

Does Force or Agreement Lead to Peace?: A Collection and Analysis of Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID) Settlement, 1816 to 2001

NSF Proposal ID: 0923406

Principal Investigators:

Douglas M. Gibler and Karl DeRouen

University of Alabama, Box 870213, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0213

Date of Proposal: January 22, 2009

(for proposed grant dates of September 1, 2009 through August 30, 2011)

PROJECT SUMMARY

Proposed Activity

This proposal seeks funding to analyze the effectiveness of substantive political settlements in ending international conflict. The recent literature on peace agreements often concludes that treaty terms matter little in determining the durability of peace following interstate conflict. The authors argue that this finding results from datasets that are ill-suited for examining the role of issue settlement following conflict. Current tests of negotiated settlements focus on the presence of negotiation rather than the removal of contested issues from states' agendas. Further, by examining mostly wars, current studies exclude the many successful settlements that resolve conflict short of war.

To address these concerns, the authors plan to collect and code every formal negotiated settlement that follows a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) between 1816 and 2001. There are 416 dyadic cases of negotiated settlement following MIDs, and the project will code each agreement for the presence and substance of political settlement. The authors will also collect information regarding the enforcement mechanisms used in the treaty, the presence of third-party mediators and guarantors, and the specifics of the negotiation process for each settlement. All information collected in this project would be available to the public in aggregated and single-case, searchable form.

Intellectual Merit

Resolving conflict represents a core value of political science, and "who gets what, when, and how" is, quite literally, simply another way of defining the substance of negotiated settlements. This research project suggests that political settlements can have lasting effects for peace, which, if true, could alter the conclusions of a significant number of current research programs. Data on negotiations, third party mediators and treaty design will also help advance the peace-making and treaty design literatures.

The authors also argue that political settlements can have strong effects as an independent variable predicting domestic-level changes in institutions and individual behavior. The positive peace of issue settlement can lead to decentralization, democratization, and political tolerance. Negative peace, however, tends to reinforce centralization and authoritarian tendencies among individuals and within institutions. These arguments obviously cut across many different literatures and subfields.

Broader Impact of Project

In addition to the immediate impact on the peace agreement literature, the analyses completed with this dataset have important implications for the scholarly literatures on studies of rivalry, territorial conflict, the bargaining literature, and research programs based on more general theories of cooperation and treaty formation. Each of these literatures has used the dichotomous imposed/negotiated settlement variable in analyses of MID data. Richer information on settlement types would allow more comprehensive tests of these theories.

The implied policy prescriptions of the current peace agreement literature should also not be forgotten. The current literature suggests that the balance of capabilities controls the likelihood of peace, and agreements must therefore reflect that balance in order to be durable. Policymakers practicing negotiations based on the current literature are using knowledge gained from a severely selected sample of cases, which is particularly unfortunate if political settlements or enforcement mechanisms can indeed prevent disputes from escalating to war. By broadening the scope of peace agreement research, both temporally and for conflicts short of war, the authors hope to provide a much better understanding of the necessary conditions for a durable peace.

What follows is a significantly revised version of a proposal we submitted in the August 2007 NSF competition. The panel summary review of that proposal noted that the proposed project was “quite innovative” and “would be a nice addition to the data sets currently available regarding militarized conflict.” However, our proposal did not provide enough specifics about the theoretical rationale that would guide the data collection effort. The panel also requested assurances that the data was available to collect and of good quality (especially from the pre-World War II era).

We address these concerns throughout this revision, but we want to highlight a few changes in the proposal here. First, we now provide much more detail on the theoretical rationale for our data collection effort. Our key argument is that there are many different types of peace, from the negative peace associated with lack of conflict to the positive peace of mutual trust, cooperation and integration. As we describe below, this type of conceptualization is essential for guiding data collection efforts on peace types and also for understanding important questions concerning recurrent conflict. This data collection is also crucial for those investigating the effects of peace types on domestic-level behavior.

Regarding the availability of data, we have already collected a majority of the formal settlements of fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) from the 19th century. We have also collected a random sample of 20 non-fatal MIDs that span the entire 1816 to 2001 time period. Though time consuming, this process is relatively straightforward since the MID data already identifies the date of the settlement. We discuss our mechanisms for ensuring reliability with our outline of budgetary requests.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Current research on the efficacy of international peace agreements emphasizes the role of capability distributions in fostering lasting settlements. Rather than emphasizing the nature of the settlement, its relation to the issues of the conflict, or even the mechanisms used to foster settlement observance, international peace research is instead now focused on the capabilities of the rival states as the prime determinants of how long peace settlements last. Resolution of an issue does not seem to matter; a balance of power supporting the agreed status quo does.

We believe this view of peace agreements is incorrect. In this proposal we apply recent scholarship on conceptualizations of international peace and argue that substantive political agreements can have lasting effects on the likelihood of peace within the dyad, even to the extent of fostering “positive” peace between combatants. As we outline below, positive peace is associated with the relinquishment of claims and the development of harmony and cooperation between actors. This type of relationship implies a decreased likelihood of future conflicts, increased trade and even limited integration between the contesting actors. Positive peace also greatly affects the domestic politics of both states in the dyad.

Unfortunately, the data we currently have to test this argument does not exist. Instead, most current scholarship relies on a selected sample of cases (wars only) that omits the successful negotiated settlements (those agreements that resolved the contested issue prior to war). Further, concentrated on contemporary conflicts, which are mostly civil, or on international conflicts that have already escalated to war, extant datasets miss important features of past agreements and the successful treaties that avoid escalations to war. Most damning, however, is the conflation of peace types within datasets of negotiated settlements. As we demonstrate, an emphasis on the presence of negotiation rather than the substantive outcome of those negotiations has resulted in data that lumps such limited agreements as force withdrawals with the positive peace outcomes of territorial exchanges and border resolutions.

Therefore, to properly test our theory of political settlement and address the data deficiencies in this literature more broadly, we seek funding to collect and code every formal negotiated settlement that follows a MID between 1816 and 2001. There are 416 dyadic cases of negotiated settlement following MIDs, and we intend to collect and code each agreement for the presence and content of political settlements. This will allow us to test our core hypothesis that political settlements are likely to last

longer than either imposed or other types of negotiated settlements. We would also use this new data to test several arguments related to the domestic-level effects of positive peace. For additional analyses, we also intend to collect data on the enforcement mechanisms used in the treaty, the presence of third-party mediators and guarantors, and the negotiation process for each settlement. All information collected in this project will be made available to the public in aggregated and single-case, searchable form.

The proposal follows by first briefly outlining the general consensus of the peace agreement literature. We then provide a theoretical explanation for why the issues under contention might matter more than enforcement mechanisms and capability differences in determining the durability of peace between rivals. As part of this discussion, we outline our theoretical expectations regarding the variegated effects of peace types on dyadic-, state-, and individual-level behavior. We continue with a discussion of several problems in extant datasets and then discuss our proposed grant activity and the analyses we intend to conduct with the new dataset. We conclude by outlining how the dataset relates to several different research programs in international relations.

EXISTING RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS

We use this section to outline the literature on the efficacy of international peace agreements. We argue that, while most studies find that the balance of capabilities among combatants is the best, sometimes only, determinant of durable peace, there are several studies that suggest political settlements can be successful. We build on these few studies in the remaining sections of the proposal.

The Balance of Capabilities and International Peace Agreements

Much of the literature on interstate peace agreements has focused on the importance of distributional issues. The argument is simple: the only agreements likely to be durable are those that roughly approximate the division of capabilities across countries; agreements that do not reflect the balance of capabilities invite continued revisionism by the more powerful combatant. Thus, enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty, increase the cost of violating a cease-fire, or prevent accidents from occurring, work at the margins and increase the prospects of peace only for those settlements that also match the distribution of capabilities among warring parties. Enforcement mechanisms alone cannot deter powerful and dissatisfied combatants.

A recent exchange provides perhaps one of the best examples of this argument. Defending the strength of cooperation theory and the role of enforcement mechanisms in keeping the peace, Fortna (2003) finds that demilitarized zones, third-party guarantees, and the presence of peacekeepers are all features of interstate war cease-fires that make an extended peace more likely. Demilitarized zones are often costly signals that reduce the incentives to fight since troops would have to reoccupy the zones to continue fighting. Third-party guarantees reduce uncertainty over combatant intentions, and peacekeepers provide physical barriers that reduce accidents and increase the costs of renewed fighting. However, using the same dataset as Fortna, Werner and Yuen (2005) find that controls for the distribution of capabilities eliminate the effects of these enforcement mechanisms. Wars forced into “premature” cease-fires by third-parties and wars that produce few clear military victories are most likely to reignite, no matter the controls in place for preserving the peace. Thus, agreement specifics matter only so much as the terms match capability distributions.

While this exchange focused on the role of cease-fires during interstate war, similar conclusions follow from analyses that examine settlements following MIDs. Senese and Quackenbush (2003), for example, explicitly model post-dispute settlements as deterrence situations. Negotiated settlements are consistent with mutual deterrence environments, where both rivals have incentives to protect the status quo but also have incentives to renegotiate should the balance of capabilities shift toward their favor. Imposed settlements mirror unilateral deterrence as enforcers of the peace must maintain preponderance in order to defeat status quo challenges. This argument essentially subsumes within a broader

framework Werner's (1999) earlier renegotiation explanation of recurrent conflict. Further, it confirms Maoz's (1984) initial finding that imposed settlements tend to last longer than negotiated agreements.

But Not All Negotiated Settlements Fail

Despite these large-N findings, negotiated settlements have been quite effective at establishing peace between interstate rivals in some cases. Gibler (1996), for example, highlights the discovery of an alliance type that resolves territorial issues among rival states. Territorial issues represent one of the most conflict-prone political issue in international politics (Vasquez 1993, 1995; Gibler 1997; see also Kocs 1995; Hensel 1994; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Holsti 1991; Senese and Vasquez 2003, 2005), as disputes over territory typically result in higher fatality rates (Senese 1996), are more likely to result in crisis recurrence (Hensel 1998), and significantly increase the probability that disputes will escalate to war (Hensel 1996; Vasquez 2004; Senese and Vasquez 2008). Even for this most dangerous issue, however, Gibler (1996) argues that the "territorial settlement treaties" that often follow militarized disputes can act as a form of governance over contentious issues for the states that sign them. The empirics provide strong support for the argument as only 1 case out of 27 territorial settlement treaties was followed by a war related to the alliance within 5 years. This is a rate of 3.7% which is much lower than the general rate of 38% for all alliances, 1816 to 2000.

Gibler (1997) has also demonstrated that these territorial settlement treaties produce a decline in the average rate of militarized disputes in enduring rivals (both in general and for territorial disputes), and the absence of these treaties in an enduring rivalry often hastens the prospects of war. Enduring rivals without a territorial settlement treaty go to war after 3 disputes and 9 years on average; this rate is compared to a 6-dispute and 36-year average for states in territorial settlement treaties (1997: 364).¹

Even better evidence on the role of political settlements can be found in Fortna (2003: 363-364) since the strongest predictor of peace in her study is a settlement that includes mutual political agreement on the contested issue. In fact, none of the cease-fires in her dataset was followed by war after a political agreement was reached. While these cases are exceedingly rare among cease-fires, the complete lack of recurrent conflict following political agreements suggests these types of settlements can be successful. The small number of political agreements also provides some evidence that the cease-fire data represent a biased set of cases.

There are only 3 cases of political agreements in the dataset for the Fortna (2003: 363) study, but it must be remembered that her study dealt with cease-fires *during interstate wars*. Selected out of this sample will be the dyads with contentious issues that were resolved before MIDs escalated to war. Indeed, the results of both Fortna (2003) and Werner and Yuen (2004) are both, by definition, based on a sample of agreements that are biased toward a greater number of unsuccessful mechanisms for facilitating peace between belligerents. After all, any successful measure used to resolve conflict at an early stage will be under-represented in a dataset focused only on interstate wars.

¹ The territorial settlement treaties were mostly limited to the 19th and early 20th centuries, but more recent work has demonstrated that territorial issues are addressed by several of the large, regional alliances found in the post World War II period. In a study that examined the link between democracy and alliance formation, Gibler and Wolford (2006) also found that standing alliances such as NATO, the OAS, and the WEU, evolved to include provisions for settling border issues among alliance members. These border settlements reduced the level of threat to member states, which also led to an overall reduction in the level of state militarization. That is why, according to Gibler (2007a), there is often a connection between the resolution of territorial issues and democracy, especially in regions (see also Thompson, 1996, and Gleditsch, 2002).

Similar findings suggest alliances may resolve conflicts related to trade as well. For example, Powers (2001; 2004) finds a class of alliances she calls regional economic agreements that many interstate leaders have used to settle outstanding issues prior to developing trade ties. Found mostly in Africa, the treaties have been effective at fostering cooperation while also decreasing the likelihood of future MIDs.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND PEACE TYPES

Why do political agreements matter? In this section we argue that negotiated peace agreements are often indicators of a different type of peace in the dyad. Rather than the negative peace associated with deterrence, negotiated agreements often bring the positive peace of harmony and cooperation. This is why the territorial settlements found by Gibler (1997) and the political settlements identified by Fortna (2003) are all associated with a reduced likelihood of future conflict in the dyad.

We use the recent peace scale concept developed by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2008) to demonstrate our argument, but we slightly alter their scale so it applies specifically to international territorial conflict. We focus on territorial issues because these are one of the most dangerous types of issues (Senese and Vasquez, 2008), which means that settlement of these issues will have profound effects on all parties. In fact, some of Gibler's recent work argues that the level of centralization within the state (Gibler, 2009a), regime type (Gibler, 2007a; Gibler and Sewell, 2007; Gibler and Wolford, 2006), and even individual identities (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller, 2009) and attitudes (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) are greatly affected by external territorial threats. We outline these effects by further amending the peace scale to include five separate types of domestic-level changes that we believe are associated with variations in international hostility.

Defining Positive Territorial Peace

Galtung (1985: 145) argued that peace can mean much more than the absence of violence. Instead, peace can also include harmony among actors, cooperation and even integration. The absence of conflict implies only that no violence has occurred. These two conditions obviously have different implications for the likelihood of future conflict. Negative peace can easily turn to conflict should the structural conditions preventing conflict change, while the positive associated with cooperation is a stable peace that can withstand most structural changes.

Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2008) provide a systematic conceptualization of Galtung's argument. Using a peace scale continuum, Klein, et al., differentiate rivalry from negative peace and positive peace according to three sets of dyadic indicators—the level of conflict, the status of issues and communications, and the number and type of peace agreements and diplomacy. Rivals are likely to have conflict, unresolved issues, and lingering diplomatic hostility. Dyads experiencing negative peace have no open conflicts, but some unresolved issues remain in the dyad and tense diplomacy is unable to build constructive settlements. Finally, positive peace is characterized by the lack of unresolved issues in the dyad, institutionalized mechanisms for communications between the two states, and diplomatic coordination between the governments.

In Table 1 we adapt the Klein, et al. (2008) framework to dyadic relations over territorial issues. We use their conflict scale (0.0 to 1.0) but alter the continuum to emphasize territorial issues within the dyad. We also amend their peace scale by including the likely domestic-level effects of each point on the conflict scale.

Conflict Indicators

Beginning on the far left of the figure, rivalry relations include those dyads that have frequent disputes in which the principle underlying issue is territorial. Their borders are heavily contested, and violent transfers of territory may have taken place in the past. Both states have actively developed war plans based upon territorial control. Dyads are at negative territorial peace when there are few or even no conflicts in the dyad even though there may be latent territorial claims and the borders remain contested. Dyadic power imbalances, major state alliances, or other factors could be dampening either or both states from initiating their war plans that are focused on regaining or controlling claimed territories. The contested nature of the border could be due to ethnic divisions across the border, poor border specification, or even previous violent transfers.

Positive territorial peace includes those dyads that have resolved their border claims as wars over territorial issues have become extraordinarily unlikely. Dyads at positive peace are likely to have few

Table 1: Applying the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2008) Peace Scale to Borders, Territorial Settlements and Domestic-Level Effects

Territorial Rivalry		Negative Territorial Peace		Positive Territorial Peace	
<u>Rivalry (1.0)</u>		<u>Low-Level Conflict (0.75)</u>	<u>Negative Peace (0.50)</u>	<u>Positive Peace (0.25)</u>	<u>Pluralistic Community (0.0)</u>
Conflict Indicators (adapted from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2008)					
War plans	Present and focused on control of territory	Present; focused on control of territory	Absent	Absent	Joint war planning; integration of war commands
Previous Conflicts	Frequent MIDs, mostly over territorial issues	Isolated MIDs/ICB Crises; presence of territorial claims	Possible territorial claims but other factors prevent outright conflict	No territorial claims; No plausible counterfactual war scenarios	No territorial claims; Cross-border integration; No counterfactual war scenarios
Previous MID Settlements	Few or no settlements	Few, no, or imposed settlements of MIDs	Imposed settlements; negotiated withdrawals	Negotiated resolutions of territorial issues	Negotiated resolutions of territorial issues
Predictions for Recurrent Conflict					
Probability of Future Conflict in the Dyad, Absent Changes	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
Predicted Domestic-Level Effects					
Centralization of government	Centralized government; strong support for leader	Centralized government; increased likelihood of political uses of conflict issues	Mixed government centralization, dependent on past conflict history	Decentralized power within society; no foreign policy issues to unite citizens	Decentralized power within society; no foreign policy issues to unite citizens
Status of military within society	Militarized state; standing army; military is important within society	Standing army; military is important within society	Mixed, dependent on past conflict history	Little justification for standing army within society; civilian control of military	Little justification for standing army within society; civilian control of military
Ease of repression	Standing army makes repression easier	Standing army makes repression easier	Mixed, dependent on past conflict history	Small or no standing army; government has little ability to systematically repress	Small or no standing army; government has little ability to systematically repress
Economic production	Strong incentives for production geared toward military	Strong incentives for production geared toward military	Some incentives for military-type goods; dual-use technologies encouraged	Strong private sector; increasing trade ties across border	Strong private sector; free flow of trade and goods across border areas
Individual Behavior	Rally effects for leader; intolerance toward minority groups	Rally effects during conflict; moderate intolerance toward minority groups	No rally effects; no external effects on political tolerance	No rally effects; individuals are generally tolerant of minority groups	Leader is not associated with nationalism; society is open and tolerant

border controls and may even have institutions that integrate trade and communication across their territories. These are the borders that are considered legitimate as leaders from both states in the dyad have mutually agreed upon border demarcations. These positive peace dyads also include the borders that have experienced peaceful transfers of territory in the past.

Negotiated and Imposed Settlements

The third row of conflict indicators includes the various types of settlements used to resolve previous conflicts. Rival states, almost by definition, have experienced few settlements. States at negative peace may have had imposed settlements forced on them by third parties; alternately, an imposed settlement may occur when one state in the dyad had enough capabilities to drive back the weaker state. As we describe below, there are many cases of negotiated settlements that mimic imposed settlements but include negotiations between the two parties. These negotiated withdrawals stop the fighting for limited periods but do nothing to resolve the contested issue. If conflict does not occur in the dyad, the reason is likely to rest with the distribution of capabilities or some other factor, rather than the efficacy of the negotiated settlement. Again, we describe these cases in more detail when we outline the problems with current settlement data.

Our last two columns on the right of Table 1 include negotiated settlements that resolve the contested issues in the dyad. Since our focus is on territorial issues in Table 1, the settlements we describe here transfer territory peacefully between parties or otherwise affirm their international border. Unlike imposed settlements, or even negotiated withdrawals, both parties to the conflict have negotiated terms they find acceptable and have disposed of the contested issue. Though perhaps a fragile peace would be associated with the first years of such a settlement, over time and with these difficult issues removed from the agenda, dyads with negotiated resolutions of border issues are likely to enjoy positive peace or even create integrated, pluralistic communities across the border. These agreements highlight the cooperation of both parties in conflict resolution and provide a baseline for continued peaceful interactions. These types of understandings are important because, as we describe in the remainder of this section, the level of threat in the dyad can significantly alter institutions and individual behavior in affected states.

Domestic-Level Effects across the Peace Scale

More so than questions of policy or ideological difference, the defense or pursuit of homeland territory prompts states to engage in provocative and violent behavior (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Threats to the homeland by revisionist neighbors force the creation of large standing armies to defend the targeted lands. The problem for domestic politics is that the development of these standing armies requires high levels of taxation as well as a broad centralization of authority in order to acquire, arm, equip, feed, and otherwise maintain the troops. Because high levels of military spending and frequent conflict also depress domestic consumption and economic growth, greater political autonomy must be found for the chief executive to maintain power. Thus, large standing armies are correlated with the rise of large bureaucracies, dominated by the military, and also a centralization of political power that co-exists with the militarily dominated state. When threat is lower or less consistent, there is little need for large standing armies, no justification for centralized authority, and power decentralization follows (Gibler, 2007; Hutchison and Gibler, 2007a; Gibler and Wolford, 2006).

That the level of external threat should play a role in shaping forms of military and domestic organization is hardly a new idea, emerging at least a century ago in the work of German historian Otto Hintze (1975 [1906]). Hintze argued that continental states facing persistent threats to their security build highly centralized state apparatuses in order to support the large standing armies needed for security, whereas states protected by geography, like islands, tend to build more decentralized militias and democratic regimes. Hintze's theory has been supported by a large number of important case studies and theoretical arguments that detail the links between peace, decentralization and the development of democracy (see for example, Thompson, 1996; Tilly, 1992; North and Weingast, 1989; Moore, 1966).

The bottom half of Table 1 mirrors the logic of these theoretical arguments by describing the likely domestic-level effects for each part of the territorial peace scale. The domestic-level effects are divided among the causal mechanisms generally associated with the peace-to-democracy literature. The mechanisms for Hintze's (1975 [1906]) argument and similar theories are listed first and divided among government centralization, the strength of the military, and the ease of repression by the state. Once again moving from left to right on the scale, states engaged in territorial rivalries are more likely to have centralized governments and militarized states to thwart the intentions of their rivals. Repression is much easier in these states because the standing armies can also be used to put down domestic opposition. Past conflict relations become more important for those states facing low-level conflict or negative peace. Prior conflicts force the creation of standing armies and state centralization to protect against predatory states, and these armies seldom disappear unless the state enters an era of positive peace with its neighbors. States at negative peace without a history of major conflicts are less likely to have standing armies and are also likely to be less centralized than states at rivalry.

Almost all the arguments linking peace to democracy rely on the assumption that states at positive peace will demilitarize while also decentralizing their state structure. In terms of the territorial peace scale, the predicted domestic-level effects of positive peace include decentralized power and less reliance on a standing army, the latter of which makes it difficult for the government to repress any opposition. Of course, the domestic effects predicted in these cells are much different from the likely effects evinced by states at negative peace with their neighbors.

Some of the first statistical findings that examined the effects of peace on democracy concentrated on the relationship between conflict and the economy. The findings generally supported the theoretical relationship, since high-intensity conflicts were associated with increased tax receipts collected by the state (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Rasler and Thompson, 1989). In Table 1, we trace this argument regarding domestic-level effects but also predict that the nature of economic spending changes substantially across threat environments. States in territorial rivalries are likely to have stronger incentives to encourage private sector production of military goods (Abelhauser, 1998; Tooze, 2006). These incentives decrease as the level of threat decreases, and thus, states at positive peace or in pluralistic communities are more likely to have economies with well-developed private sectors, increased trade, and high cross-border flows of goods and services.

Threat levels can also affect individual behavior. The rally effects literature has long speculated that support for the national leader increases dramatically when facing salient external threats (Parker, 1995; Mueller, 1994; Zaller, 1993). More recently, Hutchison and Gibler (2007) find that territorial threats to the state condition domestic publics to be less tolerant of their least-liked minority groups. The in-group/out-group mechanism in the tolerance argument is similar to the rally effects literature, but the out-group is domestic in their model. Salient threats to the state cause the mass public to be suspicious and intolerant of minority groups as nationalism takes hold. This is why New Zealand and Australia (both islands) tend to be tolerant, while Israel and India (both states contiguous with rivals threatening their territorial integrity) tend to be politically intolerant. Previously, democratic learning was thought to explain variation in tolerance levels, but Hutchison and Gibler (2007) demonstrate that the democratic learning variable is actually spurious to external territorial threat.

Rally effects and political tolerance changes are also reflected in the domestic-level effects listed in Table 1. States in territorial rivalries are more likely to find a public that supports the leader. This move toward centralized public opinion also leads to increasing intolerance for least-liked minority groups. The effects of threat are not pronounced for states at negative peace, as leader support and political tolerance are more likely to turn on domestic variables. However, for states at positive peace or for those states in pluralistic communities, there are few domestic rallies for the leader that are based on nationalism, and the society as a whole is likely to become more tolerant and open.

Measuring Peace Types

The peace that settles conflict should be a good indicator of the types of relations that states are likely to face in the future. Negotiated settlements imply compromise and acceptance among parties, while imposed settlements suggest future revisionism should capabilities change. Unfortunately, as we describe in the next section, our current datasets of international conflict do not reflect this variation across peace types. Instead, current settlement datasets focus on the presence of negotiations rather than the substance of a political settlement. Negotiated withdrawals of forces are made equivalent to more meaningful solutions in which all parties accept the settlement of contested issues, and this conflation of peace types masks the ability of substantive issue settlements to provide lasting peace.

This type of missing data presents problems that are quite pervasive within international relations research more generally. As Gary King (2001: 499) has argued, the lack of good baseline data on dyadic relations renders almost all large-N, quantitative conflict studies prone to omitted variable bias since variation of the historical animosity within the dyad remains unmeasured. After all, any peaceful years between, for example, India and Pakistan are not exchangeable with the peaceful years between the US and Canada, without first accounting for the level of hostility that exists in the dyad. Or, as we describe above and in Table 1, the positive peace of substantive settlement has different consequences than the negative peace of imposed settlement for both dyadic relations and domestic politics.

THE LACK OF DATA ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

Extant datasets on peace agreements are simply not equipped to gauge the efficacy of negotiated international settlements. In this section we describe three types of bias in the existing data. The first type of bias is most damning: the current data does not accurately measure when a political settlement is achieved. Instead, data collection efforts have been focused only on the presence of negotiations, not the substance of the agreement. Further, most of the peace agreement datasets are limited either temporally or by scale of conflict, and each of these can lead to biased conclusions regarding the effects of negotiated settlements. We address each of these criticisms in turn.

Substance of Issue Settlement

The MID Project defines negotiated settlement as “the successful attempt to confer, bargain, or discuss an unresolved issue with a view towards reaching an acceptable settlement” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). Note that this definition does not include the condition that the unresolved issue was actually settled. Nor does this definition require the issue discussed to be the same as the issue that started the conflict. In other words, any type of negotiation during the end phase of conflict qualifies as a negotiated settlement, even if the issue was not settled. Similarly, a settlement in which both parties agree to withdraw from battle is identified as a negotiated settlement in the data, even if the issue that started the conflict is never addressed by the agreement.

For example, several agreements were negotiated among belligerents ending the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (MID#1046), with American and Soviet pressure playing a key role in forcing the war’s end. The MID data collection identifies each of these agreements as negotiated settlements. However, the treaties specify only a cease-fire for all parties and the withdrawal of forces by Israel, Syria, and Iraq. No agreement was made on the status of Israeli occupied lands or the larger territorial issues related to Israeli independence, and most of these issues remain to this day as conflict continues.

Contrast the post-Arab-Israeli War agreements with the 1910 territorial dispute between Peru and Bolivia (MID#1180). Contested were territories north of Lake Titicaca, the eastern Andes Mountains, a forested region at the border of the Amazon basin, and the valuable pasturelands of Apolobamba. The MID data codes the conflict as a fatal dispute with fewer than 25 casualties, but apparently, the situation was quite tense as both governments mobilized their forces at the border (Bowman, 1921: 577). Argentina’s arbitration was rebuffed, ending with Bolivian domestic uproar at the initial findings and a break in relations between Bolivia and both Argentina and Peru (Peterson, 1964: 266). The good offices of

the United States aided the creation and acceptance of a commission that resolved the conflict with a new survey of the border. Both countries agreed that all future disputes on the border would be submitted to the President of the Royal Geographic Society (in London) for arbitration (without right of appeal). This settlement obviously held since no future MIDs were recorded over this issue, and the dispute is not included in Huth and Allee's (2002) dataset of territorial disputes, 1919-1995.

The recurrence of conflict across the Arab-Israeli dyads would seemingly serve as confirming evidence for Werner and Yuen's (2005) claim that negotiated settlements forced by other actors seldom work. However, the Peru-Bolivian dispute had similar outside pressure, from Argentina and the United States, but a lasting agreement on the border issue was reached even though both disputants had braced for conflict. Taken together, these disputes seemingly present mixed evidence for the effects of negotiated settlements. Of course, the nature of these settlements differs dramatically. In the Arab-Israeli case, the settlement never addressed the issue that started the conflict, and the underlying issue of the conflict was never resolved. The negotiations covered the cease-fire only. The commission judging the border between Bolivia and Peru resolved the territorial claim with a revised border and created a mechanism to resolve future claims.

One might argue that the Arab-Israeli War presents a unique case given the difficulty of the territorial questions involved. While that may be true, the negotiated agreements at the end of the war still should not serve as dispositive evidence on the efficacy of political settlements. Instead, we should examine the many cases of successful settlement that have resolved conflicts prior to escalation. Most current datasets do not do this however. Instead, focused on war settlements only, existing studies often suffer a selection effect that removes the successful issue settlements from the sample; these successful settlements occur well before hostilities escalate to the point of international war.

Scale of Conflict and Negotiated Settlements

It may be the case that most successful settlements have not been included in existing datasets. Recall the exchange between Fortna (2003) and Werner and Yuen (2005) we described earlier in this proposal. Both studies used the same dataset, which selected on cases of cease-fire during interstate wars. While instructive, these 60+ cases ignore the myriad other serious disputes that never reached the level of fatalities necessary to label the conflict a war.² If negotiated peace agreements at earlier stages of conflict are often successful, then this dataset represents a highly selected sample of cases that were extremely intense or otherwise difficult to resolve. A more representative sample of negotiated agreements must also include the settlements that ended conflict short of war.

In Table 2 we list the average lengths of peace following negotiated and imposed settlements. As the summary demonstrates, negotiated settlements of non-fatal MIDs tend to last much longer than settlements of either fatal MIDs or wars. While this could merely be a reflection of the difficulty in resolving certain types of disputes, in preliminary analyses we found no statistically significant relationship between issue type and severity of dispute among the MIDs that ended with negotiated settlement. Territorial issues – the most difficult issue to resolve peacefully – are as abundant among the non-fatal MIDs as they are among fatal MIDs and wars. The lower level MIDs were also not necessarily over low-salience issues, since these results are consistent with Gibler's (1996; 1997) work demonstrating that alliance settlements often prevented low-level MIDs from escalating to the point of fatalities, even when dealing with conflicting major state claims over territories in the Balkans, Africa, and Asia.

The difference in mean rates of peace across severity levels suggests a selection effect based on scale of conflict. Negotiated settlements of disputes at an early stage can be effective and provide for lasting peace. Once fatalities have occurred, however, settlement of the issue becomes more difficult as leaders commit to winning the dispute and imposing the settlement (which may be especially true for

² Note also that while the cease-fire dataset includes a variable for political settlements, the coding only captures whether the agreement was unilateral, negotiated, formal, and/or specific. Details of settlements are not included.

democracies that experience casualties, as Fearon, 1994, may suggest). More importantly for our study, datasets that focus solely on wars or other high-severity conflicts will be selecting cases biased against negotiated settlements. This selection effect probably accounts for the paucity of political agreements in Fortna's (2003) cease-fire dataset. Thus, even if Werner and Yuen (2004) are correct in arguing that capability balances greatly influence the settlements of the most severe conflicts, we do not yet have data available to dismiss the positive effects of negotiated settlements at earlier stages of international conflict.

Temporal Domain

Most peace agreement datasets cover the period following World War II.³ In Table 2 we also present some simple summary statistics that highlight potential problems caused by Cold War and post-Cold War case selection. The unit of analysis is each peace period that follows any MID, and we differentiate between MIDs that follow negotiated settlements and those in which settlements were imposed.⁴ We also divide the cases according to three time periods – prior to World War II, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War periods. When computing the mean settlement duration, we exclude cases of immediate settlement failure, or periods of zero-length peace, but inclusion of these cases does not alter the difference between negotiated and imposed settlements for any of the time periods. Finally, we distinguish among non-fatal MIDs, MIDs with at least one fatality, and wars, with cases labeled as war if at least one of the disputants had 1,000 or more battle fatalities.

Table 2. Mean Length of Peace Periods following MIDs

		<i>Negotiated</i>		<i>Imposed</i>	
		Years	N	Years	N
<i>All Cases</i>	1816-1945	28.54	155	38.11	120
	1946-1989	14.68	91	21.09	23
	1990-2001	3.44	27	5.33	16
<i>Non-Fatal MIDs</i>	1816-1945	30.45	127	30.83	63
	1946-1989	16.16	68	16.89	9
	1990-2001	3.86	22	5.36	14
<i>Fatal MIDs</i>	1816-1945	23.46	13	24.00	5
	1946-1989	10.78	18	26.50	6
	1990-2001	1.25	4	3.00	1
<i>Wars</i>	1816-1945	16.73	15	41.88	52
	1946-1989	8.60	5	19.25	8
	1990-2001	3.00	1	3.00	1

Table 2 provides evidence of significant differences between the mean years of peace for negotiated and imposed settlements across the 3 time periods. For each level of severity, negotiated settlements last roughly twice as long prior to World War II than in the latter two time periods. The same

³ Fortna's (2003) dataset on cease-fires is one example. Generally, though, there seems to be an obvious trade-off between scope of coverage and time period used. For example, the most comprehensive peace agreement collection in terms of scope is housed at Uppsala University (see Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen, 2006) and is part of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program led by Peter Wallensteen. This project codes agreements along 28 different features including military provisions (e.g., amnesty) and political institutions (e.g., elections, federalism). The data collection includes both interstate and civil wars using the 25-death threshold of the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. However, since the data only include cases from 1989 to 2005, most of the identified agreements follow civil wars.

⁴ The rates are somewhat different from our January 2007 proposal because the reviewers suggested we look at all MIDs rather than just fatal MIDs. Thus, the rates now correspond to time between all MIDs.

is true for imposed settlements of non-fatal MIDs and wars during the first and third eras, but fatal MIDs actually last much longer during the Cold War than during any other period.

Even more striking is the difference between the number of negotiated and imposed settlements for each time period. Negotiated settlements are twice as numerous as imposed settlements prior to World War II for all MIDs short of war, but for wars, imposed settlements are 3 times more likely during this time period. Also interesting is the comparison of negotiated to imposed settlements of non-fatal MIDs during the Cold War. Negotiated settlements are almost 8 times more likely than imposed settlements during the Cold War years.

These inter-temporal differences highlight the Cold War years as an especially abundant era for arriving at negotiated settlements, and there are many explanations for why this may be the case. Perhaps third party negotiators were eager to keep conflicts stabilized so as to minimize the likelihood of nuclear power involvement; or, perhaps major state interests in most parts of the world waned with the breakdown of Cold War alliances, thus accounting for the fewer settlements following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet another explanation might focus on differences in the types of disputes that occurred in each period, as the post-1989 period was relatively unique in the large number of newly independent states entering the international system while the pre-1945 period focused on colonial holdings and state formation.

Regardless of the role that these systemic influences may have played, the large differences across periods underscore the need for analyzing an extended temporal domain in order to avoid omitted variable bias. If there are systematic differences across time periods in the rationale leaders use to make and hold agreements, then explanations that do not model the determinants of negotiation are likely to produce biased estimates of the predictors of successful agreements. Put differently, the settlements for disputes arising from new states at the end of the 20th Century may not adequately reflect the types of settlements needed as the 21st Century progresses. Only a broader range of settlement types would provide confidence in estimates of settlement success.⁵

Since averages can often obscure a great deal of variation, we use Table 3 to describe differences across settlement types according to 5 categories of settlement length: 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, and 21 or more peace years. The columns present both the actual counts of each settlement length category and the percentage of the settlement type each cell represents. By categorizing the lengths of peace in this manner, we immediately uncover an interesting pattern across the time periods – except for the longest-lasting settlements prior to World War II, the percentage of agreements that last each categorical length are roughly the same.

Despite the literature that suggests otherwise (Senese and Quackenbush, 2003; Werner, 1999; Maoz, 1984), imposed agreements last no longer than negotiated settlements. The reason behind this observation is that the imposed settlements include 11 cases of unusually long peace spells (over 110 years), and these cases all occur prior to 1945. These 11 cases represent less than 7% of the 159 imposed settlements, but their exclusion removes any statistical difference in means between imposed and negotiated settlements after World War II. Of course this does not invalidate the correlation between

⁵ One other issue related to the post-1989 time period should also be mentioned. We have had very few years with which to measure the success (or failure) of different agreement types. Table 2 lists 5 negotiated settlements of fatal MIDs or wars between 1990 and 2001 and an average duration of peace of less than 3 years, but all 5 rivals were still at peace as of 2001. While these cases can be modeled with duration models that include right-censoring, there is no variation in outcomes for the post-1989 cases of negotiated settlement. Further, the average lengths of peace following settlements for all other periods suggest failures of these 5 agreements would be, on average, unlikely for at least 9 more years. Thus, additional data, with both failures and successes, are needed to assess the strength of various agreement terms and enforcement mechanisms.

imposed settlements and longer peace spells, but it does emphasize the dependence of the observed difference on relatively few cases.⁶

Table 3. Settlements by Average Length, Type, and Era

Time Period: 1816-1945		Total Number of Settlements			
Years of Peace	Negotiated	%	Imposed	%	
0 to 5	48	31%	37	30%	
6 to 10	18	12%	13	11%	
11 to 15	23	15%	9	7%	
16+	66	43%	63	52%	
Total	155		122		

Time Period: 1946-2001		Total Number of Settlements			
Years of Peace	Negotiated	%	Imposed	%	
0 to 5	58	49%	16	41%	
6 to 10	17	14%	7	18%	
11 to 15	7	6%	3	8%	
16+	36	31%	13	33%	
Total	118		39		

Here we have identified three basic problems with existing data on negotiated settlements. The first problem concerns the nature of the settlement: existing data mask large heterogeneity across settlement types and have no method of determining when an issue has been settled. Second, most datasets suffer from a severe selection effect; by concentrating on negotiations following wars, existing data sources have missed the successful agreements that have prevented escalation to war. And finally, temporal selection has also biased our understanding of both imposed and negotiated settlements. Given these basic problems with existing datasets, we use the next section to outline a research project and data collection effort that will provide analyses of negotiated political settlements, 1816 to 2001.

TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACE TYPE, RECURRENT CONFLICT AND STATE BEHAVIOR

As the peace scale in Table 1 demonstrates, the heterogeneity across settlement types can have profound implications on the likelihood of future conflict in the dyad as well as the institutions and political behavior of the states involved. Absent recurrent conflict, however, borders settled by withdrawals are indistinguishable from dyads that have resolved territorial issues if the presence of negotiation is the defining characteristic of settlement. For our knowledge of political settlements to progress, therefore, it is essential that we understand and measure the differences across settlement types.

Principle Data Collection Effort and Analyses

Our core argument is that settlements that incorporate substantive resolution of the contested issues can be more effective than imposed settlements for providing positive peace between belligerents. Thus, we expect that (H1) *negotiations that include political settlements of contested issues are more likely than imposed settlements to provide lasting peace in the dyad.* We also expect that (H2) *dyads that include political settlements of contested issues are less likely than other dyads to escalate their conflicts to war.* As we outlined at the beginning of this proposal, however, most empirical studies find that imposed settlements and settlements that reflect the capability distributions within the dyad last longer than most negotiated

⁶ Table 3 also provides insight into another important inter-temporal difference: 19th and early 20th Century diplomats may have been better skilled since relatively fewer failed agreements were negotiated, and a greater percentage of their agreements lasted more than 15 years. Thirty-one percent of the negotiated agreements lasted less than 1 year, compared to an average of 49% or more for negotiated agreements during the Cold War. Whether due to the quality of diplomacy or some other factor, the negotiated settlements made during this period were often more successful, and the inclusion of these cases in peace agreement datasets is therefore essential.

settlements that end conflicts. Our data discussion demonstrates that this conclusion is unwarranted because extant data (1) does not accurately reflect the heterogeneity across settlement types, (2) is biased toward a highly selected sample of cases, and (3) is biased toward more recent cases of settlement.

To address each of these selection problems, we seek funding to collect and code every negotiated settlement that ended a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) between 1816 and 2001. We use the definition of a negotiated settlement from the MID Project codebook (dated February 11, 2001 and available on the Correlates of War 2 website).⁷ There are 416 dyadic cases that meet this definition of negotiated settlement for all MIDs between 1816 and 2001. Of these, 184 (just over 44%) did not last one full year before fighting erupted again in the dyad. Many of these zero-year settlements were likely not formal agreements but were instead the “verbal or tacit understanding[s] by official representatives of all protagonists as noted in the historical sources,” described in the MID codebook. Almost 30% of all settlements lasted at least 10 years before renewed conflict, and almost 10% last 50 years or more.

As the MID definition of negotiated settlement implies, formal agreements can take the form of treaties, exchanges of letters, communiqués, and other written communications between leaders. Since the MID dataset has already defined our universe of possible cases, we need not worry about Type II errors of missing negotiated settlements. Thus, we can instead focus our research efforts on collecting all documents related to the already identified negotiated settlement. We expect to identify these settlements based on comprehensive searches of all available primary sources for each dispute. For most cases, this method would focus on an exhaustive search of the contemporary news sources surrounding each settlement date.⁸

Once the agreements have been collected, we intend to code each settlement for the information that will allow us to examine the effects of substantive political settlements. This data includes:

Political Settlements. We are primarily interested in the nature of the political settlements in these agreements and therefore plan to collect as much information as possible on the list of specific demands by each combatant in the dispute. We would then match these demands to the terms included in the settlement. We expect the demand and solution list to provide much more information than the current MID codings of territory, policy, regime, and other.⁹

Background Information. We intend to collect information on the types of negotiations, the level of negotiators, the length of negotiations, length of agreement, and other information that we believe might prove useful to other research programs. This type of information would supplement the standard background information regarding actors, timing, and place.

⁷ “...the successful attempt to confer, bargain, or discuss an unresolved issue with a view towards reaching an acceptable settlement. It is identified by some type of agreement (formal or informal), the lack of any unconditional surrender or giving up on concessions, and the absence of any attempt of external imposition of a settlement. Examples include the presence of a written agreement signed by official representatives of the state, reached in a situation unfettered by constraints; a joint communiqué stating their mutually accepted conditions for agreement; the exchange of letters stipulating mutually agreed upon terms; the formal acceptance of a cease-fire; or the existence of a verbal or tacit understanding by official representatives of all protagonists as noted in the historical sources.”

⁸ Two anonymous reviewers for previous versions of this proposal expressed concern that some of the settlement data was not available. We therefore created a random sample of 20 non-fatal MIDs with negotiated settlements (the most difficult cases to find) and collected the formal agreements or statements that constituted the settlement. In all cases we were able to successfully find documentation on the settlement; this makes sense considering the information had to be available to the MID Project originally in order to be included in the dataset.

⁹ Of course it is impossible to determine *ex ante* whether an issue was completely settled by an agreement. However, matching pre-conflict demands to specific terms in the agreement should capture all the substantive political settlements, and inclusion of the cases that did not settle the issue in this class of agreements would only bias analyses against confirming our expectations.

Dispute Demands. The MID dataset provides a great deal of information on the combatants, the level of fatalities, and the hostile actions taken in each dispute. However, not much information is given on combatant demands, other than the categorical codings of territory, policy, regime, or other, and the dichotomous measures for revision states. We change that for these cases of negotiated settlement by examining leader pronouncements made before and during the dispute. We intend to provide other scholars with as much detail on these demands as is possible.

We are collecting the negotiated settlement data with the expectation that it can be used in conjunction with existing Correlates of War and related datasets. Thus, we will keep all common codes (such as state membership) to facilitate portability of the data. We expect to release the dataset with our own analyses of the roles that political settlements play in these negotiated agreements. The release of the dataset will include the coded dataset, access to all coding sheets, and copyrights permitting, the original agreements. The data release will follow our articles that examine the efficacy of political settlements.

Additional Analyses

As we argue in the theory section above, we also of course have an interest in the domestic-level effects of positive and negative peace. Thus, in the article announcing release of the dataset to the public, we also intend to develop a typology of negotiated peace settlements that goes well beyond the current dichotomous measure. Not all negotiated settlements are the same. The variation in agreements implies different levels of cooperation between former belligerents – from simple armistice agreements (negative peace) to wholesale territorial transfers (positive peace). We believe that a catalogue and description of the various agreement types will provide an important step forward for both the international conflict and the peace agreement literatures.¹⁰ This type of advance will permit examination of many of the second-image reversed questions implicit in our peace scale. In these studies, the political settlements become independent variables predicting state-level and individual-level changes (see Gibler, 2009a).

Finally, we intend to collect data on the type and process of settlement for each dispute. Thus, the new dataset will enable us and other scholars to answer several questions of import for the peace-making community. Among these are:

- What is the effectiveness of third party intervention when conflict erupts?
- Can intergovernmental organizations facilitate peace with early intervention?
- Which mechanisms provide for a more lasting peace – armistices, demilitarized zones, monitoring, international peacekeepers, etc? Does the effectiveness of these mechanisms vary by contested issue?
- What effects do different types of international systems have on the design and effectiveness of negotiated settlements?

We anticipate using multiple methodologies to answer these questions. Recent advances in duration analyses with selection (Boehmke, et al., 2006) will be especially useful in testing our arguments regarding bias and the length of peace following each settlement type. Qualitative evaluations of agreement strength will be used to complement our statistical inferences.¹¹

¹⁰ For a similar argument in the civil war literature, see the work of Hartzell (1999), Hartzell et al. (2001), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). For the import of proper variable conceptualization, see Goertz (2006).

¹¹ One clear advantage of our dataset is its greatly extended temporal domain. Not restricted to particular eras in the international system, we would now be able to examine how learning affects the form and function of agreements between rivals over an extended period of time. This is important because a large minority of rivalries began well before 1945, and an even larger minority of rivalries survives the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Thompson, 2001). Examining isolated agreements without controlling for the effects of prior conflicts or agreements produces biased estimates and introduces the strong assumption that variables of interest have uniform effects across each event (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002). If learning does occur, negotiated settlements may last longer in their second, third or fourth attempts, or only after repeated conflicts have shaped the nature of the contested issues. This set of analyses will be especially relevant to the treaty design and rivalry literatures.

DATASET EXPERIENCE OF PIS AND PROPOSAL RELEVANCE TO OTHER FUNDED SUPPORT

Both principle investigators have participated in several large data collection efforts. DeRouen is currently involved in a project collecting data on mediation during civil wars; funded by the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy, this project collects data on mediation during and after civil war spells between 1946 and 2004. DeRouen also just completed a three-year grant (funded at US \$350,000; other members of grant include Jacob Bercovitch, Peter Wallensteen and John Henderson) on civil wars in Southeast Asia; an additional grant examining peace-building has just been funded for US\$600,000.

Gibler was part of the multi-university, NSF-funded project, "Collaborative Research on Updating the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set," Grant#SES-0001704. Gibler's responsibilities for the project included collection and coding of incidents and Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) occurring in the Horn of Africa between 1993 and 2001. The total individual award was approximately \$25,000, funding one graduate student from July 2000 through June 2002. Gibler completed the update and revision of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000 (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004); Gibler also extended the alliance and system membership data to 1648 (Gibler, 1999). The full dataset was recently published in two-volumes by Congressional Quarterly Press (Gibler, 2009b).

IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING THE MID DATASET WITH PEACE AGREEMENT DATA

We have thus far outlined the utility of the proposed activity for the peace agreement literature. In this final section we conclude the proposal with a brief discussion of how our analyses and data collection effort can affect at least two other major scholarly research programs as well as the general policy literature on peace agreements.

First, to encourage the use of the peace agreement data in conjunction with existing datasets, we plan to provide easy internal links to extant datasets such as Goertz and Diehl's (2000) rivalry data, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997), and of course, the NSF-funded EUGene software program. EUGene is most useful for combining various datasets because the program provides menu-driven access to variables from multiple datasets, all connected by common codes for country, year, and dispute (see Bennett and Stam, 2000). There are currently over 100 variables covered by EUGene, including MIDs, trade data, minimum distance data, polity scores, and alliances, that would therefore have the potential to be linked with the negotiated settlement data.

Since the proposed dataset is based on the current Correlates of War MID dataset, we see immediate benefits of using the agreement data with most unified (initiation, escalation, and settlement) explanations of conflict. International relations scholars have rich information on all aspects of initiation and escalation. With the addition of an agreement dataset, models that provide a more nuanced explanation of outcomes could also easily be tested. This would affect the emerging literature on bargaining, literatures focused on expected utility explanations of conflict, and research programs derived from broad theories of cooperation and contract.

The democratic peace program would also find a negotiated settlement dataset useful. Dixon and Senese (2002) and Dixon (1994) have demonstrated a relationship between democracies and negotiated settlements; the most recent study even uses MID settlement codes in their analyses. Thus, a dataset of agreements could potentially affect the literature surrounding the democratic peace. If democracies are more likely to negotiate settlements to their conflicts, as these authors suggest, are the forms of the agreements also different from other settlement types? Or, as some might contend (see for example, Gibler, 2007a), democracies may just have fewer difficult to resolve issues.

Finally, as we write above, the extant peace agreement literature suggests rather dismal policy prescriptions for most interstate conflicts. But again, this conclusion is based on a highly selected sample of cases. Including cases prior to 1989 and cases of non-war are essential to understanding the mechanisms that promote a durable peace. Thus, we believe the proposed dataset could immediately prove important for policy-guiding research into successful negotiated peace treaties.