tax the fishermen. Specific sources from CoW confirmed this report.

MID#3115

From Keesing’s: “In addition to aircraft, which had been based in South Yemen for some time, the Soviet Union was understood to have installed surface-to-air missiles in South Yemen and to have a number of T-72 medium tanks based there, some of which, according to Western analysts, had been moved towards the borders with Oman and North Yemen. Soviet naval activity was increasing and according to some sources included the construction of submarine pens; the Soviet warships were largely at bases developed on South Yemen’s Socotra Island, some 250 miles south-east of its coastline. (A subsequent report in the Daily Telegraph of Nov. 17, quoting sources from Oman, stated that residents on Socotra were being moved away because the Soviet Union wished to develop a new naval base on the island.)” These were Soviet actions, and they were not directed at Oman. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#3121

From Keesing’s: “President Mobutu announced on Feb. 4, 1980, that Zairean troops were being sent to guard the border with the Congo, where it was claimed that a camp had been identified in

which were said to be 800 Cuban forces and nearly 3,000 Zairean dissidents. Subsequent reports alleged that the Congolese Government (which denied the presence of Zairean dissidents in the country) had put a stop to preparations by such groups for an attack on Zaire.” The show of force targeted non-state actors, and there is decent evidence that the Congolese were acting to put down the insurgents targeting Zaire. This is not a militarized incident.

MID#3123

Argentina’s navy opened fire on two Bulgarian trawlers illegally fishing in Argentinean waters who resisted detention. There is no indication of a formal protest from Bulgaria about the action.

MID#3125

This case is coded as two Ghanaian threats to use force directed towards Togo. The first, in August of 1977, codes a statement that “Ghana has no territorial ambitions on any country but will never permit an inch of her territory to be encroached on by any country.” The second, in November, followed a statement that Ghana “is prepared to shed blood to the last drop to defend the territorial integrity of the nation.” Neither incident specifies an explicit target or a specific use of force; there is no dispute here.

MID#3136

This dispute is a duplicate of MID#2683.

MID#3153

Jordan accused Saudi Arabia (and also Egypt) of inciting unrest after Jordan signed the Baghdad Pact. Neither state denied these claims, as riots went on for four days in Jordan. However, there is no evidence for a show of force from Saudia Arabia during this time.

MID#3164

This case duplicates MID#1123. Iraq accidentally bombed a Turkish village while pursuing Kurdish rebels. Later, Iraqi war planes attacked the border area, killing two Turkish soldiers. Turkish fighters also shot down an Iraqi jet. Iraq claimed that the fighter had been shot down in Iraq, while Turkey claimed it was shot down for violating Turkish air space. The issue for both cases was the same, and the dates overlap. This is not a separate set of militarized incidents.

MID#3177

Israel seized a Greek freighter that had been towed into port after engine problems. It was carrying arms to Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, and there was no protest from the Greek government.

MID#3194

Iceland seized four Soviet fishing vessels for illegally fishing in Icelandic waters. The captains were fined and released. There was no formal protest from the USSR.

MID#3198

This case refers to the detainment by Indonesia of four British ships and two Panamanian ships on 3 September 1951. Singapore's embassy in Jakarta negotiated the release the following week, but there was no protest from either Britain or Panama.

MID#3201

This case refers to the Soviet seizure of several British fishing boats in 1952 and January of 1953. The Valafell was seized on 21 May 1952. Another British fishing boat, the Equerry, was seized on 21 September 1952. Another seizure occurred 17 December 1952. This boat was fined and released on 30 December 1952. More seizures occurred in January. In each case the boats were detained for a short time, and in many cases the boats were asked to pay fines. There was no British protest of the seizures.

MID#3204

Chinese Nationalists seized and later released a Danish-flagged freighter operating out of Hong Kong. The boat was released on August 28th, and three or four of the Chinese crew were to be tried for being Communist agents. Denmark did not protest.

MID#3212

Chinese Nationalists seized a Japanese freighter off of Formosa. There was no protest from the Japanese government.

MID#3222

An American shrimper was accidentally shot by the Mexican Coast Guard when confronted for illegally fishing in Mexican waters. This was actually one seizure out of about 25 by the Mexicans. The United States asked for an explanation of the shooting, but there was never a formal protest. Mexico instead asked the UN General Assembly for confirmation of a 9-mile limit to territorial waters versus the 3-mile limit argued by the United States.

MID#3223

A Norwegian patrol ship fired shots to scare off Soviet trawlers illegally fishing in Norwegian waters. There was no protest.

MID#3224

Yugoslav patrols seized 22 Italian fishing boats in the Adriatic, six miles off its coast. There is no evidence of a formal protest by Italy. However, this incident and several others led both countries to adopt a treaty in 1958 that details the procedures for seizure and detention of boats illegally fishing in territorial waters.

MID#3226

Communist guerillas raided a Thai training camp for defense volunteers. These were guerillas, not Laotian troops.

MID#3228

MID#3228 is a duplicate of MID#1685, concerning the seizure and escape of a Polish submarine from Tallinn, Estonia.

MID#3233

In March 1825, American and British forces landed at Sagua La Grande, Cuba, in pursuit of pirates. Pirates do not constitute a militarized force, and there was no protest from Spain.

MID#3234

In November 1824, Commodore David Porter landed with a party of 200 men in the town of Fajardo (Puerto Rico) which had sheltered pirates, thus insulting American naval officers, and forced an apology. Pirates do not constitute a militarized force, and there was no protest from Spain.

MID#3235

In October 1824, the U.S.S. Porpoise landed bluejackets near Matanzas, Cuba in pursuit of pirates. Pirates do not constitute a militarized force, and there was no protest from Spain.

MID#3236

On April 8th 1823, the United States landed forces in pursuit of pirates near Escondido, Cuba. They also landed near Cayo Blanco on April 16th. On July 11th U.S. forces landed at Siquapa Bay and on July 21st at Cape Cruz. They also landed at Camrioca on October 23rd. Pirates do not constitute a militarized force, and there was no protest from Spain.

MID#3237

In 1822, the United States landed naval forces on the northwest coast of Cuba to suppress piracy. The forces burned a pirate station on the island. Pirates do not constitute a militarized force, and there was no protest from Spain.

MID#3238

“An erratic Scotchman” named Sir Gregor McGregor recruited a force of 50 men in Baltimore, sailed them to Amelia Island off Spanish Florida, and demanded and received the surrender of the Spanish garrison there. These were not official US forces.

MID#3255

MID#3255 is coded using a Chinese source that roughly translates, “A Brief History of the Russian Aggression of China,” written by Fu Summing. The timing of the events described in this dispute—a highest action of attack by Russia, with no militarized response by China—corresponds well with events taking place in Mongolia. China controlled Mongolia, but the Khalkha Mongols declared their independence from the Qing Dynasty of China in 1911. In 1912 Russia sent a small military mission to Yihe Huree (modern day Ulaanbaatar) to train the fledgling Mongolian army. This army attacked Chinese forces beginning on June 1st and forced the surrender of a Chinese garrison at Hovd in Western Mongolia at the end of August. There is no evidence that Russian forces did

more than train the Mongolian troops, and, since Mongolia is not an independent system member until 1921, this is not a dispute.

MID#3256

Russian Cossacks attacked and killed 200-400 Chinese Mohammedans in Sinkiang province in November 1916. Negotiations continued into January with no resolution. Russia wanted to use this incident to get China to oust the Germans and join the Allies in World War I, saying Germans had antagonized the Cossacks and instigated the riot. The attacks were not carried out by an official militarized force. They were carried out by Russian nomads (Cossacks) who happen to join the military at various points in history. In this case the Cossacks were acting independently.

MID#3266

There is no militarized incident here. Mao had asked the USSR for military aid, equipment and Soviet personnel. Stalin declined any direct military assistance but sent a dispatch of advisors from the Soviet General Staff. This seemed to be in fear of sparking a war with the U.S., which seemed determined to defend Taiwan. Mao repeatedly asked the Soviet Union for military assistance for the conquest of Taiwan. His vice chairman, Liu Shaoqi, brought the issue to his talks with Stalin from July 1949 through August 1949. On July 11th, Stalin outright rejected the request stating that the assistance could cause a world war. On July 25th, Mao sent a telegram to Liu that urged him to again ask Stalin for military assistance; a topic which Stalin avoided during the talks. On July 27th, he repeated that he did not want to risk war with the United States, and Liu withdrew his request for support and closed the issue.

MID#3268

A Botswana police station took damage during an exchange of fire between South African and Zambian forces in Rhodesia. Botswana was not the target.

MID#3270

Portuguese commandos raided a PAICG [African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde] guerilla base in Senegal. These were not Senegalese troops or representatives, and Senegal did not protest.

MID#3271

Portugal warned the Congo and Zambia that their economies would be damaged if they did not stop terrorists based in their countries from attacking the Benguela Railway. There was no threat to use force. From Keesing's: All traffic from Zambia on the Benguela Railway to Lobito was suspended by the Portuguese authorities on March 20, 1967, because of rebel attacks, but was resumed on April 6. A statement issued jointly by the Portuguese Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Overseas Territories on April 8 warned both Zambia and the Congo (Kinshasa) that their economies would be seriously damaged unless they took steps to prevent terrorists allegedly based in their countries from making further attacks on the railway. The statement said that saboteurs in the earlier attacks had come from Zambia and the Congo, "where they have been welcomed and helped," and went on: If these countries do not want to co-operate, or are not interested, or do not possess the means to put an end to terrorist activities, the Portuguese Government declines any responsibility for the

situation which may be created, and does not consider that it has the duty to sacrifice itself for the interests of the landlocked countries when these very countries do not protect their own interests.”

MID#3320

The Times of London reported twice in the month of April, 1817, commenting specifically on an article put out by the Brussels Oracle on April 4. The Oracle article concerned Turkey putting itself on the “war establishment,” seeking redress for past unfortunate arrangements and highlighted the fact that Russia had not yet completely demobilized its military from the past war, specifically citing bases and Russian troop movement in Poland. Both Times articles denounced these troop movements and reports of war establishment in Turkey as mere rumor, one going so far as to denounce them as an “unprincipled attempt to agitate the feelings of Europe.” There is no corroboration that the Ottomans engaged in any show of force in April of 1817.

MID#3324

This case is a British show of force in late January of 1878 against Russia during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8 (MID#0187). The militarized incident concerns the same issue, participants, and actions as MID#0307 and should be dropped as a duplicate case.

MID#3342

This is a mobilization of the civilian guard in Switzerland to protect property near the start of World War I. The “alert” does not involve military personnel and is not directed at any other states.

MID#3350

The British seized a Norwegian trawler for laying mines off the English coast. The action was not protested by Norway.

MID#3363

MID#3363 concerns the German capture of a Somoan leader. The Germans sent four warships to Samoa after the breakup of the Tripartite Washington Conference of 1887, captured Malietoa and carried him off into exile. Samoa is not in the state system in 1887, and the United States’ representative had explicitly stated that its flag did not protect Samoa. There were no warships or American or British troops in the area, and, hence, there was no show of force by the Germans.

MID#3376

In September 1962, Israel and Egypt began accusing the other of having kidnapped a West German rocket expert, Dr. Heinz Krug. Krugs Intra Trading Company supplied Egypt with rocket parts. On July 21st 1962, Egypt’s secret rocket center launched its first rocket. Israel charged that Egypt had kidnapped Krug in order to halt a deal between him and an Israeli firm. Egypt charged that Israel had planned to kidnap all scientists working on rockets, automatic weapons, aircraft, or other such projects.

On November 30th 1962, Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion warned that Israel could not remain passive in the case that the United Arab Republic intervened in a country closer to Israel like it had in Yemen.

The kidnapping, if confirmed, could possibly be a dispute with West Germany, if West Germany protested. The threat by Ben-Gurion was too vague to constitute a threat to use force.

MID#3402

In August 1952, Syria's leader, Col. Adib Shishekly, stated that "the Middle East is not large enough for both Arabs and Jews." On August 18th 1952, Israel's Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion denounced the statement and called it a grave violation of the armistice agreements and a threat to peace. Israel asked for the mixed armistice commission to meet immediately. The threats to Israel were thought to have possibly just been for Syrian audiences, but Israel reacted because they "could not afford to be complacent."

There is no sign of a show of force, and the language in the statement does not constitute a threat.

MID#3429

This is the same dispute as MID#3405, which was a series of clashes and seizures between Israel and Egypt and Syria. There seems to be no justification for the earlier start date in this case (July 1954 versus October 1955 in MID#3405). This case should be dropped.

MID#3505

MID#3505 is coded as a 184-day declaration of war by Bulgaria against Hungary in 1941. This makes no sense as Hungary and Bulgaria would soon be allied later in the same year.

Instead, the date (April 24, 1941) corresponds with a Bulgarian decision to declare war in those areas of Greece and Serbia occupied by Bulgarian troops. Since Greece and Serbia were knocked out of the state system by German occupation, there is no dispute here.

MID#3517

MID#3517 is a double count of MID#1789 which codes a German attack on a Colombian vessel in 1943 and Colombia's entry into WWII. This case is actually counted three times in the dataset (see also, MID#3886). Both MID#3517 and MID#3886 should be dropped.

MID#3524

MID#3524 is a double-count of MID#3877, in which Mexican ships are attacked by German submarines and Mexico declares war on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

MID#3553

Swiss recruits accidentally crossed the border into Liechtenstein during an exercise. Switzerland apologized to Liechtenstein, who accepted the apology.

MID#3571

This was not a dispute between Sri Lanka and India. It was a seven-day offensive by Sri Lanka against Tamil Tiger rebels within Sri Lanka. India had had peacekeepers in the area from 1987 to 1990, and the Tamils used the peacekeeping force as motive for their assassination of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in June of 1992. There was no attack of India by Sri Lankan forces.

MID#3609

This was the seizure of a Spanish vessel and crew. Spain had originally blamed Morocco, but the Polisario Front claimed responsibility and held the crew of 15 fisherman. There are not two state actors in this incident.

MID#3640

Guinean exiles and mercenaries launched a failed invasion from Portuguese Guinea into neighboring Guinea. Portugal denied any involvement though Guinean protests argued that a Portuguese general had given instructions to the mercenaries. Even if this was the case, the forces were irregulars.

MID#3646

This case concerns the Russian ultimatum given to the Chinese in March of 1911, which is actually MID#3647. The dates of this case are earlier to note the tension between the two countries and the increasing belligerence of Russia. The case codes a border fortification by Russia that lasts for almost one year. The original source for the case is in Chinese, and a translation suggests that there was no separate militarized incidents besides the threat by Russia in MID#3647. Searches of other sources confirmed this, and this case should be dropped.

MID#3655

This is a conflict between rival Chinese warlords in the Battle of Urumqi (1933). Sheng Shicai, the warlord in Xinjiang, appealed to the Soviets for aid in the fight. Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the Chinese state, considered sending official Chinese forces to the area, but backed off the idea when he heard the Soviets were involved. The Soviets were invited into the conflict between rival warlords, fighting for the Chinese governor, and the Chinese state did not protest. Unless there is evidence of protest from Chiang Kai-shek, which there is not, this becomes a first incident coding rule issue (JBS, p. 169). With no protest, there is no militarized incident.

MID#3701

By November of 1939 there were rumors of a German attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and the Nazis began massing military forces following the end of the American arms embargo on Germany. Belgium and the Dutch met on November 5th to discuss cooperation in the event of conflict and also to discuss border fortifications. Both states were careful to explicitly declare that their actions were due to “general tensions” so as not to antagonize Germany. Nevertheless, on May 10th 1940, Germany invaded both countries (starting their entry into MID#0258). The United States declared the next day that the Netherlands and Belgium would now be treated as belligerents due to German occupation.

The Dutch fortification starts MID#3701; the Belgian fortification begins MID#3702. Both should be dropped because there was no target of the fortification. The dispute (MID#0258) begins for each state with the German invasion of their territory.

MID#3702

By November of 1939 there were rumors of a German attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and the Nazis began massing military forces following the end of the American arms embargo on Germany. Belgium and the Dutch met on November 5th to discuss cooperation in the event of conflict and also to discuss border fortifications. Both states were careful to explicitly declare that their actions were due to “general tensions” so as not to antagonize Germany. Nevertheless, on May 10th 1940, Germany invaded both countries (starting their entry into MID#0258). The United States declared the next day that the Netherlands and Belgium would now be treated as belligerents due to German occupation.

The Dutch fortification starts MID#3701; the Belgian fortification begins MID#3702. Both should be dropped because there was no target of the fortification. The dispute (MID#0258) begins for each state with the German invasion of their territory.

MID#3710

A German U-Boat stopped an American ship en route from Bordeaux to Ireland. The German commander had thought it was a Greek ship he had ordered to turn back the previous day, and he allowed the American ship to proceed when he realized his mistake. The incident lasted less than 24 hours and was never protested.

MID#3711

MID#3711 is a one-day dispute in which Rumania declared war on the United States in support of Germany. However, the originally coded date was off by one year (1940 instead of the correct year of 1941). With the correct date, both states are involved in the World War II conflict (MID#0258). Per JBS (1996: 170): “5) Military interactions between two states are not coded as separate militarized incidents if they are at war. A state at war may, however, be involved in one or more incidents of military confrontation with a state that is not involved in that war.”

MID#3712

The US froze Hungarian assets in March of 1941 since Hungary was dominated by Germany. Hungary protested and said that it would “see to it that Hungarian interests were taken care of.” This is hardly a threat to use force.

MID#3803

A Soviet patrol accidentally crossed the Turkish border and surrendered when they realized their mistake. Both countries withdrew troops from the border to avoid further incidents. This is not a militarized incident by Russia and was not interpreted as such by Turkey. Consult JBS qualifications #3, #4 (p. 169-170) News reports do suggest increased troops and military preparedness by both states, but these reports are not enough to constitute coding a show of force incident for either side.

MID#3821

This case duplicates MID#3542.

MID#3828

Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Germany on this date, and sources confirmed that there was no Bulgarian reaction to the move. Sofia had actually been establishing closer relations with Russia as well as distancing themselves from Germany. There is no evidence of a clash between Turkey and Bulgaria on this date.

MID#3829

MID#3829 is a double count of MID#3719, the German seizure of Finnish vessels in 1939 and 1940.

MID#3830

On December 10th 1939, the Soviets rebuked Germany for supplying Finland with arms against the Soviets and allowing them to fly over, land, and refuel on German territory. This was a diplomatic dispute and not a military one. On December 14th, the USSR and Germany signed two treaties in response to reports of a rift between the two states.

MID#3831

Mexico asked the Allies on December 20th 1939 to allow the shipment of German manufactured goods to Mexico. Germany and Mexico had contracted oil for manufactured goods at the outbreak of the war. Mexico asked Germany for the goods to repay the debt of the oil and Germany stated that the goods were ready but could not make it to Mexico because of the blockade. Mexico told the allies that the goods had already been paid for prior to the war, and to allow the passage of the ships. There was also an incident on December 19th 1939 in which a German freighter on a voyage from Mexico to Germany was fired upon by a British cruiser. The freighter fled to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Since Germany and Britain were already at war, this militarized incident is part of the larger MID/war.

MID#3833

British warships forced a German battleship into a Uruguayan port after a running battle. There was no indication that the British violated Uruguayan waters, and Uruguay issued no protest. Without a protest in this situation, there is no militarized incident between Britain and Uruguay.

MID#3837

A British source said (“authoritatively”) that an Italian submarine sank a Spanish ship, which might serve British interests if it meant altering the bargaining going on between the Axis and Franco regarding Spanish admission into World War II on behalf of the Axis. However, Rohwer (1997, 127) argues that the Monte Moncayo was probably sunk by a mine in the Mediterranean as there were no Allied or Italian submarines in the vicinity.

MID#3858

This case is a policy dispute pitting Bulgaria against Germany and Rumania. Germany received large amounts of food and oil from the Balkans, so Hitler attempted to keep peace in the region. He variously tried to check Italy's aggressive policy there, satisfy Hungarian and Bulgarian claims to Romanian territory peacefully, and to avoid Great Britain's intervention in Greece (Center of Military History, 1986, 1). Bulgaria wanted to avoid conflict too. The Bulgarian leader, Tsar Boris, declared neutrality in September 1939, and he declined Soviet and Balkan requests for alliance in late 1939 and early 1940. However, Bulgaria also had unfulfilled territorial ambitions. With pressure from Germany, Bulgaria and Romania signed the Craiova Agreement on 7 September 1940, which granted all of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria and led to a population exchange between Northern and Southern Dobruja. The Bulgarians were ecstatic.

However, in October Rumania accepted 20000 German troops, prompting worry in Bulgaria that it was next. The Germans took over Rumanian sea assets; constructed large airports in Rumania; sent Rumanians for pilot training in Germany; and, most importantly, seized Rumanian oil fields. In mid-October Germany turned the pressure on Bulgaria to align with the Nazi regime. Germany pressured Bulgaria to mobilize 300,000 to 400,000 men "as a gesture against Turkey and Greece" ("Denial in Moscow"). Bulgaria resisted that pressure, but it did implement several Nazi-friendly policies: a new economic agreement with Berlin that fixed the currency exchange rate, anti-Semitic policies, and dissolution of the social clubs Bulgarian politicians often joined. Turkey worried that Germany would occupy Bulgaria.

On 23 October Turkey announced its intention to invade Bulgaria if Bulgaria permitted a Nazi occupation. On 6 November the media reported that Bulgaria had aligned with Germany and Italy in exchange for territory. Bulgaria signed the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941. There was no show of force by Germany and no border fortification by Bulgaria against Germany. A new dispute was created for the Turkish threat to Bulgaria, however.

MID#3859

Turkey warned Bulgaria not to join Italy against Greece. Russia was being wooed by the Axis powers not to stand with Turkey. Russia told Germany in early November 1940 that it had offered Bulgaria a guarantee similar to that of Germany. There was no threat to use force against Bulgaria by the Soviets.

MID#3866

A submarine sank a Brazilian freighter. Survivors suspected that it was Italian (based on the stature and "swarthy" of four of its crew, but there was no proof and the sub had no markings). Reports of the incident phrase the attack as "possibly by an Italian submarine." Brazil launched an inquiry but did not protest.

MID#3870

Hungary placed special Iron Guard controllers in charge of units along its border with Rumania in January of 1941. While border fortification is not routine, and the action was government-authorized, this action was not necessarily an explicit threat toward Romania. Romania was

neutral and Hungary was an Axis state. It is possible that the fortification actions were general in nature, and more likely in response to moves beginning in the Eastern front of the war.

MID#3874

MID#3874 describes one incident—the sinking of a Portuguese ship by a German Uboat in October of 1941—of the larger dispute described by MID#0421. MID#3874 is a double count and should be dropped.

MID#3879

The Cuban Navy Department received a report that a ship was torpedoed off the Cuban coast. However, they were unable to find any supporting confirmation or even identify the ship by the name given. The NYT dismissed the authenticity of the original report.

MID#3880

MID#3880 is a declaration of war by Cuba against Germany. This declaration is already part of MID#3519.

MID#3886

MID#3886 is a double count of MID#1789 which codes a German attack on a Colombian vessel in 1943 and Colombia's entry into WWII. This case is actually counted three times in the dataset (see also, MID#3517). Both MID#3517 and MID#3886 should be dropped.

MID#3903

The US warned Iran that it bore some responsibility for the fate of American hostages in Lebanon in 1989. There was not a specific threat of military action, and Iran did not respond.

MID#3918

A Sri Lankan soldier accidentally fired upon 20-30 Indian “peacekeepers” who were invited into the country. At least two Sri Lankan and two Indian soldiers were killed in the attack. Because the firing was accidental, and Indian soldiers were invited into the country, this incident is not a dispute. From the LA Times:

“A soldier in Sri Lanka mistook Indian peacekeeping troops for rebels and opened fire, sparking a gun battle that left at least two Sri Lankan soldiers and two Indian soldiers dead and wounded at least five others, an Indian government spokesman said Saturday. The clash, which occurred early Friday, was the first of its kind since Indian troops were sent to Sri Lanka nearly two years ago, but the spokesman called the incident a mistake and said both countries consider the matter closed. The Sri Lankan soldier fired on an Indian patrol of between 20 and 30 soldiers passing a remote jungle camp, setting off a brief fire fight, said the spokesman, who requested anonymity. The shooting occurred near Vavuniya, about 140 miles northeast of the capital. The exchange of fire between the two sides “lasted for a short while. It was stopped when the mistake was realized,” the New Delhi spokesman said. “It was decided to treat the matter as closed and not to publicize it.”

MID#3951

A French warship fired shots to halt a North Korean freighter, the Sam Il Po, as part of the trade embargo against Iraq. The ship was eventually boarded and its cargo verified before being allowed to proceed. There was no protest from North Korea, and the incident lasted less than 24 hours.

MID#4017

This dispute describes a conflict between Italy and Slovenia. Italian officials sent troops to its border with Slovenia. The Italian government claimed that troops were assembled because of Serbian threats to retaliate against nations involved in a NATO operation in Bosnia, as well as to prevent weapons from being transported from the former Yugoslavia into Italy. This dispute did not escalate past the fortification of the Italian border and was not directed against Slovenia. The border fortifications also seem directed at intervention rather than a display of force against Serbia.

MID#4023

The MID narrative for this dispute describes the incident:

“This dispute consists of one incident in which China placed its forces on alert in response to its concern that Taiwan was beginning to increase moves toward independence. China placed its air, naval, and land forces on alert. This dispute consists of one incident in which China placed its forces on alert in response to its concern that Taiwan was beginning to increase moves toward independence. China placed its air, naval, and land forces on alert.”

However, neither the CoW listed sources, nor any other newspaper sources, describe an alert in January 1993. Relations were tense, and China’s desire to enforce reunification high, but China was still solidly taking the policy of not striking until Taiwan acted first. Taiwan also arranged to purchase 150 American F-16 Fighting Falcons and 60 French Mirage 2000-5 fighter planes, but this was not explicitly directed at China.

MID#4025

According to the Deutsche Presse-Agentur:

“Taiwan admitted Wednesday that one of its coastal police vessels intruded in Japanese waters on January 8 while pursuing a smuggling vessel. The National Police Administration made the statement in response to the Japanese Maritime Police Agency’s accusation that a Taiwanese police vessel invaded Japanese territorial waters and fled after taking photos of five Japanese fishing boats. ‘The coastal police vessel was chasing the smuggling vessel in Taiwan waters, then crossed into Japanese waters,’ the statement said, promising to further investigate the incident.”

There was no Japanese protest of this incident which would be required in this case of an accidental crossing.

MID#4026

From UPI:

“A Taiwanese lawmaker who was sailing toward a disputed islet in the East China Sea Friday was turned back by Japanese patrol ships, prompting calls in Taipei for a military solution to the dispute. Taipei County Council member Chin Chieh-shou and his 18-member party were sailing to one of the Diayu islands just 200 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and 300 kilometers southwest of Okinawa when they were stopped by three Japanese patrol boats, state television reported. After unfurling Taiwan’s national flag and burning the flag of the Japanese navy, Chin’s group aboard the Yi Long No. 6 fishing boat was forced to return to Taiwan. The incident was the latest in a string of failed attempts by Taiwanese civilians to destroy a lighthouse built by the right-wing Japan Youth Federation on the main islet of Diayu, or Senkaku.”

The lawmaker was acting as a private citizen and did not represent Taiwan in the incident. This is not a militarized dispute.

MID#4032

This case began with riots over shops and markets not wanting to accept soldier’s wages paid in new banknotes. When the violence erupted on January 28, troops were sent immediately on January 29 and 30 to evaluate foreign citizens who were in danger as violence grew. There were deaths in the dispute, but an official death count of citizens or troops were never confirmed. This dispute was in the capital of the Republic of Congo, Kinshasa and Zaire. The Republic of Congo allowed a limited number of French and Belgian troops in to evacuate their citizens. Belgium stated that it 500 paratroopers on standby to help an evacuation, but this was not a threat to use force against the DRC. Even if a clear threat was ever made, it would not be against the DRC but, rather, against the rioting soldiers.

MID#4153

This case describes the detention of a Nicaraguan boat by the Salvadoran navy. The lone source for this possible seizure in Xinhua:

“the bodies of two Nicaraguan naval servicemen who had disappeared in the Pacific Ocean on March 7 were spotted Friday, one week after the shipwreck, military sources said today. The other four bodies, already located in the sea, are expected to be recovered today. The six crew members of the Nicaraguan navy’s rapid boat no. 004 disappeared when they were ordered to assist a Nicaraguan boat. The Nicaraguan boat was detained by the Salvadoran naval force in the Gulf of Fonseca shared by Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Naval investigations indicated that the incident was caused by boat engine problems and high waves.”

According to the story, any detention would have had to occur in February, not March. Further, there is no indication that the detention lasted more than 24 hours. That and the lack of additional evidence documenting a seizure recommends that this case be dropped.

MID#4163

MID#4163 is a double count of MID#4116. Both involve Togo’s claims of guerilla activity along its border with Ghana in 1994 and Togo’s subsequent closure of the border.

MID#4178

The CoW narrative provides this description: "This dispute consists of one incident in which Chinese border forces shot a Mongolian national that crossed the border into China. Mongolia protested the incident."

It is based on one BBC report, which cannot now be found. No other news sources are available for this incident.

Subsequent research by CoW found the following:

"MID#4178 is coded as an attack by China against Mongolia, October 10 to October 13, 1999. Source document in Mandarin confirms that Chinese soldiers shot at Mongolians on Chinese land crossing into Mongolia." ([link](#))

There are problems with this interpretation. The Mongolians were not official forces—they were alcohol runners—and were shot on Chinese soil. It cannot be a Chinese attack if the forces were on Chinese soil. Border violations only involve official forces, too.

MID#4264

An Australian peacekeeping force was sent to East Timor by the UN and was immediately harassed, and Australian warships and jets were placed on alert. On September 13th 1999, Indonesia said that they would not allow Australian forces to have a role in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor. On September 22nd, President Habibie of Indonesia gave a speech to Parliament expressing that it was necessary to allow foreign troops into East Timor. He added that the government had no choice, but also that Australia had 'overreacted and had breached the terms of a defense agreement.' Indonesia and Australia were working together, albeit reluctantly on the part of Indonesia, on peacekeeping operations in East Timor. This is not a militarized dispute. It is a diplomatic dispute, if anything.

MID#4265

On July 28th 2001, New Zealand peacekeepers exchanged gunfire with suspected militiamen in West Timor. An Indonesian soldier was shot four times in West Timor, 65 feet from the border with East Timor. The soldier had fired, was carrying a weapon, and was in civilian clothing not uniform. The peacekeepers returned the fire and the soldier was killed. The soldier did not represent the Indonesian government. New Zealand was not attacking Indonesia or its representative.

MID#4270

This MID is the boarding of two Iraqi ships, a tanker and a tug boat, which were suspected of trying to violated the UN imposed embargo and smuggle oil from the country by the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi boats refused to be boarded and navy commandos and Marines took the boats by force. No shots were fired, although one crew member was hit by a rifle butt as he resisted the boarding party and three other Iraqis were temporarily handcuffed when they put up a fight. After it was determined that the boats were not operating in violation of any UN sanctions because the tanker was carrying water, not oil, they were released. The incident did not last more than the required 24 hours.

MID#4274

MID#4274 and MID#4215 code two troop alerts by Kuwait in response to Iraqi moves in 1999. The alerts are ten days apart (in January) and concern the same border issue. These incidents should be aggregated. We recommend dropping MID#4274 and extending the end date of MID#4215 to January 21, 1999.

MID#4311

The Tanzanian military was strengthening its presence along the border but to control the refugee situation in Burundi. There was also no protest from Burundi's government. In fact, the Burundian defense minister commended Tanzania's actions along the border. This is not a dispute between the two countries.

MID#4327

This dispute is a double count of MID#4259. The participants, issues, and location of conflict all overlap, and even the incident data uses much of the same set of incidents to aggregate into a dispute. MID#4327 should be dropped.

Appendix IIC—Cases that should be merged with other disputes

MID#0251

MID#0251 describes an incident on April 9, 1965, in which American and Chinese jet fighters clashed near Hainan Island, China. One American fighter crashed after accidentally being hit by a missile from another American plane.

Fighter clashes continued between the two countries but were coded as a separate dispute for some reason: MID#2929 starts with the shooting down, on October 5, 1965, of an American plane by Chinese fighters. The participants are the same, the issues are the same, and the location is consistently near the Vietnamese border. These disputes should be merged. We recommend keeping MID#2929 because it contains other incidents as well; its beginning date should be changed to April 9, 1965.

MID#0266

MID#0266 should be merged with MID#1706. Both concern a series of border incidents between France and Tunisia following the latter's independence and French refusal to abandon its base at Bizerte. The issues in all incidents are the same, involving the same participants, and fought in the same general location. CoW source listings confirm this.

MID#1008

Based on JBS coding guidelines and the occurrence of border incidents between Jordan and Israel, it appears that this MID should be combined with MID#1006 that ends on August 4, 1955. The end of MID#1006 appears to be a ceasefire agreement, not a formalized end to hostilities (NY Times, Love 8/5/55). The article reports that Jordan was technically still at war with Israel, and that a liaison pact had been established to help communication along the border and prevent clashes along the truce line. MID#1008 is coded to begin on October 17, 1955, but this is less than three months after the August 5th date. Even if a cease-fire was not established in MID#1006, Israeli-Jordanian border incidents occurred on 6/23/55 and in mid-September 1955.

This dispute involves a string of hostile border incidents between Israeli and Jordanian forces, and it also involves diplomatic protests to the Mixed Armistice Commission regarding sabotage activities from both sides on civilians living near the Israel-Jordan border. On October 17, 1955, a small border incident was reported in which an Israeli patrol was fired on from Jordanian positions. Jordan and Israel reportedly negotiated a settlement of their complaints related to this issue, but in November, Israel issued a strong warning to Jordan over incidents in which Israeli homes were dynamited by Jordanian infiltrators. Israel said Jordan would face severe repercussions if these attacks continued. More severe border clashes began to be reported in March 1956, with one on March 13, 1956 lasting six hours between Israeli and Jordanian forces.

Other fatal clashes and incursions were reported with frequency in April and into August. In September 1956, Israel staged a raid on a Jordanian border post and killed 19. Other reprisal raids in October led to 66 deaths, and on October 12, Britain warned Israel that it would honor its defense pact with Jordan if raids continued. On October 26, 1956, Israel announced that it did not want war with Jordan, but that it would do whatever was necessary to defend itself if attacked. Israel reported border raids from the Jordanian side in mid-November, but news reports indicate

that the Israeli government believed these to be staged by Egypt in an attempt to get Israel to attack Jordan (essentially they believed it was a passive-aggressive attempt by Egypt to get back at Jordan for not lending more support during British invasion).

MID#1020

MID#1020 should be merged with MID#1019. Both disputes concern exchanges of fire on the Israeli-Jordanian border near Jerusalem from August 1963 to September 1965. The last incident in MID#1019 on 29 October, in which two Israelis were injured after shots by Jordanian forces across the border, occurs less than three months before the the start of MID#1020. No ceasefire, withdrawal, or agreement exists in these three months to justify separating these disputes. Since these disputes are united by participants, issue, and location, we recommend merging MID#1020 with MID#1019 and dropping MID#1020. CoW source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#1134

MID#2112 concerns a series of militarized incidents between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. An agreed withdrawal from the disputed territory on 21 May 1974 originally separated these disputes. However, MID#1134 begins less than three months after the withdrawal, with clashes occurring in the first two weeks of August 1974. Therefore, we recommend folding MID#1134 into MID#2112 and dropping MID#1134. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#1204

On June 11, 1907, a Nicaraguan warship attacked and captured the Salvadorian port of Acajutla. Martin contends that it was a few months after this that Honduras joined in the dispute on the side of Nicaragua. It was then announced on September 24, that Guatemala would support an uprising in Honduras, and the ouster of puppet President Davila, effectively taking sides with El Salvador. This is actually an extension of MID#1202. The same issues and participants are involved (with Guatemala joining in September of 1907), and there is only a two-month gap between the disputes, with no formal agreement ending the first dispute. This MID#1204 should be dropped and MID#1202 should be extended.

MID#1211

Bolivia and Paraguay signed a ceasefire on 12 June 1935. The peace talks were scheduled to begin in August, with both countries ready to compromise. However, cross-border recriminations began in earnest during this month, culminating in Bolivia threatening to stop demobilization if it didn't get its way at the peace conference and Paraguay responding by threatening to militarily help two Bolivian-controlled territories secede. [Note that the original coding of MIDs had MID#1027 and MID#1211 as separate disputes because there was thought to be a three-month period of inactivity following the June 12th cease-fire, with the new dispute beginning three days after the 3-month rule came into effect. However, Bolivia's threat to use force and especially Paraguay's open threat to use military force against Bolivian territory, both in August, extend the original dispute (MID#1027) and force the deletion of the separate incident (MID#1211).]

The peace talks included agreements for a prisoner release and both countries demobilizing their militaries to a population of 5,000 each. Paraguay held 17,000 Bolivian POWs to the 2,500

Paraguayans held by Bolivia. Paraguay announced that it would release a certain number of prisoners as a quid pro quo with Bolivia and then release the rest once the peace agreement had been signed by Bolivia. Also, Paraguay refused to put the issue of a claim of ownership by Bolivia of a port on the River Paraguay on the table during the talks. Outraged, Bolivia threatened to suspend its demobilization efforts unless Paraguay released the Bolivian POWs immediately. Paraguay refused and in response actually mobilized its 18-21 year olds on September 15, 1935. [This was originally the start of MID#1211.]

On October 5, Bolivian officers were returned by Paraguay, and October 7, 1935, the neutral military mission returned from the Chaco to announce that both countries militaries had been successfully demilitarized down to 5,000 each. [The original coding had an end date of October -9, 1935.]

MID#1216

We recommend merging MID#1216 with MID#1213 and dropping MID#1216. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment. Both disputes concern allied United States and South Vietnamese attacks and incursions into Cambodian territory during the backdrop of the Vietnam War. Originally, these disputes, as well as MID#1217, were separated by 6-month counts. MID#1216 also added the participants of China and Thailand. However, both China and Thailand should be dropped as participants from the incidents in MID#1216. China's coded threat to use force was too vague to be considered a militarized action. People's Daily made a more aggressive statement: "the Chinese people will firmly support the Cambodian people to utterly defeat the U.S. aggressors." The actual Chinese government's statement read, "The Chinese Government and people resolutely support this solemn stand [of the Royal Government of Cambodia against the United States]." There is no evidence that Thailand was working with the U.S. and South Vietnam at this time, though Cambodia accused the U.S. of provoking Thai incursions. Incidents between Thailand and Cambodia are actually part of MID#1229.

MID#1213 ends on 24 October 1964 with Cambodia alleging an attack by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces on Anlong Kres. On 25 December 1964, Cambodia protested a South Vietnamese attack (including the participation of one American soldier) on Sctaum. On 9 August 1965, Cambodia issued a clear threat to use force in response to vague threats by South Vietnam. MID#1216, as originally coded, lasts from 12/26/1965 to 2/18/1966. On 1 May 1966, the U.S. pursued and attacked Viet Cong forces in Cambodia territory. Cambodia protested. On 20 September 1966, Cambodia accused the U.S. of another attack on Cambodian territory. MID#1217 begins on 1 February 1967 when Cambodia alleged an attack by 100 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. These incidents connect disputes MID#1213, MID#1216, and MID#1217.

MID#1217

We recommend merging MID#1217 with MID#1213 and dropping MID#1217. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment. Both disputes concern allied United States and South Vietnamese attacks and incursions into Cambodian territory during the backdrop of the Vietnam War. Originally, these disputes, as well as MID#1216, were separated by 6-month counts. MID#1217 also added South Korea as a participant. However, South Korea should be dropped from the incidents in MID#1217. There is no evidence the South Korea carried out an attack against Cambodia in February 1967, much less in an allied action with the U.S. and South Vietnam.

MID#1213 ends on 24 October 1964 with Cambodia alleging an attack by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces on Anlong Kres. On 25 December 1964, Cambodia protested a South Vietnamese attack (including the participation of one American soldier) on Setaum. On 9 August 1965, Cambodia issued a clear threat to use force in response to vague threats by South Vietnam. MID#1216, as originally coded, lasts from 12/26/1965 to 2/18/1966. On 1 May 1966, the U.S. pursued and attacked Viet Cong forces in Cambodia territory. Cambodia protested. On 20 September 1966, Cambodia accused the U.S. of another attack on Cambodian territory. MID#1217 begins on 1 February 1967 when Cambodia alleged an attack by 100 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. These incidents connect disputes MID#1213, MID#1216, and MID#1217.

MID#1315

There are three disputes between India and Pakistan in 1964 and 1965 that need to be combined into one larger dispute. The issues are the same (Kashmir), the actors are the same (India and Pakistan), no formal agreements were respected for enough time to warrant different disputes, and continuous militarized incidents occurred, obviating the need for a six-month rule delimiter of dispute ending. This narrative keeps MID#1312 since it is most likely the Second Kashmiri War, and the two other MIDs (MID#1315 and MID#1316) should be dropped. Note that MID#1317 overlaps temporally, with the same actors, but the dispute concerns the Indian/East Pakistani border and is, therefore, a separate dispute.

In January 1964, Pakistan brought the unsettled Kashmir question before the UN Security Council again. Pakistan wanted to have Kashmiris vote to resolve the issue of state allegiance (as had been put forth by the UN several times), but which India had rejected saying that Kashmir had acceded to Indian control in 1947. Various clashes began on February 21 (MID#1316). Pakistan wanted to mediate the dispute, but India rejected the idea and called for negotiations without third-party intervention. The UN Council called for more Pakistani and Indian talks on the issue in May 1964. Shortly after this announcement, on May 19, 1964, Indian troops reportedly killed four civilians across the Pakistani border. Pakistan appealed this incident before the UN. Top state leaders were scheduled to meet in late May 1964, but these talks were cancelled upon the death of Prime Minister Nehru of India. Indian troops were reported to have killed numerous civilians during June of 1964, and Pakistan officially denounced India on these border violations in late July 1964 (Pakistan Scores India, 7/29/64). Deadly clashes took place from the summer of 1964 through the summer of 1965.

MID#1312 is the Second Kashmir War. On 30 June 1965 India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire in the Rann of Kutch dispute, after which Pakistani President Ayub Khan warned India that another MID would escalate to total war. Indian Prime Minister Shastri encountered some resistance to this agreement in the parliament, with some members calling for a similar warning for Pakistan. Moreover, the ceasefire reminded many Indians, including Cabinet ministers, of their 1962 border conflict with China, which dented Indian prestige (Lamb, 1967, 117-118). On 31 March 1965 Sheik Abdullah, a Kashmiri political leader, met with Chinese Premier Chou Enlai. They discussed the Kashmir question, then Abdullah accepted an invitation to visit China in the future. Indian authorities arrested Abdullah upon his return on 8 May. Riots and non-violent protests broke out in Indian Kashmir. Mujahedin began to cross the ceasefire line from Azad Kashmir. On 19 May Indian and Pakistani troops clashed at the border. Meanwhile, the mujahedin engaged in sabotage and hit-and-run attacks in Indian Kashmir. The leaders of both countries appeared to

have little latitude in dealing with the crisis. Pakistanis wanted to support the rebels in Indian Kashmir, especially in light of the progress the mujahedin had seemingly made since 1947, and Shastri already smarted from the lashing he took from the ceasefire agreement for the Rann of Kutch. Then it comes as no surprise that the dispute escalated. On 25 August thousands of Indian troops crossed the ceasefire line to cut the infiltration of mujahedin.

On 4 September the UN passed Resolution 209, which called for a ceasefire, but India declined. Also, the Soviets offered to mediate the dispute, but both disputants declined. On 6 September Indian forces launched an offensive toward Lahore, and the UN once again called on both parties to cease fire in Resolution 210. On 8 September the US announced it would stop supplying India and Pakistan with military equipment, which burdened Pakistan more because the US was its sole supplier. On 20 September the UN Security Council demanded a ceasefire and a return to pre-war positions (Resolution 211). Pakistan was running out of ammunition, and India agreed when China made a threat over the India-China border dispute. The two sides stopped firing on 23 September, but they did not fully implement the ceasefire (which is listed as MID#1315). Troops from both sides remained in the other's territory and continued to clash. In addition, Pakistan threatened to leave the UN unless the fundamental issue of sovereignty in Kashmir was addressed. In January 1966 Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan met at Tashkent for mediation from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. On 10 January the participants signed the Declaration of Tashkent. On 22 January 1966 their army chiefs met at New Delhi and agreed to begin a 1000-yard withdrawal.

MID#1315 should merge with MID#1312, Ceasefire Violations. Although India and Pakistan signed a ceasefire on 23 September, “the ceasefire line separating the two armies continued for several months more to be the scene of continual incidents which served to keep alive the tensions which had resulted in the September crisis” (Lamb, 1967, 130; also see Keesings 1965, 21103). Because some of these incidents occurred within thirty days of the ceasefire agreement – which the MID data seem to recognize because MID#1315 begins the same day MID#1312 ends – and the same issue (Kashmir) was at the heart of both, one MID did not end and another begin; rather, the same MID continued.

MID#1316

See drop narrative for MID#1315.

MID#1349

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. Note that the following is an abridged list of incidents:

- On January 1, 1958 (MID#1347): South Korea seized Japanese fishing boats through February 12, 1959.
- On February 14, 1959 (MID#2838): South Korea was greatly angered by Japans plan to repatriate Koreans in Japan to North Korea. The South Korean government hinted that it might intercept the transport ships. No specific threat was made, and there is no evidence that the South Koreans put their military on alert.

- On June 11, 1959 (MID#1349), South Korea warned Japan that it had suspended permits between the two countries due to a Japanese agreement with North Korea.
- On November 15, 1959 (MID#2839), a Japanese fishing boat inside of the disputed waters claimed by South Korea, was fired upon by a South Korean patrol boat.
- On February 12, 1960, a Japanese fishing boat was sunk, and its crew was seized. On March 7th, Japan lodged its second protest, demanded an apology, the return of the captured crew, and compensation for the damage.
- On May 8, 1960 (MID#2874), A South Korean patrol boat fired on two Japanese fishing boats.
- On November 2, 1960, there was a small arms attack on a Japanese boat.
- On August 22, 1961, a 99 ton Japanese fishing boat and its crew of 14 were seized by a South Korean patrol boat in the Japan Sea near the Rhe line. South Korea claims this to be the limit of their territorial waters and Japan does not recognize this line. This was the 7th seizure of this kind since January.
- On October 29, 1961 (MID#3310), a South Korean patrol boat fired on and captured a Japanese fishing boat within Japanese territorial waters. This was reported to have been the twelfth South Korean seizure of a Japanese fishing boat since January.
- On January 15, 1962, a South Korean patrol boat fired on a Japanese patrol boat. The Korea boat chased the Japanese boat for an hour and a half, but there were no casualties.
- On May 13, 1962 (MID#2889), The South Korean Navy seized three Japanese fishing boats for violating territorial waters.
- On October 15, 1962, two South Korean patrol boats seized a Japanese fishing vessel, the Shotoku Maru.
- In January, 1962, several Japanese fishing boats seized by South Korean patrols.
- On June 19, 1963, South Korea released 42 captured Japanese fishermen and five detained vessels. All had recently been seized for trespassing South Korea's fishing demarcation line. South Korea hoped this would normalize relations between the two countries.
- On September 27, 1963 (MID#2895), Japan protested the South Korean seizure of the Japanese fishing boat, Number One Fukuho Maru, and its 34 crew members which occurred that same morning.
- On January 29, 1964 (MID#2905): A South Korean patrol boat attacked and seized a Japanese fishing boat.

MID#1379

MID#1379 and MID#2189 should be merged with MID#2188. MID#2188 documents a continuous series of incidents violating the 1953 armistice agreement between North and South Korea. The conflict includes attacks, border violations, and airspace violations across the demilitarized zone involving North Korea, South Korea, and US-led troops as part of the UN command. Originally, these disputes were separated by 6-month counts. However, the dates for MID#2188 and

MID#2189 are connected by less than 6 months, and two North Korean-alleged airspace violations by the UN command in the few weeks leading up to 12 May 1964 connect MID#2189 and MID#1379 by less than 6 months. Therefore, we recommend merging MID#2189 and MID#1379 with MID#2188. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#1421

MID#1421 should be merged with MID#1423. Both disputes concern militarized incidents along the Ethiopia-Somalia border following British Somaliland's independence and unification with Somalia in June 1960. MID#1423 is an Ethiopian attack on a Somali patrol along the border, and Somalia's subsequent border reinforcements. Less than 6 months later, a series of incidents along the border continued the conflict (originally, MID#1421). As these disputes are connected by participants, issue, and location, we recommend merging MID#1421 with MID#1423 and dropping MID#1421. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment

MID#1467

This MID covers the same issue and has the same disputants as MID#1316. These clashes are part of the longer dispute between Pakistan and India.

MID#1523

MID#1523 is connected to MID#1506 and should be considered an extension of it. The issues are the same—how to deal with the overthrown Ecuadorian president, Juan Jose Flores, and the effects the regime change and Flores had on the region. The actors are the same, with Venezuela, a joiner in MID#1506 with a show of force, remaining a joiner to the overall dispute of Peru versus Colombia and Chile, and the location of the disputes are the same. (Note that the originally coding of MID#1523 also incorrectly labeled the dispute as Peru versus Chile and Colombia. Chile was suspicious of Peru's support of Flores, but Colombia was declaring war on the other two countries and Chile backed Peru.)

MID#1506 should have the following two changes:

- New start date for Peru, Colombia, and Chile is 4/13/1852.
- The end date should correspond with the negotiated settlement (3/16/1853)

MID#1617

MID#1617 should be merged with MID#1360. Both disputes concern Cambodian protests of incursions, clashes, and occupations of Cambodian territory led by North Vietnamese forces. The initiating incident of MID#1617 (a clash on 3/15/1970) occurs less than 6 months from the last incident of MID#1360 on 10/16/1970, with no agreement in between these dates. As these disputes are connection by participants, issue, and location, we recommend merging MID#1617 with MID#1360 and dropping MID#1617. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#1624

This dispute occurred on February 14, 1842. The incidents within this dispute are within the six-month window of the prior dispute between Britain and Brazil, which was originally coded as

ending on August 29, 1841. All incidents concern attempts by both states to occupy the Pirara region between British Guiana and Brazil.

MID#2004

We recommend connecting MID#2004 with MID#1764. Both are over the same issue of Italian national Ernesto Cerruti's arrest in Colombia. The earlier justification for separating MID#1764 from MID#2004 hinges on a negotiated settlement concluding MID#1764 being separated from the onset of MID#2004 by more than one month. This does not hold upon further review.

MID#1764 ends with an agreement that Colombia would allow Cerruti to board the *Flavio Gioia* (an Italian warship dispatched to the area) and communicate his full story to the Italian commander on the condition that the Italian commander would return Cerruti to mainland Colombia. Colombia, in turn, would further permit Cerruti to wander the streets peacefully while his conspiracy case was ongoing. Cerruti was to not break any additional laws. In short, Italy guaranteed him bail. This was accepted July 8th.

August 5th, Cerruti is arrested again and Italy renews its show of force with the *Flavio Gioia*. The negotiated bail did not end MID#1764. This information was gathered from Paul Bureau's (1896, 23-24) book that was available to us but apparently unknown to CoW. MID#2004 should be connected with MID#1764.

MID#2028

MID#2028 is actually part of MID#2030. MID#2028 codes a Laotian attack on two patrol boats on the Thai side of the Mekong River, as well as the seizure of two patrol guards near the Mekong River. The incidents were a response to a blockade issued by Thailand to protest the new Laotian government, put in place from a coup on August 9, 1960. This is also the issue surrounding MID#2030, which concludes with the announcement that Thailand would end its blockade. Since the same participants were involved in the incidents of both disputes, and both concerned the Thai blockade following Laos' coup, MID#2028 should be dropped.

MID#2073

MID#2073 refers to several Ethiopian air raids on Somalian towns, beginning on 30 January 1984. There was an ongoing dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. The final raid occurred on 25 May 1984. This dispute is really an extension of MID#2072, which was originally coded as ending on August 13, 1983. The six-month rule requires that this dispute be dropped and the termination date of MID#2072 be amended to include these actions.

MID#2084

MID#2084 refers to the Chilean arrest of two Argentine officers on suspicion of actions "against national security" on 25 April 1981. They were released in June, 1981.

This event occurs less than five months prior to MID#2085, over the same disputed issues—the borders between Chile and Argentina. MID#2085 also details several border violations and arrests by both sides. We see no rationale supporting a separate dispute here and suggest merging this dispute with MID#2085 and changing the start date of that dispute to incorporate this case.

MID#2094

MID#2094 should be merged with MID#0199 (the Sino-Indian War). The Sino-Indian War is coded as ending with a ceasefire on 21 November 1962, providing also the end date for MID#0199. However, there was no formal agreement, and incidents concerning the same Himalayan border dispute driving the war occurred within 3 months (MID#2094). Since these disputes are connected by participants, location, and issue, and the incidents occurred within three months of the ceasefire, we recommend merging MID#2094 with MID#0199 and dropping MID#2094. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2114

This dispute should be combined with MID#2115, the Iran-Iraq War. Escalation to war occurred less than six months after this dispute, there was no formal settlement, and the border issues were the same between these two countries. Abdulghani reports that Iran and Iraq returned to cold war relations after the fall of the Shah in Iran. While Iraq initially tried to make friendly diplomatic gestures towards the new regime, relations between the two states quickly deteriorated in the spring of 1979. Abdulghani reports that both governments accused the other of 500-600 territorial violations between February 1979 and September 1980 (p. 200-201), and he notes that "a war of inflammatory words" erupted between both sides shortly after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran. While no reports by the NY Times or London Times were found related to militarized incidents between Iran and Iraq from Feb. 1979 to June 1979, Keesing's (June 1980) notes that it was widely believed that Iraq was providing substantial arms to Arab rebels inside Iran who were fighting the Revolutionary Guard. Keesing's goes on to state that this support led to border clashes in early 1980.

Keesing's (August 1981) also reports that as early as February 1979, Iraq had been voicing discontent with the Algiers Accord signed by both countries in 1975 (defining the countries' borders along the Shatt al-Arab waterway), and that the country's dissatisfaction with Iran was aggravated by the latter's internal upheaval. It seems that Iraq wanted to address the issue immediately, but Iran was concerned more with quelling domestic unrest and establishing the Islamic Republic. The New York Times reports that in June 1979, Iran charged that Iraq had conducted an air attack on its territory twice that month and warned that it would take necessary measures to prevent other attacks. The NY Times also reports other border clashes beginning in October 1979 and lasting through April 1980. In February 1980, Iraq called for border revisions again, although Hussein maintained that he did not have territorial ambitions inside Iran. He wanted Iranian forces to withdraw from three disputed islands in the Shatt al-Arab waters. In March 1980, diplomatic relations between the two sides were reported to have deteriorated significantly. Abdulghani reports that June-September 1980 saw intensified and more frequent border clashes with heavy artillery and a reported 14 repelled Iranian attacks into Iraqi border towns. He goes on to report that a full-scale war had begun between the two sides on September 22, 1980 (p. 204), and it appears that this escalation to war ends the dispute on this date. The original CoW coding for MID#2115 lists the beginning of the 8-year Iran-Iraq war to begin on August 27, 1980, but most sources indicate that fighting escalated to war in mid-September.

The War (MID#2115) was fought over contested territory, specifically the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan bounded by the Khorramshahr-Ahvaz-Susangerd-Messian line. On 22 September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, and on 23 September Iran bombed Iraqi air bases. The UN offered its first

resolution calling for a ceasefire on 28 September 1980 (479). Iraq gained momentum, driving Iran toward the border. Iraq fortified the Iranian city of Khorramshahr, but on 9 June 1982 Iran seized control; Iraq subsequently implemented a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from 5500 square kilometers of Iranian territory. Iran wanted to see Saddam Hussein gone, so it continued the fight. However, it got bogged down trying to cut Basra off. In 1983 Iran began to use human waves to attack Iraq, and Iraq used mustard gas against Iranian troops. In 1984 ships, including oil tankers, were attacked in the Gulf. In February 1986 Iran captured al-Faw and held it for two years. Iran lost the territory it had gained by the summer. On 20 July Iran and Iraq accepted a ceasefire as demanded by UN Resolution 598. The ceasefire went into effect on 20 August 1988.

MID#2183

MID#2183 should be merged with MID#0136. The issue in both disputes concerns tensions between the United States and Mexico after General Huerta seized power in a coup d'etat in February 1913. Temporally, MID#0136 overlaps with the end of MID#2183. Therefore, we recommend merging MID#2183 with MID#0136 and dropping MID#2183. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2189

MID#2189 should be merged with MID#2188. Originally, these disputes seem to have been separated by a 6-month count. However, the actual dates connect these disputes by just under 6 months, with MID#2188 ending on 11/20/1962 and MID#2189 beginning on 5/17/1963. As both disputes concern incidents of clashes between the U.S. (and South Korea) and North Korea related to the demilitarized zone following the Korean War, we recommend merging MID#2189 with MID#2188 and dropping MID#2189. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2190

MID#2190 should actually be incorporated into MID#1379, which was originally coded as ending on October 19, 1969. The start of this incident, over the same issue as MID#1379, is March 13, 1970, less than six months later. The United States joins MID#1379 on 11/25/1964.

MID#2210

MID#2210 is an extension of MID#2209 and should be dropped. MID#2210 begins on May 5, 1927), less than two months after the end date of MID#2209 (April 3, 1927). The incidents involve the same participants (China and Japan), and all incidents concern Japanese involvement in the Shandong province of China following Chinese targeting of Japanese nationals.

MID#2209 should be changed to have an end date of August 30, 1927. Its outcome should be stalemate, and its settlement should be none.

MID#2213

MID#2213 is a bilateral dispute between China and Russia in June of 1935. It is actually an extension of MID#2212, which is coded as ending three days prior to the start of this dispute. We recommend dropping this case because the original coders likely separated the militarized incidents following an agreement to end the dispute that was made on June 9, 1935. MID#2212

is coded as ending June 10th, and MID#2213 is coded as beginning on June 13th. In actuality, the agreement was signed by Chinese authorities on July 6th, which should mark the end of MID#2212. MID#2213 concerns the same participants, issues, and location (control of Manchuria) as MID#2212 and, therefore, should be dropped.

A separate dispute between Japan and China follows in November (MID#0616), after the signing of the agreement to Japan's demands.

MID#2243

We argue MID#2243 is actually part of MID#1623 and that MID#1623 was erroneously coded as ending with a negotiated settlement because the MID in the data set that followed it was concluded with negotiation.

MID#2243 is actually part of MID#1623. Joseph Russell, the British proconsul to Panama, was attacked in a crowded city street by a local named Justo Paredes, apparently following a dispute. To defend himself, Mr. Russell unsheathed his concealed sword-cane and began to repel Paredes. He succeeded in his defense but was badly wounded himself. He was taken, under military guard, to a hospital. However, Russell was arrested and imprisoned under a charge of "premeditated assassination" brought forward by Paredes (MID#1623). Since the charge of assassination lacked credibility, the local court instead convicted him of violating an archaic 1761 Spanish conceal-carry statute and sentenced Russell to six years in jail. On August 31 (and again on November 28) Lord Palmerston threatened Colombia, demanding immediate release of Russell, the sacking of all local authorities involved with his trial and imprisonment, an apology and 1000 pound sterling. The Granadians (Colombians) refused and Cartagena was blockaded on January 10, 1837 as a result (it was declared official 10 days later) (MID#2243). On January 4th, 1837, Russell was released after the Granadian Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of First Instance, which found that the consul could not be tried. The 1000 pounds sterling was also paid. Britain ended its blockade on January 31 and released all ships it had detained in the process.

Justification for separating MID#2243 from MID#1623 hinges on a negotiated settlement in MID#1623. This did not happen. Our review of the British Foreign Office papers allowed for a more comprehensive timeline on this issue than one would gather from using just the one source that CoW says it used.

- 01/20/1836: Russell and Paredes get into that fight, badly injuring both men.
- 01/31/1836: Russell tells Palmerston of his ordeal. Palmerston sends a new consul, Thomas Turner, to Panama while Russell recovers.
- 03/01/1836: Turner arrives in Panama and sees that a Colombian military force had occupied the consulate.
- 03/03/1836: An alcalde (or "mayor" in this context) seizes the consulate outright, seals it up, and removes the British seal. A Panamanian judge upheld it and the regional governor affirmed it as well.
- 05/20/1836: Russell loses his court case on that aforementioned technicality.
- 08/31/1836: Palmerston threatens Colombia.

The dispute continues from there, though this timeline underscores our argument that MID#1623 and MID#2243 are not separate disputes. There was no negotiation to conclude MID#1623.

MID#2340

MID#2340 was originally coded as Nicaraguan troops moving into Costa Rican territory and taking “strategic frontier positions” to prevent the civil war from spilling over into Nicaragua. Costa Rica later reinforced its troops on the border after a Nicaraguan National Guard plane entered Costa Rican airspace (on 5/31). Border events continued over the summer of 1948 as Nicaragua seized (and released) Costa Rican planes and both states fortified their border (in October). The original six-month count that ended on May 31, 1948, should be extended past October. Since MID#2339 was originally coded as beginning on December 11, 1948, when Nicaraguan troops and Nicaraguan-backed insurgents invaded Costa Rica, the two disputes should be merged into one dispute. Therefore, we extended MID#2339’s start date to 4/19/1948 and coded its end date as 2/21/1949, when both states signed the Pact of Amity in Washington, DC.

MID#2362

MID#1109 concerns a series of militarized incidents including Egyptian attacks into Saudi Arabian territory surrounding Najran on the Yemeni-Saudi border. Amid civil unrest in Yemen, Egypt supported the Republican forces in Yemen, while Saudi Arabia supported the Royalists. Originally, these disputes were separated by participants, with MID#2362 only involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia. (MID#1109 also includes Yemen.) However, both disputes concern the same issue, and the incident that coincides with the end date of MID#1109 on 14 May 1967 duplicates the incident for MID#2362. As these dispute are connected by participants, issue, and location, we recommend folding MID#2362 into MID#1109 and dropping MID#2362. CoW’s source listings confirm this assessment. Yemen remains a joiner to MID#1109.

MID#2595

MID#2595 should be merged with MID#2584. Both disputes concern Iraqi attacks on Cypriot shipping vessels during the Tanker War. Originally, these disputes were separated by a 6-month gap. However, an incident on 6 May 1986 in which Iraqi forces attacked the Cypriot tanker, the Superior, connects these disputes by less than 6 months. Therefore, we recommend merging MID#2595 with MID#2584 and dropping MID#2595. CoW’s source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2617

MID#2617 should be merged with MID#1362, which is coded as ending fourteen days earlier. Both cases concern a rivalry between the minority-led Tutsi government of Burundi and Hutu rebels and refugees, allegedly acting with the support of the Tanzanian and Rwandan governments. Between 15 March and 22 July 1973, several confirmed reports of clashes between Burundi and Tanzanian troops occurred along the border. In May 1973, according to the Africa Contemporary Record, Burundi also alleged that Rwanda had directly provoked Hutu rebels by amassing troops along the border and was working in concert with Tanzania. However, Rwanda had no additional militarized incidents in the conflict. The dispute ended on 22 July 1973, when Burundi and Tanzania issued a joint communique. Burundi accepted responsibility for an incident on 29 June 1973 and agreed to pay indemnities, while Tanzania withdrew its protest against Rwanda and agreed to re-open its

borders. Since these disputes are connected by participants, location, and issue, we recommend merging these two and dropping MID#2617.

MID#2624

MID#2624 should be folded into MID#1229, as the same participants, locations, and issues are driving both disputes. MID#2624 concerns allegations that Cambodia had attacked and seized a fishing boat in Thai territorial waters in the Gulf of Siam. While on the surface this could be considered an isolated incident, Cambodia responded directly to Thailand's allegations with its own accusations that Thai forces had attacked border guards in Siemreap Province. Given the contemporary border dispute between the two states captured in MID#1229, coupled with the Cambodian government's counter-allegations regarding incidents described in MID#1229, the incidents of MID#2624 seem directly related to the ongoing dispute. A review of CoW's listed sources corroborates this assessment.

MID#2628

MID#2628 should be merged with MID#1302. All incidents concern the disputed borders between India and East/West Pakistan. The first set of incidents in MID#1302 concludes with a ceasefire on August 26, 1958, followed by a formal agreement on September 11th that resolved 8 of the 15 disputed territories. Some conditions of the agreement regarded the Bengali region of Assam on the East Pakistani border, though this portion of the dispute was not entirely resolved. Less than 3 months after the ceasefire and subsequent agreement, the Bengali-East Pakistan border became the site of the Pakistani raid into Indian territory on November 10th which begin MID#2628. Subsequent incidents took place in other locations along the disputed border discussed in the September 11th agreement. As these disputes are connected by participants, location, and common territorial issue, and MID#2628 begins less than three months after the ceasefire which ends MID#1302, we recommend merging these disputes.

MID#2709

MID#0343 concerns militarized incidents between the Soviet Union and China during China's Cultural Revolution. Incidents include border fortifications, shows of force, and clashes. MID#2709, from 1/26/1967 - 2/12/1967, also applies to the ongoing issues in MID#343 and occurs within its temporal domain. As these disputes are connected by participants, location, and issue, we recommend folding MID#2709 into MID#0343 and dropping MID#2709. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2766

MID#2766 should be merged with MID#2823. Though MID#2766 concerns more specifically a French threat to use force against Iran, rather than the explicit Iranian attack on French tankers during the Tanker War, the threat clearly followed Iran's attacks on merchant vessels during the Tanker War. The threat comes five months after the last incident of Iranian attacks on French-flagged merchant vessels during the Tanker War, and thus may be considered a response to the same issue. As these disputes are united by participants, issue, and location in the Persian Gulf, we recommend merging MID#2766 with MID#2823 and dropping MID#2766. CoW source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2797

MID#2797 should be merged with MID#2594. Both disputes concern militarized incidents between Iran and Kuwait regarding Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil fleets. Originally, these disputes were separated by a 6-month count. However, the attack on a Kuwaiti oil tanker on 22 October 1986 in MID#2594 occurs less than 6 months before the start of MID#2797. MID#2797 begins on 11 May 1987, with another Iranian attack on Kuwaiti oil tanker, and continues with Iran's militarized responses to Kuwait seeking US and Soviet protections of its oil fleets. Since these disputes are connected by participants, issue, and location, we recommend merging MID#2797 with MID#2594 and dropping MID#2797. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2839

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#2844

MID#2844 should be merged with MID#3218. Both disputes concern British violations of Saudi Arabian airspace during the same three-month period. As the same participants, issue, and location are present, we recommend merging MID#2844 with MID#3218 and dropping MID#2844. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2874

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#2889

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#2895

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#2905

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#2941

MID#2941 overlaps temporally, and both concern clashes and border incursions between the U.S. (and South Korea) and North Korea in the demilitarized zone following the Korean War. Therefore, we recommend merging MID#2941 with MID#1379 and dropping MID#2941. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2943

MID#2943 refers to the detainment of two US ships by Cuba beginning 5 December 1971 near the Bahamas. Castro claimed the captains of these ships were participants in counter-revolutionary activities. The ships were held, but the crew was released 27 December 1971.

This dispute occurs five months after the US seizure of Cuban fishing vessels and represents a response to that dispute (MID#2946). The participants and issues are the same, and the two disputes should be combined. We recommend dropping MID#2943 and extending the end date of MID#2946 to December 27, 1971.

MID#2979

MID#2979 should be merged with MID#2971. Both disputes concern North Korean-alleged airspace violations by U.S. reconnaissance planes and are connected by less than 6 months, with MID#2971 ending on 8/14/1981 and MID#2979 beginning on 1/9/1982. Therefore, we recommend merging MID#2979 with MID#2971 and dropping MID#2979. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#2993

MID#2993 is a continuation of MID#0409, both of which describe (maritime) territorial divisions between Japan and the Soviet Union. MID#0409 codes Soviet harassment of Manchurian and Japanese boats on the Amur River that escalated to clashes between the two militaries after the Soviets occupied two islands on the river. After the USSR withdrew its troops, Japan withdrew its own. These incidents were followed by the Soviets seizing ships at the mouth of the same river. The last seizure in this dispute took place on September 11, 1937.

MID#2993 should be dropped, and MID#0409 should end on September 11, 1937, with an outcome of stalemate.

MID#3124

MID#1333 concerns ongoing incursions and attacks by the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) government into Botswana amid civil conflict in Rhodesia. Rhodesia alleged that Botswana had housed and

supported Rhodesian nationalist forces fighting against white minority rule. MID#3124 is an incident in September 1977, within the temporal domain of MID#1333, in which Rhodesian forces attacked a village in Botswana's Pandamatenga territory on the Rhodesia-Botswana border regarded by Rhodesia as a central infiltration point for nationalist insurgents. As these disputes are connected by participants, issue, and location, we recommend folding MID#3124 into MID#1333 and dropping MID#3124. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#3310

Continuous action and the same issue links a series of seizures and conflicts between Japan and South Korea (MID#1347, MID#1349, MID#2839, MID#2874, MID#2889, MID#2895, MID#2905, and MID#3310). MID#1347 is recoded, and the remaining disputes should be dropped. See the drop recommendation for MID#1349 for an abridged list of incidents linking each of the MIDs into one, longer dispute.

MID#3385

MID#3385 continues to describe the dispute over the town of Taba in the disputed area of the Sinai. MID#3384 was originally coded as ending on January 21, 1983, less than seven months prior to this dispute. However, we found evidence that Israel admitted to several border incursions, and Egypt protested border postings in Taba and other areas in June of 1983. With no six-month gap, this should be coded as one long dispute. Therefore, we recommend dropping MID#3385 and extending MID#3384 to July 5, 1985.

MID#3407

MID#3407 is a series of militarized incidents in the month of August 1962 between the two regarding Israel's Kinneret-Negev water diversion project. Overlapping issues and connecting incidents will merge MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423 and MID#3424 into MID#3434. Our summary of MID#3434 follows.

MID#3434 (11/1/61 - 4/19/64) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. There is no 6-month gap in the series from November 1, 1961, until February 13, 1966. However, per Zeev Maoz's analysis of the issues at work during this time period, we argue to form three MIDs regarding each of the principle issues driving these incidents. The first issue, encompassed in MID#3434, concerns Israel's water diversion project (the Kinneret-Negev project), which served not only to draw from scarce water resources, but also to increase the margin of superiority in material capabilities which became apparent after the 1956 war. It begins with the first incident following a regime change in Syria on September 28, 1961, and ends with the last incident prior to the successful conclusion of Israel's Kinneret-Negev project in June 1964.

CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423, and MID#3424 should be merged with MID#3434. An abridged incident history for MID#3434 is included below:

MID#3434 is coded as a border violation by Syria and a show of force by Israel on September 27, 1961, one day after the leader of Syria resigned from the UAR and one day before a group of officers took control of the country. There are reports that the Israelis quite purposefully avoided antagonizing Syria at all costs because the UAR split was such a beneficial outcome for them. Further, Syria did not have control over its military, especially to the point of having a border violation over Israeli territory. Thus, the coded actions seem extraordinary events for both sides, and there is no historical evidence that suggests this incident occurred.

The border along the Sea of Galilee was calm for a few months thereafter, but on November 1, 1961, Israel reported that Syrian forces had fired on a tractor plowing on Israel's side of the border. Israeli and Syrian forces exchanged fire in the incident, and Israel also reported the incident to the MAC in protest of the firing. A number of other incidents were reported in March 1962, including an Israeli reprisal raid on Syrian villages that was condemned by the UN Security Council. A cease-fire was brokered on March 17, only to be broken by firing between the two sides on March 18. Shootings between the two sides were also reported on June 15 and June 26. Another clash was reported in August 1962 (MID#3407), after which the Israeli government asked the UN for help with the Syrian aggression. A cease-fire was also brokered after this incident on August 29, but it too was broken on September 11, 1962 when Syrian forces fired on Israeli tractor crews that it claimed were planning aggressive action and had made territorial violations. Israel protested this incident to the MAC. 12/4/62: Fire was exchanged between Israeli and Syrian forces in the demilitarized zone along the southeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. This began with Israeli tractors moving into the disputed area with the support of armed Israeli police (MID#3423). Syria's government assured Israel that a similar incident would not happen again. 12/16/62: Syria mobilized troops along the Israeli line. 3/15/63: Israel diplomatically protests against alleged Syrian aggression against Israeli fishermen in the Sea of Galilee, as well as harassment of other Israelis; Syria denied this charge and accused Israel of harassing Syrian citizens. 6/9/63: Syria accuses Israel of jet attacks on villages near the Sea of Galilee and lodges a complaint with both the Palestinian Truce Commission and the UN Security Council. 7/13/63: Syria captured a man and two women whose motorboat was blown against the north eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. 7/15/63: Israel complained to the UN Truce Supervisory Organization about the seizure of six people from a boat on the Sea of Galilee by Syrian authorities; the complaint claimed that Syrian boats had crossed the sea border and abducted the three Israelis and three Belgians from Israeli territory (MID#3424) 8/11/63: Israel expressed concern over 'Syria's aggression' which included incidents of fire along the border, and the refusal to release the captured man and women. 8/19/63: Israeli and Syrian forces clashed both in the air and on land, and both charged the other with aggression. 8/18/63: Syria accused Israel of building up its troops along the Israeli-Syrian border; Syria warned major powers that it would use aggression to counter any Israeli aggression. 8/20/63: Israel and Syria clash in air and land battles despite UN cease-fire attempts. 8/24/63: Israel and Syria agree to a UN cease-fire, but Israel issues a warning three days later that it will take whatever measures it needs to secure its northeastern border along the Sea of Galilee (this warning occurred after Israeli youth were killed in a Syrian ambush). 8/21/63: Israeli and Syrian forces clashed in both the air and on land. Both sides reported aggression by the other side, there were no reported Syrian casualties but there were said to most likely have been Israeli deaths. Israel charged that on 8/29/63: the Syrians once again violated the U.N. truce by ring on Israeli farms.

Israeli forces did not return the fire. 9/3/63: the Soviet Union vetoed a resolution condemning Syria for the 'wanton murder' of two Israeli farmers at the Sea of Galilee, which had occurred on August 19th. Late October/early November 1963: Israel holds Syrians hostage to put added

pressure on the release of the Israelis held by Syria 11/6/63: there was a clash between Israeli border patrol and three Syrians. Israeli forces shot and killed one Syrian, and the other two escaped. Israel led a complaint for the border violations by Syrian citizens (MID#3408). 11/11/63: Israeli Army reports shooting across the Syrian-Israeli border, in which two Israelis were wounded. 2/10/64: an Israeli plane was red upon by Syrian forces but was not hit. According to Israeli sources, the plane was flying over Israeli territory. 4/17-19/64: six seamen aboard Lebanese vessels were seized by Israeli forces, two were Egyptian and four were Syrian. Israel had been asking both countries for the return of twenty of its citizens, and the capture of the seamen was supposed to add to Israels bargaining power.

MID#3408

MID#3434 (11/1/61 - 4/19/64) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423, and MID#3424 should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3409

MID#3425 (7/2/64 - 2/13/66) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3409, MID#3410, and MID#3435 should be merged with MID#3425. Our summary of MID#3425 follows.

MID#3425 (7/2/64 - 2/13/66) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. There is no 6-month gap in the series from November 1, 1961 until February 13, 1966. However, per Zeev Maoz's analysis of the issues at work during this time period, we argue to form two MIDs regarding each of the principle issues driving these incidents. The second issue, encompassed in MID#3425, regards a counter-water diversion project Syria instituted, the Headwater Diversion Plan, which was approved by the Arab League in 1964. Understanding the Israel's military capabilities were superior and apparent following the 1956 war and concerned with the implications of this arrangement, Syria attempted to upset the status quo by thwarting Israel's acquisition of another material resource, water, recently ensured with the conclusion of the Kinneret-Negev project. MID# begins with the first incident following the conclusion of the Kinneret-Negev project and ends with the another regime change in Syria to government control by the military junta in February 1966.

CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3409, MID#3410, and MID#3435 should be merged with MID#3425. An abridged incident history for MID#3425 is included below:

7/2/1964: A clash broke out between Israeli and Syrian forces after Syria attacked a motorized patrol near Ashmora. 8/6/64: Israel accused Syria of carrying out a night raid in Israeli territory. (MID#3425) 11/3/64: Fighting broke out along the Israeli-Syrian border. In one clash, five Israeli soldiers and seven Syrian soldiers were killed. (MID#3409) 11/13/64: Israeli and Syrian forces engaged in a two hour battle that resulted in casualties. It began when Israeli jet fighters attacked Syrian positions along the northeastern frontier. 5/14/65: Israeli and Syrian forces exchanged heavy gun fire for 45 minutes in the Jordan Valley after Syrian positions had opened fire at a motorized Israeli patrol. The patrol reciprocated and added to by Israeli tanks. 9/11/65: Syria called for the creation of a joint Arab liberation army to crush Israel, at a conference of the Arab League states. During this time there was immense tension over water, specifically the diversion of the Jordan River. Israel had proposed to pump water from the Sea of Galilee into the Jordan to irrigate the Nagev desert. (MID#3435) 12/2/65: Syrian posts opened fire on Israeli soldiers that were guarding a tractor in northeast Israel. (MID#3410) 12/16/65: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon approved a plan to divert the water of the Jordan River before it reached Israel. 2/13/66: Israeli and Syrian forces clashed for an hour and a half along the border in the Huleh Valley demilitarized zone. Both sides said the other had started the fighting, and their forces had just returned fire. Israel stated that the Israelis had been given the right to cultivate in that area, and Syrian forces shelled the Israeli tractors. Syria said that the tractors entered a prohibited area and were escorted by tanks, artillery and automatic weapons which began ring at Syrian positions and villages. There were injuries on both sides, but no report of casualties.

MID#3410

MID#3425 (7/2/64 - 2/13/66) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3409, MID#3410, and MID#3435 should be merged with MID#3425. Our summary of MID#3425 follows.

MID#3423

MID#3434 (11/1/61 - 4/19/64) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423, and MID#3424 should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3424

MID#3434 (11/1/61 - 4/19/64) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423, and MID#3424 should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3425

MID#3434 (11/1/61 to 7/24/66) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel over the same territorial issues. There is no 6-month gap in the series until July 24, 1966. Therefore, this dispute and several others (MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3409, MID#3410, MID#3423, MID#3424, MID#3433, and MID#3435) should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3431

This dispute is a series of militarized incidents that should be folded into MID#3419. The participants are the same – Israel, Egypt, and Syria, the issues are the same, and the dates are within the longer temporal range of MID#3419.

MID#3433

MID#3434 (11/1/61 to 7/24/66) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel over the same territorial issues. There is no 6-month gap in the series until July 24, 1966. Therefore, this dispute and several others (MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3409, MID#3410, MID#3423, MID#3424, MID#3425, and MID#3435) should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3435

MID#3434 (11/1/61 - 4/19/64) documents a series of militarized incidents between Syria and Israel in the aftermath of the war in 1956. CoW's Specific Sources documentation supports merging MIDs between Israel and Syria during this time period, as they do not clearly reveal a new issue at work other than what we argue is driving the incidents, and because no 6-month gap exists to justify keeping them separate. Therefore, MID#3407, MID#3408, MID#3423, and MID#3424 should be merged with MID#3434. See the drop recommendation for MID#3407 for an abridged incident history.

MID#3442

MID#3442 should be folded into MID#3444. MID#3444 is coded as the First Lebanon War between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Lebanon was not coded as an active participant in the incidents between Israel and Syria in MID#3442, which likely justified the original separation of these disputes. However, the incidents in MID#3442 duplicate incidents ongoing as part of the First Lebanon War, and Lebanon became a joiner to the conflict. Additionally, according to JBS's qualification number 4 for the aggregation of incidents, all incidents between Israel and Syria in MID#3442 should be coded as part of their concurrent wartime involvement in MID#3444. Therefore, we recommend merging these two disputes.

MID#3500

This case (and MID#3501) should be merged with MID#1272. The description for MID#1272 is below:

MID#3500 is a Polish-Lithuanian conflict that occurred shortly after both states became independent in the aftermath of World War I. Poland's new independence led Jozef Pilsudski, then leader of the fledgling republic, to attempt restoration of the former status of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Lithuania, now independent as well, felt any union with Poland as it had previously would be a simple subjugation and loss of cultural autonomy and refused all overtures. Poland opted to restore its pre-partition territories by force. Vilnius was the heart of the conflict. The predominantly Polish city in Lithuania was under siege by Russia's Red Army, who moved west after Germany retreated from the area. Poland, who despised the Russians for their role in Poland's elimination from the interstate system, moved against Russia. Lithuania, for whom Vilnius was a capital, was caught in the middle of this power struggle. Lithuania was forced to withdraw from Vilnius on January 3, 1919 under threat from the Soviets (see: MID#2603). The Lithuanian government relocated to Kaunas. Russian occupation was tenuous and both the Poles and Lithuanians seized the opportunity to expel the Bolsheviks from Vilnius. The Poles got to Vilnius first. Arriving on April 18th, the Poles occupied Vilnius, effecting the call to occupy the city and unify it with Poland that the Sejm passed on April 4th. Pilsudski had complete control of Vilnius by April 21st, prompting the Lithuanians to declare Poland as an invading force that did not cooperate with the government in Kaunas. Worse yet, with the Russians expelled and the Germans maintaining a hands-off approach that did not want to upset Poland, Lithuania had little recourse. Definitely the junior power to Poland at the time, no direct negotiation with Poland would result in a favorable settlement that included a Lithuanian Vilnius. Tensions ran high, even resulting in minor clashes early in May (beginning of MID#3500).

Poland and Lithuania attempted negotiation of their predicament from May into June, materializing in no agreement. As a result, Poland began occupying other territories in Lithuania on June 6th, which prompted Lithuania to agree to a line of demarcation on June 18th, 1919. Lithuania was trying to limit Poland to what it had already acquired. This line was short-lived. It did not satisfy the territorial ambitions of either side. Poland had violated the line of demarcation by July 12th. Ferdinand Foch on July 26th proposed a new line that was more favorable to the Poles. It assigned Suwalki and Sejny to Polish domain. The Lithuanians agreed to the line, but maintained an occupying force in Sejny. An uprising from the predominantly Polish population followed in August, resulting in Poland's eventual occupation of the territory by September 7, 1919.

Polish cell in Lithuania had unsuccessfully attempted a coup in Kaunas, aiming to overthrow the existing government in favor of one that would support a union with Poland. This coup was discovered in late August, 1919. A purge of Polish activists residing in Kaunas (and in the military) followed when the Lithuanian government discovered the plot. The Lithuanian government eventually got their hands on the full list of conspirators on September 22nd and executed a purge.

Both Lithuania and Poland were beset with domestic turmoil at the end of 1919, but skirmishes over this very issue (formalizing borders between them) still appeared to occur. Lescius (2004, 280-284 [in Lithuanian]) notes that Polish raids on Gelvonys, Ukmerge, and Vepriai, followed through September and October 1919. The Poles seized Salakas on October 5th and attacked Kapciamietis on October 12th. Small-scale shows of force against Lithuania continued into early 1920, including attacks on Kalkuni (Latvian side of Lithuanian/Latvian border) and Turmantas in March 1920. No real change of position resulted. However, these latest developments, and Lithuania's growing domestic problems, allowed the Poles to focus their efforts against the Soviets. This led to the Kiev offensive in April 1920.

The major change that took place in late 1919 and early 1920 was the relationship between Lithuania (and the other Baltic states) and Soviet Russia. The coup attempt, combined with the Western powers delayed recognition of Lithuania, led Lithuania to see a new opportunity to cooperate with the Soviets. The Soviets, whose greatest regional threat was Poland, was more than happy to start normalizing relations with a meek Lithuanian state. Discussions between Lithuania and Russia were slow going but ultimately led to a breakthrough on July 12th, 1920. The Lithuanians signed a peace treaty with Russia and, three days later on July 15th, the Russians offered to return Vilnius to Lithuania in exchange for Lithuania's cooperation with the Red Army. Duplicitous of the Soviets or not, Lithuania accepted this offer and provided free passage of troops through Lithuanian territory in order to fight the Polish army.

While the Russians pushed back the Poles and crossed the border into Poland proper, Lithuania occupied towns that were vacated by retreating Polish forces. The Lithuanians joined present Soviet forces in reoccupying Vilnius, the heart of the dispute between Lithuania and Poland on July 18th, 1920. This turning point was ephemeral. The Battle of Warsaw, aka "The Miracle at the Vistula" of August 20th, 1920, abruptly changed the dynamic in Eastern Europe. The Soviets suddenly found themselves in a full scale retreat, providing no assurances to Lithuania of protection by the Soviets. Poland used the turn of events at first to negotiate with Lithuania regarding their border in order to focus on the Soviets. When this failed, Poland attacked at the end of August, 1920. Fighting between both sides continued. Lithuania still held a favorable position because of the previous Soviet advances. Further, a League of Nations intervention on September 20th, 1920, was thought to ultimately lead to a peace whereby Lithuania kept Vilnius. This did not happen. Poland turned up the heat on Vilnius with attacks on the Niemen River in the Suwalki Region that left Vilnius vulnerable. A surprise attack on Vilnius occurred on October 9th, under the guise of a mutiny led by Polish general Zeligowski. Vilnius was in Polish domain once more, though nominally a new entity called the "Republic of Central Lithuania" that served as a buffer state between Poland and Soviet Russia. This appears to be the end of the conflict. Lithuania protested, obviously, but could not get a sympathetic audience that would restore Vilnius to Lithuania. Poland and Lithuania began negotiations again over the issue of Vilnius, with Poland rejecting any measure that would abolish the new puppet state it had created. The only agreement that followed from this negotiation was an agreement to end hostilities on November 29th, 1920. This also set up a neutral zone that lasted until 1923. Further, the Riga Conference ultimately settled the Polish-Soviet War turnaround in Warsaw in August 1920 in March 1921. Herein, Russia acknowledged the current situation in Vilnius and that Vilnius was essentially under Polish domain. The Republic of Central Lithuania was formally annexed into Poland in 1922. The borders for Poland and Lithuania remained until the beginning stages of World War II.

MID#3501

This case should be merged with MID#1272. The disputes are over the same issue, and evidence of clashes between the two countries bridge the previous 3-month rule following a cease-fire that separated the dispute into two cases. See the summary for MID#3500 for a full description of these three cases.

MID#3541

MID#3541 should be merged with MID#3071. Both disputes concern militarized actions between Iran and the United States over issues in the Persian Gulf, specifically Iran's threats to block oil

resources from passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Originally, these disputes were separated by a 6-month count. However, newspaper reports indicate that in December 1983, Iran was conducting unconventional airspace maneuvers over U.S. naval ships stationed in the Persian Gulf, presumably for reconnaissance in relation to the U.S.'s efforts to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz. Connected by this show of force, we recommend merging MID#3541 with MID#3071 and dropping MID#3541. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#3808

This dispute should be combined with MID#0337. British authorities refused to hand over four Chinese accused of assassinating a pro-Japanese customs inspector to the Japanese military. In response, the Japanese army began to blockade French and British concessions in Tientsin on June 14, 1939.

On November 25th 1939, the British went forward with their plans for instituting a blockade to seize German exports. There were protests by six neutral nations, and Japan threatened Britain that it would reciprocate seizures.

The seizure of this dispute is really part of the British blockade that began much earlier. For example, on January 21st 1940, British forces seized twenty-one German seamen off of a Japanese liner, Asama Maru, off of Yokohama; a second seizure (the Tatsuta Maru) occurred two days later. On January 30th Japan lodged a second complaint and stiffened their stance to stressing that the return of the Germans was essential.

On February 6th, Britain agreed to release nine of the twenty-one Germans, but the Japanese refused the offer and wanted all of the German passengers released to Japan.

On February 17th, it was reported that the Japanese government forbid Japanese shipping lines and ferries to carry "nationals of belligerent powers of military age." The German press criticized Tokyo for accepting British demands.

MID#3811

MID#3811 should be combined with MID#3542, the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia. The Soviet occupation began on June 26, 1940, and should be coded as a six-month count. MID#3811 details the Soviet massing of troops on Romania's border as well as a Soviet attack on a Romanian ship. These incidents should be folded into the larger dispute concerning Soviet acquisition of land at Romania's expense.

MID#3832

This case was a separate incident of the seizure of the Tacoma, a German cargo ship, by Uruguay. However, that seizure was part of the incident involving the sinking of the German battleship Graf Spree by Argentine forces, which is MID#3834. This case should be joined with MID#3834.

MID#3857

This case codes one incident—the Bulgarian reinforcement of its frontier with Turkey—that is part of the larger dispute between Germany and Bulgaria against Turkey. It should be merged with

MID#3850.

MID#4043

MID#4043 was originally coded as beginning seven months after MID#3554. However, we have evidence of several border incidents in the interim, including a clear border fortification by Serbia in March of 1993. We therefore recommend dropping MID#4043 and extending the end date of MID#3554 to August 14, 1994, since multiple incidents and the same issue connect the two disputes.

MID#4087

MID#4087 should be merged with MID#4022. According to the CoW's narratives and sources, the primary participants in both disputes are North Korea, South Korea, and the US. MID#4022 includes two additional participants involved in naval exercises directed towards North Korea - Canada, Japan, and Australia. Japan was also involved in MID#4087, however these incidents are already accounted for in the participant data for MID#4022. Therefore, the additional participants should be included as joiners to the original dispute (MID#4022). All incidents in both MID#4022 and MID#4087 from November 1993 to September 1999 concern challenges to the 1953 Korean War armistice agreement and challenges to the established borders with North and South Korea. Therefore, we argue that Canada and Australia should remain participants in MID#4022, and since the issues surrounding their participation are the same as in MID#4087, we do not find sufficient support for keeping these disputes separate based on the participants involved. Additionally, since the end of MID#4022 and the beginning of MID#4087 overlap by 6-months, and no other justification exists to keep these disputes separate, we recommend merging MID#4087 with MID#4022 and dropping MID#4087. CoW's source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#4157

MID#4157 is an extension of MID#4156. The disputes involve the same members, concern the same issue, and take place in the same geographic area. We recommend dropping MID#4157 and extending the end date of MID#4156 by three months.

Both these disputes concern the boundaries near the Corentyne River. MID#4156 directly concerns Guyana permitting Toronto-based oil consortium CGX Energy, Inc., to drill in the contested territory. Though CGX withdrew and moved its drilling operations elsewhere, no settlement was reached. Relations between both states were favorable prior to the incident, in spite of the unresolved boundary dispute, until tensions escalated in September, resulting in the incidents of MID#4157 during which Surinamese soldiers violated Guyanese maritime boundaries.

Guyana tried to argue that both countries could benefit from the arrangement with CGX, but Suriname did not want to cede any part of its position over the territory. Since CGX withdrew before MID#4157 took place, the original coders may have believed the issue was terminated. However, the incidents in MID#4157 occurred because the issue from MID#4156 was still ongoing, even if CGX withdrew, due to a lack of settlement and continued tensions over the issue.

It is also possible that the original coders thought a settlement was reached after MID#4156. Some sources mentioned an agreement to meet and form a settlement, but later sources stated that a settlement was never reached.

MID#4233

MID#4233 should be merged with MID#4210. Both disputes concern incidents of Turkish violations of Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea from February 2000 to January 2001. The incident on 31 January 2001 (MID#4233) occurs about three months after the last incident in MID#4210. As these disputes are united by participants, issue, and location, we recommend merging MID#4233 with MID#4210 and dropping MID#4233. CoW source listings confirm this assessment.

MID#4336

The Correlates of War narrative describes MID#4336 with this summary: “This dispute consists of one incident in which a Chinese warship chased a U.S. Navy ship from international waters near the Chinese coast. China regards the waters as its own territory, but the claimed maritime boundary is not recognized internationally. This dispute represents another case in which Chinese forces challenged American surveillance activities along its coast.”

The surveillance activities of the US were challenged less than one month later in MID#4280. CoW describes that dispute as “5 incidents between the US & China that center around American reconnaissance near the Chinese coast. On 4/1/2001 an American spy plane crash-landed on China’s Hainan Island after colliding with a Chinese fighter over international waters. The Chinese pilot was killed in the accidental collision. China, after the crash, seized both the American crew and plane. The United States responded to the crash and seizure by demanding release of the crew and return of the plane. The US also responded by moving 3 destroyers to the waters off China. China scrambled 10 fighters on 4/5/01 when it detected a US spy plane off the China coast. The dispute was resolved on 7/3/01 after the US expressed regret and the plane was returned to the US. The crew was released on 4/11/01.”

The participants are the same in each dispute, and the issue is obviously the surveillance of China by the United States. The close temporal proximity of these incidents—less than eight days apart—only adds to the connectedness argument. We suggest merging these two cases, making MID#4280 contain six incidents, beginning on March 23, 2001.

Appendix IID—List of changes by dispute number

We provide two tables in this Appendix that list our recommended changes. The first table lists all suggested date and participant changes, and the second table provides all suggested conflict intensity and dispute ending changes. Interested readers should consult our bibliography for justifications of each of these changes.

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3										Yes
7	12	11		25						
8	11			4						
9										
11										
12				29						
13	24	12	1862	15						
15	1	2								
16							1		1	
19				6	8					
20				5	4					
21										Yes
23	19	2		28	9					
25				21	5	1833				
26	31									No
27										
28				3	10					
31				7	9	1901				
40				28	3	1929				
41				22						
43										
50	9			6	2					
53	21			22						
55										
56				21	9					
57								5	5	
61	30	8								
64				7						
68	3			13	1					
69				8	9	1914				
71				15						
78				-9	12	1847				
86				-9	4					
88				26						
91							2		2	
100				16						
104					6					
108	25	3								
111										
114				15		1912				
115				11						
119				10	9					
121	-9			-9						
122				26	12	1961		6	6	
123	21	7								
126				12						
127				11	5					

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
128				5						
131				1						
136	15	7	1913							
137				13						
139	18	1	1935							
141					11	1880				
142										
144	13									
146				26						
148	21			25	3	1960				
153				18	9	1833				
158				23	8		1	2	3	
159	9	6		18	11	1903				
160										
166										
169				6	10					
172	6			16						
173	17									
174										No
177	10	1	1923	10	7					
178										
180				5						
182										
183	12									
187				3	3					
189	20	12								
191				14	6					
196										
197	23						8		8	
202										
208							1	1	2	
212					2			2	2	No
220	21	6								
225				27						
227				19						
228				12	5					No
236										
238	14									
241	2	4		13						
242	9			25						
247	2			7	2					
248	30			30	1					
254				13						
256										
260	2									
262				8						
301				15	2	1836				
304				2	12					No
307				30	5					
309					7					
310										
311										
312		10								
313				3	1	1911				
315				4	11					

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
316										
317	31	3	1913					1	1	
321	15									
323										
327					4					
337	14	6	1939	17	2					
339	28	3								
345	10	6		10	6					
346				17						
347										
349	27	12	1968	-9						
350				4	7					
352										
353	7			11	11		1	1	2	
354				13						
355										
356										
361	4			4						
362				6	9					
363				4						
364										
365				12						
366										
367				7	9					
370	25									
371	8	2		12						
373				15						
374	22									
375	31	3								
377					7					
378	7									
379	17									
380										
381										
391	25									
394	30	10		29	5					
395	23			9						
396								2	2	Yes
397	8	10		16						
398	1	5		5	12					No
399	8			6						
400				30	10	1917				
407										
409				11	9					
410				26	11					
414	31	3								
418							2		2	
420				31			3	3	6	
421				17						
501	31	1		31	1					
502				28						
503				6						
504	25	5								
507										No
510										Yes

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
511					5					
518	3									
521				22	7	1917				
522	7			7	5					
523							2			2
603				17						
604	14	8								
605	18			9	11					
606	23									
607				13	4	1958				
608				12	7					
610										
612				16	3					
613	16	8		11	3					
614			1945			1945		2		2
621				16	1	1943				
622	1	3	1945	1	3	1945				
625							3			3
632	7			7	4	1917				
633				27	12					
634	29	9		6	10	1949				
1006										
1013				28	10					
1019				5	9	1965				
1023	11	12		9	1	1952				
1024	6									
1025	26			26	2	1928				
1026	7	10		4						
1027				7	10	1935				
1039	10						2	3		5
1051										
1061				29	1	1976				
1062										
1063	15	6								
1066							2			2
1068	14									
1070	29	1		1	6	1966		4		4
1072										
1073				9						No
1074										
1081										
1083				9						
1084										
1086	7	7								
1087				30	3	1912				
1091										
1093				28	5					
1094										
1095				28						
1097	26			22	8					
1099	12	1								
1100	-9									Yes
1104				6						
1105										
1106	17	10								

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1109				18						
1110				3						
1117				2	4					
1118										
1119	28									
1123	15	8		16						
1129				20	5			1		1
1131	13									
1133				26						
1135				14	4					
1136	19			14						
1138				4						
1139				24						
1147		4								
1151	10			13						
1152				30	11	1935				
1153	1	6		19						
1154	19	7		29	1					
1155				14						
1156				14	5					
1158				30						
1161										
1166										
1170				13	9					
1171	-9									
1175				29						
1178	8	8		21	3					
1179										
1181				24						
1182		10			10					
1184	14			-9						
1189										
1190				9						
1191										
1202				20	12					
1213					7	1967				
1214										
1215	7	6		29	6					
1219					9					
1226	4			6						
1227	6	10		27						
1228	16			13						
1229				30	9					
1230	21									
1234	24	12	1920	22	7					
1235	7	7		18	11					
1240	15	9		15	9					
1241	19									
1243										
1244	21	9						2		2
1245				24						
1246	12									
1247				4	4					
1249										
1262	5	11			5	1919				

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1263	9			13						
1268				3						
1270										
1272	4	4	1919	29	11					
1280	14									
1284	31	7								
1285	6			12	9					
1286	12									
1292	7	4								
1300				8	5					
1301				19						
1302				2	8	1959				
1303				7						
1304				7	10					
1305				9	9					
1306				21	11					
1307	27			12						
1308	7									
1310	17									
1312	21	2	1964	22	1	1966				
1319	5									
1321	10									
1322				14	10					
1324				18						
1331	16			9	11		2	2	4	
1333	5			6	3					
1334	12			12						
1340	23	8		13	11					
1344	4			30	7					
1346				5	1	1956				
1347				12						
1350	27			7						
1352	19									
1353				20						
1360				18	3	1970				
1363				3	5					
1364				15						No
1366										Yes
1368				22	9					
1369	21			21						
1374										
1377	4			4						
1378	-9	2		28	10					
1380				29	10					
1381				28	5					
1382	13									
1384										
1385				24	1			1	1	
1387	16			21						
1390	9	1	1973							
1391	8			22	3					
1396										
1397				11	3					
1399										No
1401	4	11								

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1404	14									
1407	27			-9	3					
1410	22			22						
1411	25			11	7					
1418	-9	1	1963	-9	1	1963				
1419				29	5					
1422										
1423				14	9	1961				
1427										
1428										No
1435	4	5								
1441		9								
1447				21						
1448				-9	10					
1452										
1463	22	3		24	3					
1466	28	3								
1469				20						
1477	3	3			4					
1482	5									
1489				31	10					
1490				17	4					
1493		6			6					
1495										
1498										
1502	25	1								
1503				-9	8					
1506	13	4		16	3	1853				
1507				21	3					
1510				6	12					
1511				-9	11					
1512				7	8					
1513				2	11					
1515										
1517				22	1		3		3	
1519	6	12	1862	30						
1520										
1522										
1524	4	8								
1527				19	11					
1533	22									
1534				26						
1540				18	5					
1541				11	10					No
1542				23						
1543										
1544	26	9								
1545	26	3		1						
1547	8			15						
1549	6									
1550	1									
1551										
1553		3								Yes
1556	7	12	1835	7	12	1835				
1563				27	1					

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1564	6			19						
1566					10					
1567				28						
1569				20						
1571	29	8		6	9					
1573				6						
1574	6		1878	8	2	1878				Yes
1575				20	1					
1576	24			24						
1579										
1580	25			26	4					
1581				30	3					
1586				4	6					
1587										
1589										
1590	30									
1594		3			3					
1595				26	7					
1597		10								
1598		4		-9						
1599	-9	10		-9	10					
1601					1					
1603	10			2	6					
1605				5						
1608	8			5						
1610	12			13						No
1612				6						
1613				25						
1614	19			19						
1622				22	11					
1623	10			31		1937				
1627	9			11						
1629				29						
1632	15			15						
1633				-9	7					
1635	18			2						
1639				2	2					
1642				15	4					
1643	-9	4		-9	4		1		1	
1645										
1646	25			15	8					
1647	15	5	1895	16	3					
1648	21	9	1897			1897				Yes
1649	14		1899	14		1899				
1650	11	8								
1653				2	3					
1654	7									
1656				4	3					
1660	1			8						
1661				29						
1670		4	1926	-9	7					
1671	-9	9		4	7					Yes
1674	28									
1683	20	6								
1685				18						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1686				29	2	1940				
1693	22			7	7					
1694				25	1	1942				
1695	20	3		21						
1701				17	6					
1703	2	7								
1707				8						
1708										No
1709	30									No
1710										
1711	25	1		31						
1713				29						
1714							2		2	
1715	11	9								
1717	8	8								
1718										
1720	15	12	1975							
1723	25									
1724										
1732	11			11	10					
1733	23	1		25	1		3		3	
1736	1	6		1	12					
1739		9			9					Yes
1740				15	6	1842				Yes
1743	27			23						
1746	27			27						
1749				22				2	2	
1752	10	12	1825							
1755	16	6		25	8					
1757										
1762	17									
1764	6			6						
1772										
1773				9	3	1916				
1774										No
1775				30						
1778				4	8					
1780	8			27	1	1924				
1788	12			17						
1789	17			17	1	1944				
1792				17	11					
1793				18	11					
1796										No
1797										
1799				30						
1800	-9	6		-9	9	1865				
1801		6		8	12					
1803				10						
1804				10	2					
1805				14	1					
1806	17			2	7			1	1	
1807				19	3					
1808										
1809										
1810				31						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
1825								1	1	
2006	23	8								
2007	17									
2008										No
2009	27	7								
2010	14	12	1949	24						
2014	19	5		19	5					
2017				20						
2018	12									
2020					7					
2022	14									
2023	27			27	3					
2024	2			2						No
2025	18			18						
2029	28			5						
2030	9	8		29						
2031	14			14	2					No
2032	10			10						
2033										
2035	27	6		20	8			2	2	Yes
2036	23			23	6					
2038	16			18						
2040	14	1		8	3					
2041	15									
2042				3	5					Yes
2044				3	2					
2045	16									
2046										
2049										
2050	6									Yes
2052	27	1								
2053	25			13			2	1	3	
2059										
2066	11			11						
2067				31	3					
2068	8			29						
2069				9						
2072				25	5					
2079				2	2	1959				
2080	19									
2081				20						
2082				8						
2085	25	4								
2086										
2088				21						
2092	20	9								
2095	6			1	4					
2096	1			1						
2097		6		21	6					
2098		4		24						
2101	20			24						
2102	16	6	1986	13	12					
2103	14			4						No
2112	2		1973	13	3	1975				
2113				14						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2115	24	10	1979							
2116	19									
2117										
2119	22			5						
2120	8									
2121				27	2					No
2123	26			26	8					No
2126				27						
2127					9					
2129		4			4					No
2130	22	2		8	10					
2132	25			26						No
2133				4	4					
2136				16						
2138				21						
2139		5								
2140										
2143										
2144				11						
2149	20	7								
2150							5		5	
2155										
2163			1978			1978				
2168				10						
2169	29									
2170				24	12					
2171	15			15						
2174	31	10								
2175	27			22						
2176				9						
2177				12						
2178										
2179	24			15	4					
2181	30	4		20						Yes
2184	28			10						
2185	15									
2186	4									
2187	16	2		18	9					No
2188	1			20						
2192	7									
2194	5									
2195				13						
2198	5			19						
2200	10	6		14	1	1876				
2201				31	10					
2202	9	8								
2203		8								
2206	-9									
2208				12						
2209				30	8					
2211				15	8					
2212	30			6	7					
2218								1	1	
2221										
2222				5	5					

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2223				4						
2225				21	10					
2231										
2234				31	7		1		1	
2236	16	9	1857							
2237										
2244	16									
2300	4	1	1894	4	1	1894				
2306										
2307										
2311	19									
2313				25						
2315	24			24						
2316	14	3	1929	14	3	1929				
2319				16						
2320		4		10	9					
2322										
2325	-9	9		-9						
2326										
2331				25						
2335										
2338	15			-9	1	1901				
2339	19	4		21	2					
2343	2									
2346	9			26						
2347	29									
2348	26	7								
2349										Yes
2353	28	12	1985	23	5					
2354										
2357	24	6								
2360	10	1								
2363	7	2		31	10	1918				
2364	18	4		27	6					
2367	30									
2369	21									
2372				23						No
2373	26									Yes
2544		8			8					
2545	9			12						
2547				9	10					
2549	24			24						
2551				31	7					
2553	19									
2554	13	5	1984	18						
2557	6			23	8	1985				
2561	8			8						
2565				2	1	1987				
2568										
2570							1	3	4	Yes
2574	5			7						
2578	12									
2584	8			2	10					
2585	5									
2588	2									

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2589										
2590	27			27						No
2591	7									
2593	4	1	1987	4	1	1987				
2594	16	9		20	5	1988				
2596				23	9					
2600										
2603	13									
2605				3	1	1920				
2610										
2612										
2616				23						
2619	23									
2623	8	8								
2625				30						
2626	14									
2629				6	1					No
2630				28	9	1964				
2631	25									
2632	29			14	9					Yes
2633	23									
2634	30	10								
2635	19			20						
2639	16	6		1	12					
2640	10			10						
2641	16									
2642	2	7		25						
2643	-9									
2644	-9	6		4	2	1987				Yes
2646	19	7		19	7					
2647	22			22	4			2	2	
2649				14	8	1917				
2683				23						
2704		9								
2707	10	7		-9	10					
2708										Yes
2710	22	7		13						
2711	9									
2713		11								
2715	-9									
2716	17	2		-9						
2717				19						
2721										
2724				28						
2725										
2729	3				9					Yes
2731	14	4		-9	5					Yes
2733										
2735										
2739										
2740										
2741	23									
2742	-9	12	1986	5						
2745										
2746	5	4		17						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2747	-9			-9						
2748	-9			-9						
2749										
2750	16			6						
2754	29									
2757										
2760										
2762	28			28						
2767	22	12	1987							
2768	8			14						
2769	30			30						
2771										Yes
2772	16	11	1987	27	5					
2774										Yes
2775				5						
2778	3	6								
2779										No
2782	7	3		28						
2783										
2785	18			18						
2788	22									
2793	6	1		30	9					
2794	1									
2798				26						
2800	24			29						No
2801				30						Yes
2802										
2806										
2807										Yes
2808	25			9						
2817	10			22						
2820	19			19						
2821	2			2						
2823				20	1	1988				
2824	12									
2826				16	5					
2827										
2832	8	1								
2834				12	2					No
2840				17	7		1		1	
2845				29						
2847				26	10					
2850	-9	12	1956							
2852				2	5	1959				
2853	6			6						
2854	7									
2855	29	5								
2857	23	12	1957							
2858	31	12	1957							
2859				10						
2861	28			22						Yes
2863				7						
2865	1	9		31	5					
2870										
2871				15	7					Yes

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2873	15									
2875	3	3		30	4					
2877	31	7		1	8					
2878	31	7		1	8					
2880	1			1						
2884	14	3								
2888				10	7					
2891	15			15						
2892	21	1								
2897	20			20						
2898	3			3						
2901	15			15						
2904	29			29						
2908	2									Yes
2914	12			13	2					
2915	22			22						
2916	27									
2919	15			15						
2921	14			14						
2922	15			15						
2923				22						
2926										Yes
2928										
2929	9	4								
2930										
2932	13			13						
2933	12									Yes
2934				6						
2935										
2937				24						Yes
2938										
2942	14			17						
2944	28			28						
2946				27	12					
2947										
2949				17	2					
2956	-9	6		-9	6					
2959	24			24						
2960	7			8						
2962				12	7					
2963	10			12						
2964										Yes
2965										
2968										
2969	12			12						
2971				8	1	1982				
2974										
2977	9			8	6					
2984										
2986	10			5	9					Yes
2987										
2988	9	9		11	9					
2989										
2995				30	3					
2996				3						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
2997	27	9		27	9					
2998										
2999	14			14						
3000	-9	4		-9	4					
3001	26	3					1	1	2	
3003	23	1	1979	25						
3009	16			16						
3017	15									
3018	-9			-9						
3022	16									
3024										
3031	25			26						
3036	21			21						
3037				17	2					
3042				19						
3043	3									
3046							1	2	3	
3049	18	5		24						
3050				29	10					
3052	1			1						
3053	1			1						
3057	1			4	2					
3058				15	12					
3062	29	8								
3064										
3065				23						
3066										
3067	28									
3068				14	6					
3070	13									
3071		7		20	5	1984				No
3073										
3075	31	1		31	1					
3076	22	9								
3082										No
3083	14									
3086										
3088	4			4						
3093	28									No
3096										No
3097	17			17						
3099										
3101										
3102	7									
3104	18			24	7					No
3107	25			9						
3109	21			21						Yes
3111	-9			17						
3112				1	12	1980				
3113	10			10						
3114										
3117	3									
3119	26									
3126										
3127							1	1	2	

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3129				27						
3130	22			26	12					
3132										
3133				9	9	1909				
3138										
3139	5				3	1912				
3150				23						
3151	4			4						
3152										
3154	30	10								
3155				31						
3157	14			31						
3158				31						
3161				15	6		1	2	3	
3163	14			14						Yes
3167	1			4						
3168	26			26						
3169										
3170										
3172				26						
3173				3						
3175	11			26	8					
3180	30									
3182	23			17						
3183				21	6					
3184	10			4	8					No
3185				5	6					
3186	4			4						Yes
3187	27			27						
3189	3			4	7					
3190				3	7					
3191				2	10	1939				
3192				6						No
3193				19						
3195				28						
3196	1			12	5					
3197	11			11						
3199	31	7		31	7					Yes
3200	28	4		28	4					
3203	31	7								
3205	20									No
3209	2			2						
3210	10			10						
3211	15	11	1954	15	11	1954				
3214	28									
3215	9			19				2	2	
3217				17						
3218				30	1	1956				
3221										
3225				6						
3227										
3229				3						
3230	29	12	1956	26						
3231	13									
3239	10									

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3242	27			13						
3243				21						
3244				31	10					
3247	4			4						
3249		8			9					
3250				-9	11					
3259		3			11					
3260	20			20						
3263	29									
3265				28	1					
3267										
3300	25									
3324	-9	7	1877							
3326	6			16						
3330				15						
3340	14			14						
3341	18			-9						
3343	1			1						
3345				3	3					
3346	18			3						
3348				3	10			1	1	Yes
3349	18			20	10					
3351	31	7		31	7					
3352				23	8					
3361	10			27						
3362	20			20						
3364				15						
3371	7			7						
3372				18	4					
3373	26			28						
3374	24	11		25						
3377										
3383										
3384				5	7	1985				
3387				14						
3400										
3401										
3402										
3403	26			24	3					Yes
3404				28	3					
3405				25	10					
3406				3	10					
3411				9	10					
3412	14	8					4	2	6	
3413				16	3					No
3414	22									
3415				14						
3417	25	9								
3418	1			28						
3419	6			23	8					
3425	2	7		13	2					
3427				22	1					
3428	17	3								
3430				15	9					
3433	7	3		7	4	1967				

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3434	1	11	1961	19	4	1964				
3437										
3439				21						
3440										
3443				11						
3444				17	5					
3446				23						
3447				19	12					
3448				24						
3503	15	2			8	1942				Yes
3506				6	6					
3507					2					
3508				15	2					
3509				27	3					
3510				11	4					
3511				24	2					
3512				1	3					
3513					12	1941				No
3514					12	1941				No
3515					9	1943				
3516	2	4		2	4	1943				
3518				11	12	1941				
3519	8				12	1941				
3520				11	12	1941				
3521					12					
3522	8				12	1941				
3523				12	12	1941				
3525					12	1941				
3526					1					
3527					12	1942				
3540				13	9					
3542	24			19	10					
3550										
3551				22	5	1993	14		14	
3552										Yes
3554				14	8	1994				
3555				9						
3557	4	3		13	3			2	2	
3558				3						
3561	27	10		27	9					
3564				12						
3567				-9						
3569				20	12					
3572	1	6		1	6					
3573				28	5					
3574				8						
3599				10	9					
3604										
3606										Yes
3607				24						
3610	22			22						
3613	2			8						
3614	9									
3615	26			8						
3616				3	10					

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3617				16	5			1	1	
3620				3						
3621	26			26						
3625	24									
3626				20						
3628	15									
3629										
3630	19									
3631				6	1	1981				
3633	12									
3637	16			16				2	2	
3639	1									
3642										No
3647	26	2								
3656	3			23	7					
3700	25	9			10					
3701										
3702										
3708	9			4	11					
3709	6	11		27	3	1941				
3714	15			15						
3715					2					
3717				13						
3718										
3719										No
3720	27	10		27	10					
3724	-9									
3725	2	6								
3800										
3802				20						
3804				31						
3806				27						
3812				8						
3813	-9									
3814	17							2	2	No
3820	17									
3825				30	8	1940				
3827				8						
3834				29	5	1940				
3835	28			28						
3836	17			24						
3850	28			19						
3851				29						
3853				20				2	2	
3854	11	7		11	7					
3855	15			21						
3860	13			6						
3861				14						
3864	12	11								
3868				22	9					
3869	14			19	9					Yes
3872	-9									Yes
3873	17	4		17	4					
3875	13			13						
3876	10			24						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
3877	16	5		22	5		3		3	
3878										
3881	13			13	9					
3882	17			19	7					
3885	15	12	1942	15	12	1942				
3901				3	1	1990				
3904	17									
3907				13						
3909				13						
3910	9			26						
3911	7									
3913										
3914	18			14						
3916	10									
3919										Yes
3920	18	2		27	9					
3921										No
3950				4						
3952	11			29						
3953	-9	10		-9	7					
3957	30				4					
3960				14						
3974				2	1	1992				
3975										
3976				27	7					
3978	1	4		23						
3979	24									
3980				28						
3983	17	1		1						
3984	1									
3985	26	4								
3988	1			1						
3994	16			20	8	1979				
4003										
4004				24	7					
4005	26		1995	26		1995				
4006				21						
4009	8									
4010										
4011										
4012	17									
4013										
4016				18						
4022										
4027	8	2		9	8					
4029		7		26	10					
4030	12			18						
4031	9									
4035	25									
4038				12						
4040	1			16						
4042				3	10					
4045	-9			-9						
4051	17			17						
4052				10						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
4055	10			2						
4060	1	4		8	4					
4063				19						
4064	21			23						
4067	11			11						
4068	25			26						
4071	8									
4075				1	5					
4076	31	5								
4083	14			29						
4084	1			12						
4085	20	4								Yes
4088	10			26						
4090	11	8								
4092				4						
4094	9			4	12					Yes
4098										
4100				12	11					
4103				10						Yes
4109										
4113				9						
4116				6	7					
4117	4			4						
4118										
4121	11			28						
4124				2	5					
4126				15						No
4128	4			16	5					
4130										
4136	14									
4138	13			13						
4141										
4144				20						
4145	22			27						
4148				12						
4151	25	1		5						
4152										
4156					9					
4158										Yes
4160				25						
4161	15									
4171				7						
4172				25						
4174				10	11	1997				
4179	16									
4183										
4188				9	6					
4192	25									
4197	30									
4203				8	4					
4210				31	1	2001				
4212										
4215				21						
4220										No
4221				11						

MID#	Start Date			End Date			Participants			Reciprocated
	Day	Month	Year	Day	Month	Year	Num SideA	Num SideB	Total	
4225	23									
4236	13			13						
4238				14						Yes
4245										
4246										
4250				10						
4257	10									
4258				12						
4260										No
4261	12									
4272	19									
4273										
4279	18			18						
4280	23	3								
4284										Yes
4287	19									
4288										
4291				20	10					
4292	9			9						
4295	1	8								
4299										
4310										Yes
4312										
4313	16			30						
4320	2	11								
4323										Yes
4324	23	5								
4329	4			4						
4333							2		2	
4335								3	3	Yes
4337										Yes
4338				19	4					
4339	2									
4341				1						
4343								37	37	
4344							2		2	

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3	10 Mobilization [3]				
7					
8					
9				4 Yield by side B	2 Imposed
11					2 Imposed
12					
13				5 Stalemate	1 Negotiated
15					
16					
19					
20					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
21					
23				2 Victory for side B	
25				2 Victory for side B	1 Negotiated
26	13 Blockade [4]				
27	11 Fortify border [3]	3 Display of force			
28					
31					1 Negotiated
40					
41				3 Yield by side A	1 Negotiated
43					2 Imposed
50					
53			1 1-25 deaths		
55				6 Compromise	
56					
57					
61					
64					
68					1 Negotiated
69				4 Yield by side B	
71					
78	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force			
86					
88					
91	4 Threat to declare war [2]			4 Yield by side B	4 Unclear
100					
104					
108				1 Victory for side A	
111				2 Victory for side B	
114					
115					
119					
121				4 Yield by side B	
122	15 Seizure [4]				
123			3 101-250 deaths		1 Negotiated
126					
127				4 Yield by side B	2 Imposed
128					
131					
136				3 Yield by side A	1 Negotiated
137					
139					
141					
142	4 Threat to declare war [2]	2 Threat to use force			
144					
146					
148	16 Attack [4]		0 None		1 Negotiated
153					
158				3 Yield by side A	
159					
160					1 Negotiated
166	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force		4 Yield by side B	
169			6 > 999 deaths		
172					
173			3 101-250 deaths		
174					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
177				5 Stalemate
178			1 1-25 deaths	6 Compromise
180				1 Negotiated
182				5 Stalemate
183				
187				
189				
191				6 Compromise
196				4 Yield by side B
197			6 > 999 deaths	
202				1 Negotiated
208				
212				
220				
225				
227	17 Clash [4]			
228	14 Occupation of territory [4]			2 Imposed
236				4 Yield by side B
238				
241				
242				
247				
248				
254				
256				7 Released
260				2 Imposed
262				8 Unclear
301				3 None
304	10 Mobilization [3]			4 Yield by side B
307				
309				
310				4 Yield by side B
311				3 None
312				
313				
315				
316				1 Negotiated
317	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force		
321				5 Stalemate
323				9 Joins ongoing war
327				3 None
337				
339				
345				
346				
347			1 1-25 deaths	1 Negotiated
349				
350				5 Stalemate
352			3 101-250 deaths	1 Negotiated
353				
354				
355			3 101-250 deaths	
356			2 26-100 deaths	5 Stalemate
361				1 Negotiated
362				6 Compromise
				1 Negotiated

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
363	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
364				5 Stalemate	
365	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force		7 Released	1 Negotiated
366	11 Fortify border [3]				
367					
370					
371					
373					
374	17 Clash [4]				
375					
377					
378	3 Threat to occupy territory [2]			4 Yield by side B	
379	3 Threat to occupy territory [2]			4 Yield by side B	
380	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
381				4 Yield by side B	
391	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
394					
395			0 None		
396					
397					
398					
399					
400	21 Join interstate war [5]	5 War		9 Joins ongoing war	
407				2 Victory for side B	2 Imposed
409				5 Stalemate	
410					1 Negotiated
414					
418					
420			5 501-999 deaths		
421					
501					3 None
502				2 Victory for side B	
503					2 Imposed
504					
507					
510				2 Victory for side B	
511					
518					
521				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
522				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
523					
603					
604			0 None	4 Yield by side B	1 Negotiated
605			1 1-25 deaths		
606					
607					
608					
610	17 Clash [4]		1 1-25 deaths		
612					
613					
614				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
621				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
622				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
625					
632				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
633					
634					
1006	17 Clash [4]				
1013					
1019					
1023				3 Yield by side A	1 Negotiated
1024					
1025	12 Border violation [3]				
1026				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
1027					
1039					
1051	17 Clash [4]		0 None		
1061					
1062					1 Negotiated
1063					
1066	14 Occupation of territory [4]				
1068					
1070	17 Clash [4]				1 Negotiated
1072			0 None	5 Stalemate	3 None
1073					
1074				1 Victory for side A	
1081			1 1-25 deaths		
1083					
1084					1 Negotiated
1086					
1087					
1091	14 Occupation of territory [4]				
1093					
1094	15 Seizure [4]			4 Yield by side B	
1095					
1097					
1099					1 Negotiated
1100	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
1104			1 1-25 deaths		
1105			0 None		
1106			3 101-250 deaths		
1109					
1110	17 Clash [4]				3 None
1117					
1118			0 None		
1119					
1123					
1129				1 Victory for side A	1 Negotiated
1131				5 Stalemate	
1133	17 Clash [4]			1 Victory for side A	1 Negotiated
1135					
1136	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
1138					
1139					
1147	10 Mobilization [3]	3 Display of force		5 Stalemate	
1151					
1152					
1153					1 Negotiated
1154					
1155					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
1156					
1158					
1161				2 Victory for side B	
1166				5 Stalemate	
1170			0 None		
1171					
1175				5 Stalemate	
1178					
1179				5 Stalemate	3 None
1181	11 Fortify border [3]				
1182					
1184	10 Mobilization [3]	3 Display of force	0 None		
1189					1 Negotiated
1190					
1191			0 None		
1202					1 Negotiated
1213					
1214	15 Seizure [4]				
1215			0 None		
1219					
1226					
1227	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
1228					
1229					
1230					
1234					
1235					
1240				5 Stalemate	
1241					
1243					2 Imposed
1244				2 Victory for side B	
1245	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
1246					
1247				3 Yield by side A	
1249	10 Mobilization [3]				
1262					
1263				1 Victory for side A	2 Imposed
1268					
1270					1 Negotiated
1272					
1280					
1284					
1285	17 Clash [4]		3 101-250 deaths		
1286					
1292					
1300					
1301					
1302					
1303			-9 Missing		
1304					
1305					
1306					
1307					
1308			1 1-25 deaths		
1310					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
1312				
1319			1 1-25 deaths	
1321			2 26-100 deaths	
1322				
1324				
1331				4 Yield by side B
1333				
1334				
1340				
1344				
1346	16 Attack [4]			
1347				1 Negotiated
1350				
1352				7 Released
1353				
1360	17 Clash [4]			
1363				
1364	16 Attack [4]		1 1-25 deaths	
1366				
1368			1 1-25 deaths	3 Yield by side A 1 Negotiated
1369				
1374			6 > 999 deaths	1 Negotiated
1377			1 1-25 deaths	5 Stalemate
1378				6 Compromise 1 Negotiated
1380				6 Compromise 1 Negotiated
1381				
1382	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force		
1384				6 Compromise 1 Negotiated
1385				
1387				
1390				5 Stalemate
1391				5 Stalemate
1396	17 Clash [4]			
1397				
1399				
1401				
1404				
1407				6 Compromise 1 Negotiated
1410			0 None	
1411				1 Negotiated
1418				
1419				
1422	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force		
1423				
1427			0 None	7 Released 1 Negotiated
1428	10 Mobilization [3]	3 Display of force	0 None	
1435				
1441			6 > 999 deaths	
1447				
1448				5 Stalemate
1452	15 Seizure [4]			
1463				
1466			0 None	
1469				
1477				4 Yield by side B

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
1482					
1489					
1490					
1493					
1495				5 Stalemate	3 None
1498					3 None
1502	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
1503					
1506					
1507					
1510				6 Compromise	
1511				1 Victory for side A	3 None
1512					
1513					
1515	3 Threat to occupy territory [2]	2 Threat to use force			
1517					
1519					
1520				1 Victory for side A	2 Imposed
1522	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
1524					
1527					
1533					
1534				4 Yield by side B	
1540					
1541	15 Seizure [4]				1 Negotiated
1542					
1543				5 Stalemate	3 None
1544					
1545					
1547				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
1549	16 Attack [4]		0 None		
1550			0 None		
1551				5 Stalemate	
1553	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force			
1556					
1563					
1564	15 Seizure [4]				
1566				6 Compromise	
1567					
1569					
1571			1 1-25 deaths		
1573					
1574					
1575				3 Yield by side A	
1576					
1579			4 251-500 deaths		
1580					
1581					
1586					
1587	17 Clash [4]				
1589	12 Border violation [3]				
1590					
1594					
1595					
1597					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
1598					
1599					
1601					
1603	15 Seizure [4]			7 Released	1 Negotiated
1605					
1608					
1610	16 Attack [4]		0 None		
1612					
1613				5 Stalemate	
1614				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
1622					
1623					
1627				4 Yield by side B	
1629					
1632	16 Attack [4]				
1633					
1635	10 Mobilization [3]				
1639					
1642					
1643				2 Victory for side B	2 Imposed
1645				5 Stalemate	3 None
1646	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
1647					
1648	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
1649					
1650	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
1653					
1654				5 Stalemate	
1656				5 Stalemate	
1660					
1661				6 Compromise	
1670					
1671	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
1674					
1683				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
1685					
1686	10 Mobilization [3]				
1693					1 Negotiated
1694	21 Join interstate war [5]	5 War		9 Joins ongoing war	
1695	14 Occupation of territory [4]			1 Victory for side A	
1701					
1703			0 None		
1707	15 Seizure [4]				
1708			0 None		
1709			0 None		
1710			1 1-25 deaths		
1711					
1713					
1714				3 Yield by side A	
1715			2 26-100 deaths		
1717			0 None		
1718				5 Stalemate	3 None
1720					
1723					
1724				5 Stalemate	

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
1732					
1733	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
1736	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force			
1739	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
1740	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force		5 Stalemate	
1743					2 Imposed
1746					
1749					
1752					
1755					
1757				8 Unclear	
1762					2 Imposed
1764				5 Stalemate	3 None
1772				8 Unclear	
1773	21 Join interstate war [5]	2 Threat to use force		9 Joins ongoing war	
1774					
1775					
1778					
1780				4 Yield by side B	
1788					
1789	18 Declaration of war [4]				
1792					
1793					
1796	16 Attack [4]		0 None		
1797			1 1-25 deaths		
1799					
1800					
1801					
1803					
1804					
1805					
1806			1 1-25 deaths		
1807					
1808				5 Stalemate	
1809					1 Negotiated
1810					
1825			1 1-25 deaths		1 Negotiated
2006					
2007	13 Blockade [4]			3 Yield by side A	
2008	16 Attack [4]				
2009					
2010			2 26-100 deaths		
2014					
2017					
2018					
2020					
2022					
2023	11 Fortify border [3]	3 Display of force			
2024	11 Fortify border [3]	3 Display of force			
2025	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force			
2029	10 Mobilization [3]	3 Display of force			
2030				5 Stalemate	
2031	8 Alert [3]	3 Display of force			
2032					
2033			1 1-25 deaths		

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
2035	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths		
2036					
2038					
2040					
2041				5 Stalemate	1 Negotiated
2042	11 Fortify border [3]				
2044					
2045					
2046					
2049			0 None		
2050	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
2052			4 251-500 deaths		
2053					
2059	12 Border violation [3]				
2066					
2067					
2068					
2069					
2072					
2079	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force			
2080				6 Compromise	
2081					
2082					
2085					
2086				5 Stalemate	3 None
2088					
2092	12 Border violation [3]				
2095	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
2096					
2097					
2098					
2101					
2102	14 Occupation of territory [4]		0 None		
2103					
2112	17 Clash [4]				
2113					
2115					
2116					
2117	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force			
2119	17 Clash [4]			6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
2120	17 Clash [4]				
2121	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force		2 Victory for side B	
2123	14 Occupation of territory [4]			2 Victory for side B	
2126					
2127					
2129					
2130					
2132			1 1-25 deaths		
2133					
2136					
2138	15 Seizure [4]				
2139					
2140	15 Seizure [4]		0 None		
2143	11 Fortify border [3]				
2144					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
2149			2 26-100 deaths	
2150				2 Victory for side B
2155			1 1-25 deaths	3 None
2163				7 Released
2168				
2169				
2170				
2171				
2174				
2175	12 Border violation [3]			
2176				
2177			0 None	
2178	13 Blockade [4]	4 Use of force		5 Stalemate
2179			0 None	3 None
2181				
2184			1 1-25 deaths	
2185				
2186				
2187			0 None	
2188				
2192				
2194			1 1-25 deaths	
2195				
2198				
2200				
2201				
2202				
2203				
2206				
2208				
2209				5 Stalemate
2211				3 None
2212				
2218	7 Show of force [3]			
2221				1 Negotiated
2222				
2223				
2225				
2231			0 None	
2234				
2236				
2237	12 Border violation [3]			
2244				
2300			1 1-25 deaths	
2306				3 None
2307				3 None
2311				
2313				
2315				
2316				5 Stalemate
2319				3 None
2320	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force		
2322				5 Stalemate
2325			1 1-25 deaths	
2326	15 Seizure [4]			7 Released

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
2331					
2335				4 Yield by side B	
2338					
2339				6 Compromise	
2343					
2346					
2347	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
2348					
2349					
2353					
2354	11 Fortify border [3]				
2357					
2360					
2363					
2364				3 Yield by side A	
2367					
2369					
2372				5 Stalemate	3 None
2373	17 Clash [4]		2 26-100 deaths		
2544					
2545					
2547					
2549	15 Seizure [4]				1 Negotiated
2551					
2553					
2554					
2557					
2561					
2565					
2568					
2570					
2574					
2578	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
2584					
2585					
2588	15 Seizure [4]				
2589	2 Threat to blockade [2]				
2590	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force	0 None		
2591	15 Seizure [4]				
2593					
2594					
2596					
2600					3 None
2603					
2605			6 > 999 deaths		2 Imposed
2610			1 1-25 deaths	1 Victory for side A	
2612				4 Yield by side B	
2616					
2619	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force	0 None	5 Stalemate	
2623					
2625					
2626					
2629					
2630					
2631					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
2632	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
2633			0 None		
2634	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force			
2635			0 None		1 Negotiated
2639			1 1-25 deaths		
2640					
2641			0 None		
2642					
2643	17 Clash [4]				
2644	17 Clash [4]		1 1-25 deaths		
2646				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
2647				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
2649	21 Join interstate war [5]			9 Joins ongoing war	
2683					1 Negotiated
2704				2 Victory for side B	3 None
2707					
2708					
2710					
2711					
2713			2 26-100 deaths		
2715					
2716					
2717					
2721				5 Stalemate	3 None
2724	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths		
2725			0 None		
2729	16 Attack [4]				
2731	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
2733	1 Threat to use force [2]				
2735			0 None		
2739				3 Yield by side A	1 Negotiated
2740			1 1-25 deaths		
2741					
2742	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
2745			0 None		
2746					
2747					
2748					
2749			2 26-100 deaths		
2750					
2754					
2757	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
2760	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
2762					
2767					
2768	16 Attack [4]		0 None		1 Negotiated
2769					
2771	16 Attack [4]				
2772					
2774					
2775			0 None		
2778					
2779					
2782					
2783					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
2785					
2788					
2793					
2794					
2798					
2800				7 Released	1 Negotiated
2801					
2802			0 None		
2806			1 1-25 deaths		
2807	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
2808					
2817					
2820					
2821					
2823					
2824					
2826					
2827	12 Border violation [3]				
2832					
2834					
2840	14 Occupation of territory [4]				
2845	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force		6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
2847				7 Released	
2850					
2852				7 Released	
2853	16 Attack [4]				
2854					1 Negotiated
2855					
2857					
2858					
2859					
2861				7 Released	
2863					
2865					
2870	15 Seizure [4]				
2871					
2873					
2875				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
2877					
2878					
2880					
2884					
2888				7 Released	
2891	17 Clash [4]				
2892			3 101-250 deaths		
2897			0 None		
2898					
2901					
2904					
2908					
2914					
2915					
2916					
2919					
2921	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force			

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
2922				
2923				
2926				5 Stalemate
2928				1 Negotiated
2929				
2930	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force		
2932				
2933				7 Released
2934				7 Released
2935			1 1-25 deaths	
2937				
2938			0 None	
2942				
2944				
2946				
2947	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force		
2949				7 Released
2956				7 Released
2959			0 None	
2960				
2962				
2963				
2964				
2965				7 Released
2968	15 Seizure [4]			
2969				
2971				
2974				
2977				
2984			1 1-25 deaths	
2986	17 Clash [4]			
2987	17 Clash [4]			
2988	16 Attack [4]		1 1-25 deaths	
2989			0 None	
2995				7 Released
2996	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force		
2997				
2998			0 None	
2999				
3000				
3001				
3003			0 None	
3009				
3017	11 Fortify border [3]			
3018	11 Fortify border [3]			
3022	12 Border violation [3]			
3024			2 26-100 deaths	
3031	16 Attack [4]			
3036				
3037				
3042				
3043				
3046				
3049				
3050				

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3052					
3053					
3057					
3058					
3062					
3064	12 Border violation [3]				
3065					
3066				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
3067					
3068					
3070					
3071	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
3073			1 1-25 deaths		
3075	11 Fortify border [3]				
3076			0 None		
3082			0 None		
3083					
3086	12 Border violation [3]				
3088	4 Threat to declare war [2]				
3093					
3096					
3097					
3099			1 1-25 deaths		
3101	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths		
3102					
3104	16 Attack [4]			3 Yield by side A	
3107	8 Alert [3]				
3109					
3111					
3112					
3113	12 Border violation [3]				
3114			1 1-25 deaths		
3117					
3119					
3126				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
3127					
3129			1 1-25 deaths		
3130	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
3132	16 Attack [4]				
3133					
3138	17 Clash [4]		1 1-25 deaths		
3139					
3150	17 Clash [4]				
3151					
3152			0 None		
3154					
3155					
3157					
3158	11 Fortify border [3]				
3161					
3163	17 Clash [4]				
3167	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force		7 Released	
3168				8 Unclear	1 Negotiated
3169					1 Negotiated
3170	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
3172				
3173				
3175				
3180				
3182	12 Border violation [3]			
3183				
3184				
3185				
3186	17 Clash [4]			
3187				
3189				6 Compromise 1 Negotiated
3190				
3191				
3192	15 Seizure [4]			7 Released
3193				
3195				
3196				7 Released 1 Negotiated
3197				
3199				
3200				
3203				
3205	15 Seizure [4]			
3209				
3210				
3211				
3214				
3215				
3217				
3218				
3221			1 1-25 deaths	
3225				7 Released
3227			0 None	
3229				1 Negotiated
3230				
3231				
3239				
3242				
3243				
3244				
3247				
3249				3 Yield by side A
3250				3 None
3259				
3260				
3263				
3265				
3267				
3300				
3324				
3326				
3330				
3340				5 Stalemate 3 None
3341				
3343				
3345				1 Victory for side A 2 Imposed

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3346				1 Victory for side A	1 Negotiated
3348				9 Joins ongoing war	
3349				5 Stalemate	
3351					
3352	11 Fortify border [3]				
3361					
3362					
3364					
3371	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			
3372			1 1-25 deaths	5 Stalemate	
3373	17 Clash [4]				
3374	17 Clash [4]			5 Stalemate	3 None
3377			0 None		
3383	12 Border violation [3]		0 None	5 Stalemate	3 None
3384					
3387					
3400	16 Attack [4]				
3401	12 Border violation [3]	3 Display of force	1 1-25 deaths		
3402	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force			
3403	17 Clash [4]				
3404					
3405	17 Clash [4]				
3406					
3411					
3412	17 Clash [4]				
3413	16 Attack [4]		0 None		
3414					
3415					
3417	17 Clash [4]				
3418	17 Clash [4]				
3419	17 Clash [4]				1 Negotiated
3425	17 Clash [4]				
3427	17 Clash [4]				
3428					
3430					
3433	17 Clash [4]		0 None		
3434					
3437			2 26-100 deaths		
3439					
3440	10 Mobilization [3]	3 Display of force			
3443					
3444					
3446					
3447					
3448					
3503					
3506				8 Unclear	
3507				8 Unclear	
3508				8 Unclear	
3509				8 Unclear	
3510				8 Unclear	
3511				8 Unclear	
3512				8 Unclear	
3513				8 Unclear	
3514				8 Unclear	

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3515				8 Unclear	
3516				8 Unclear	
3518				8 Unclear	
3519				8 Unclear	
3520				8 Unclear	
3521				8 Unclear	
3522				8 Unclear	
3523				8 Unclear	
3525				8 Unclear	
3526				8 Unclear	
3527				8 Unclear	
3540	17 Clash [4]				
3542	17 Clash [4]				
3550			1 1-25 deaths		
3551					
3552					
3554					
3555				4 Yield by side B	2 Imposed
3557					
3558			3 101-250 deaths		
3561				1 Victory for side A	
3564	20 Begin interstate war [5]				
3567				4 Yield by side B	
3569					
3572					
3573					3 None
3574					
3599					
3604			1 1-25 deaths		
3606	12 Border violation [3]				
3607					
3610					
3613					
3614	17 Clash [4]				
3615					
3616					1 Negotiated
3617					
3620					
3621					
3625					
3626					
3628					
3629	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force	0 None		
3630					
3631					
3633	8 Alert [3]				
3637					
3639	17 Clash [4]		3 101-250 deaths		
3642	14 Occupation of territory [4]				
3647					
3656					
3700					
3701	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
3702	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
3708					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3709					
3714				9 Joins ongoing war	4 Unclear
3715				8 Unclear	
3717					
3718			0 None	5 Stalemate	3 None
3719					3 None
3720					
3724					
3725					
3800					1 Negotiated
3802	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
3804					
3806					
3812				5 Stalemate	
3813					
3814			0 None		
3820					
3825	1 Threat to use force [2]				
3827					
3834					
3835					
3836	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
3850	7 Show of force [3]	3 Display of force			
3851	1 Threat to use force [2]	2 Threat to use force		5 Stalemate	2 Imposed
3853					
3854					
3855					
3860					
3861					
3864					
3868				5 Stalemate	
3869	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths		
3872	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
3873					
3875					
3876					
3877					
3878				8 Unclear	
3881					
3882					
3885					
3901					
3904					
3907					
3909					
3910					
3911	16 Attack [4]		0 None		
3913			1 1-25 deaths		
3914	17 Clash [4]				
3916					
3919			1 1-25 deaths		
3920					
3921					
3950					
3952					

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
3953					
3957					
3960					
3974				1 Victory for side A	2 Imposed
3975				4 Yield by side B	
3976	11 Fortify border [3]				
3978					
3979					
3980					
3983					
3984					
3985			2 26-100 deaths		
3988	17 Clash [4]				
3994	16 Attack [4]		2 26-100 deaths		
4003	12 Border violation [3]				
4004					
4005					
4006					
4009					
4010				5 Stalemate	
4011					1 Negotiated
4012	15 Seizure [4]	4 Use of force			1 Negotiated
4013					1 Negotiated
4016					
4022	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths		
4027					1 Negotiated
4029					
4030					1 Negotiated
4031					
4035					2 Imposed
4038					
4040	8 Alert [3]	3 Display of force			
4042					
4045					
4051					
4052	15 Seizure [4]				
4055					
4060					
4063					
4064					
4067				5 Stalemate	
4068					
4071					
4075				6 Compromise	1 Negotiated
4076					1 Negotiated
4083	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
4084					
4085			0 None		
4088					
4090					
4092	16 Attack [4]		0 None		1 Negotiated
4094				7 Released	
4098	12 Border violation [3]				
4100					
4103					3 None

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures		Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome Settlement
4109				3 Yield by side A
4113				
4116				
4117	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force		
4118	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force		
4121				1 Negotiated
4124				
4126				
4128				
4130			0 None	
4136				
4138				
4141				5 Stalemate
4144				
4145				
4148				
4151				
4152	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force		
4156				
4158				
4160				7 Released 3 None
4161			0 None	
4171				
4172				
4174				7 Released
4179				
4183				1 Negotiated
4188				
4192				
4197				
4203				1 Negotiated
4210				
4212	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force		
4215				
4220				
4221				
4225				
4236				
4238				
4245	17 Clash [4]		1 1-25 deaths	
4246				2 Imposed
4250			1 1-25 deaths	
4257				5 Stalemate
4258				
4260	10 Mobilization [3]			
4261				
4272			0 None	
4273			1 1-25 deaths	
4279				
4280				
4284	14 Occupation of territory [4]	4 Use of force		5 Stalemate
4287				
4288			1 1-25 deaths	
4291				
4292				

MID#	Conflict Intensity Measures			Dispute Endings	
	Highest Action	Hostility Level	Fatality Level	Outcome	Settlement
4295					1 Negotiated
4299			1 1-25 deaths		
4310	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force			
4312					
4313	17 Clash [4]	4 Use of force	1 1-25 deaths	5 Stalemate	1 Negotiated
4320				5 Stalemate	3 None
4323					
4324					
4329					
4333	16 Attack [4]	4 Use of force			
4335					
4337					
4338					3 None
4339					1 Negotiated
4341					
4343					
4344					

Appendix IIE—Brief discussion of Correlates of War comments on recommended changes

We provided the Correlates of War (CoW) project with several descriptions of our recommended changes as our review progressed. Then, in January of 2014, CoW Director, Zeev Maoz, hosted a mini-conference at the University of California-Davis, to discuss our recommendations. We sent a revision of our recommendations soon after the conference and a more comprehensive report to all involved in May 2014. We also sent the CoW project a draft of this paper in November of 2014. This appendix provides a brief review of our discussions and disagreements over our recommended changes following the release of the draft of our paper.

First, we have received no comment on MIDs for which we recommended keeping but with changes, including recommendations of both major and minor changes.

Second, the following 60 cases were added to the drop report after the Davis meeting and may not have been reviewed by CoW: MID#0216, MID#1022, MID#1042, MID#1149, MID#1150, MID#1164, MID#1183, MID#1255, MID#1309, MID#1329, MID#1398, MID#1409, MID#1496, MID#1501, MID#1509, MID#1526, MID#1604, MID#1659, MID#1786, MID#1787, MID#2015, MID#2027, MID#2076, MID#2077, MID#2093, MID#2105, MID#2134, MID#2137, MID#2172, MID#2227, MID#2314, MID#2356, MID#2558, MID#2620, MID#2621, MID#2726, MID#2911, MID#3023, MID#3039, MID#3125, MID#3233, MID#3234, MID#3235, MID#3236, MID#3255, MID#3324, MID#3385, MID#3505, MID#3517, MID#3524, MID#3655, MID#3711, MID#3829, MID#3874, MID#3880, MID#3886, MID#4163, MID#4178, MID#4274, and MID#4327.

Third, CoW wants to treat eight cases as merges while we believe these are drops: MID#1082, MID#1687, MID#1790, MID#2182, MID#2365, MID#2366, MID#3228, MID#3646, and MID#3821. We could not find evidence of MID#2368 and do not consider it a drop (it is in our list of cases that could not be found). CoW wants to drop MID#3542 instead of our recommendation of dropping MID#3821; these are duplicate cases, so the result is the same. For these eight cases, CoW essentially agrees with our recommendations, but our labeling differs.

Fourth, we found new information for six previous drop recommendations (changes were noted in our May 2014 drop report that was given to CoW). Even though CoW agreed with our earlier recommendation to drop these cases, we now believe the disputes should be kept, with changes made in several of the disputes: MID#1698, MID#1809, MID#2600, MID#2870, MID#2928, and MID#3156. Also, we agreed with CoW arguments at the UC-Davis meeting in 14 cases and have changed the recommendations accordingly. The recommendations for these disputes were changed in our May 2014 drop report: MID#1097, MID#1339, MID#1418, MID#1696, MID#1709, MID#1717, MID#2087, MID#2610, MID#2615, MID#2623, MID#2760, MID#2838, MID#2967, and MID#3002.

Finally, there remain 62 cases of disputes that CoW wants to keep even though we argue that the disputes should be dropped from the dataset. These can be divided into two categories: disagreements over evidence and disagreements over coding rules. In the first category, there are a large number of cases in which the drop report listed the story of a possible incident but did not include all the information about our searches for protest. It is difficult to prove a negative, but we were always very careful to conduct comprehensive searches of the weeks (and many times months) following these events for evidence of protest. Nevertheless, if CoW has evidence of protest in these cases, we will be glad to change our recommendation(s).

- In all there are 19 cases in which we found no protest that CoW wants to keep: MID#2848, MID#2864, MID#2896, MID#2900, MID#2902, MID#2903, MID#2912, MID#2939, MID#2954, MID#2957, MID#2990, MID#2994, MID#3204, MID#3212, MID#3223, MID#3224,

MID#3237, MID#3710, and MID#3951.

- There are also 17 cases in which CoW believes we did not consult original sources when, in fact, we did, and we still recommend dropping the case. These disputes are described in the drop report: MID#1028, MID#1176, MID#1558, MID#1641, MID#2078 (actually in could not find report), MID#2706, MID#2712, MID#2837, MID#3153, MID#3266, MID#3268, MID#3321 (actually in could not find report), MID#3363, MID#3376, MID#3571, MID#3828, and MID#3831. If CoW believes these recommendations are in error and can provide evidence of a dispute, we will be happy to revisit these cases yet again. However, our many reviews of historical record of these events still suggest that these cases should be dropped from the dataset.

The second category of disagreements over coding-rules interpretation includes 24 cases. We reviewed each of these cases once more in light of CoW's brief notes on our narratives; we also conducted additional searches for each of the cases. Ultimately, we decided to recommend keeping MID#1128, MID#2738, MID#3723, MID#3824, and MID#3856, following major changes to the coding of each dispute. We changed the recommendation for MID#3857 to a case that should be merged with MID#3850. We stand by our drop recommendations for the remaining cases: MID#0239, MID#1162, MID#1725, MID#1734, MID#2016, MID#2108, MID#2608, MID#2703, MID#2787, MID#2831, MID#2842, MID#3077, MID#3121, MID#3237, MID#3270, MID#3350, MID#4026, and MID#4032. Interested readers are encouraged to consult our drop narratives and email us for original sources and/or our search results for these cases of disagreement.