

The Missing Military: How International Conflict Shapes Domestic Political Bargaining*

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Abstract

Most analyses of domestic bargaining only consider the military as a potential tool for elite-led repression of the population, but this misses the point that militaries are often institutions with interests of their own. Militaries developed to guard the territorial interests of the state against external threats are likely to institutionalize and become self-interested. These militaries also have the greatest capacity for repression. However, there are also conditions under which populist revolt will push these militaries to favor democracy or democratic reforms. The interests of other military types are either time-sensitive or elite-responsive, depending on whether the regime had to bargain with the public in order to militarize. These arguments together link the stimulus that creates or grows militarization with the repressive power of elites, their relative bargaining power within society, and the likelihood of and conditions for democratization. Tests using cross-national data from all available countries, 1960-2000, strongly support these expectations.

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1 Introducing the Argument

The strength and interests of the military can affect political regimes in many different ways. Consider these recent examples. First, Egypt's military was asked to put down a series of domestic protests quickly after the start of the Arab Spring, but they refused. This decision was in stark contrast to what happened in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain—protests were stifled with a combination of additional monies for the masses and repression of key dissidents in Saudi Arabia, while joint Saudi and Bahraini military forces brutally repressed revolts in the smaller kingdom. Finally, almost ten years earlier, one of the first moves by the United States after invading Iraq was to dismantle the military as part of the post-war de-Ba'athification program, laying off almost a half-million personnel. This led to widespread unrest and was a contributing factor in the insurgency fight against American forces. Many of these officers also eventually became leading figures in the rise of the Islamist State in the region. These episodes highlight the repressive power of some militaries but also the variegated ways in which military interests interact with other facets of the state. The differences are important for understanding several of the debates we are having over what causes military-led authoritarianism, domestic inequality, and institutional reforms and democratization.

Most scholarship on the military within society considers the development of militarization as a process by which elites, responding to threats, build the military by bargaining with the population. In this view the environment that made the 17th Century English king negotiate with parliament in order to raise money to fight the Dutch (North and Weingast 1989) was the same type of environment that forced an amended constitution in the United States that allowed eighteen year-olds the vote during the Vietnam War. Once democratization occurs, culture and education then impose citizen leadership on the armed forces, professionalizing the military.

I argue that this story only correlates with one type of external threat. These non-territorial threats are more likely to target the regime and regime interests. As such, these threats will often spur the growth of militaries that require active bargaining by the elites. This new leverage for the public is temporary and, as the familiar story linking conflict with franchise extension goes, domestic liberalization is traded for militarization. The need for the military passes with the threat, the public knows this, and this makes it necessary for the elite to grant self-enforcing institutional changes.

But what happens if the elites do not need to bargain? Many regimes have independent wealth from resources that can be used to buy off the population needed to create the military. The individuals in these militaries have little cohesive interests and are responsive to their elites, who pay them. Repression can follow if the elites pay enough and require it, and the military reinforces the power of the regime within society.

There are other situations in which a bargain need not occur. When external threats are both serious and salient to the public, individuals will rally for their state and create the forces necessary to guard the state. Over time, these militaries institutionalize and develop interests of their own. Often large in size, and often sitting within the confines of the state, these land-based militaries impose a separate bargaining force on the dynamics of elite-popular contention. Elites mobilize more easily, so the military most often allies with them and enforces a repressive state, but this need not always be the case. When elites become weak, or when the public is able to mobilize, the military may join populist movements and support reform. This is what likely

happened with Egypt's army, which is why it behaved so differently from the resource-built militaries on the Arabian Peninsula.

In the following sections I trace through and develop the arguments that link the processes of military creation and growth to domestic bargaining power. I discuss why territorial threats are so different from other threat types and outline the conditions under which these threats either reinforce repression or create opportunities for democratization. I differentiate these threats from periods when the regime is targeted or when the regime is capable of paying for its own defense. Together, these arguments are able to explain when regimes are likely to be autocratic, repressive, military-led, and when opportunities for liberalization and democratization are likely to occur. I also show how the bargaining power of the military can affect both horizontal and vertical distributions of wealth within society. Changes in economic inequality provide a good assessment of intra-societal bargaining power, and inequality has often been identified as an important mechanism for regime changes.

2 Military and Society

Central to the study of the military as an institution has been the question of how and when civilian authority could be exercised. Beginning with Huntington's (1957) early work, the arguments had a normative cast as the professional soldier was expected to accept civilian control over policy and be amenable to uses of force in only limited circumstances. The military officer was an advisor only, and a conservative advisor at that, making no policy choices. The soldier followed orders—no matter how violently they countered the soldier's judgment. The shadow of this argument was long, lasting for decades after. Even recently, arguments persist that the most important issue of civil-military relations in democracies is civilian control (Desch 2001). Getting soldiers to obey civilians, even when disagreements persist, constitutes the hallmark of established democracy.

The primacy of this issue follows from its importance in resolving an important tension in democratic philosophy between liberty and the development of large, standing armies (Feaver 1999). A strong military is often needed to guard the state against attacks from external forces. However, when the military becomes too strong, it can overturn civilian-led democracies or encourage adventurism abroad.

The worry about strong militaries developed, too, from an observation of developing country politics during the Cold War. A substantial number of autocratic and authoritarian states were led or influenced by the military, and coups were a consistent threat in states with weak governmental capacity. Coup threats often linger still, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and, cumulatively, these real-world dangers for democratization have led researchers to focus on the determinants of military-insatigated coup attempts (see, for example, Londregan and Poole 1990, Powell 2012) and examinations of military influence within the state (Nordlinger 1977, Pion-Berlin 1992).

These military-threat studies have overshadowed a consistent sub-current of research that examined the beneficial role of the military within society. For example, contemporaneous to Huntington was the review of armies in politics in studies like Pye (1961) and Lieuwen (1961). While granting the non-democratic, sometimes authoritarian nature of military-led governments

and the dangerous politics that follows heavy military influence in the state, these studies also found threads of state modernization instigated by the military. The armies were apparently leading state institutions to development, and these were populist-based modernizations. For example, consider this observation in Lieuwen (1962, 148):

Until the appearance of reform-minded young officers, governments in Latin America had paid little attention to the masses. The latter unquestionably benefitted, materially and psychologically, from the social and economic reforms introduced by the new-type military leaders. Although the latter were not practitioners of genuine democracy, their new policies tended to bring about greater equality in income and social position, without which political equality could never have a solid, long-term basis. Many of the military regimes, moreover, . . . achieved a certain amount of material progress by fostering industrialization, the development of communications and public works projects, and by enforcing political stability without which national economies tend to stagnate and even to retrogress.

The military within society had, by necessity, developed into formidable forces in many countries, and, according to these arguments, the armies institutionalized and brought their modernization and reforms to the public.

The benefit of military influence in politics can also be seen in several recent studies. Thyne and Powell (2014) find that coups often occur in non-democracies, and both coup attempts and successful coups increase the likelihood of democratization. Similarly, Marinov and Goemans (2014) find that coups make competitive elections more likely—but only after 1991. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War seemingly signal a break in the willingness of Western states to support unelected governments. Coups hasten the reforms necessary to recover aid monies and investment from established democracies.

The trends in this literature describe well the many ways in which the military can influence politics and society, but there remains no unifying theory of how the military will behave as an institution within the state. We know the correlates of coups and democratization; we also know that military influence—especially the influence of a strong military—is a constant source of friction for developing countries. What we lack, however, is an understanding of what exactly the interests of the military institutions are likely to be. When will the military encourage equality and mass modernization? When is democratization likely? I begin an answer to these questions in the next section with a theory that connects military institutional interests with the external threats to the state that cause militarization in the first place.

3 Why (and How) the Military Affects Political Bargaining

How the military is structured within society can play a large part in both inter-elite and elite-public bargaining over who controls the government, the distribution of wealth in society, and regime type. While most examinations of institutional change and democratization relegate the military to a tool for repression by other elites, the military often has a separate self-interest within the state that is capable of strongly affecting institutional change. These military interests depend in large part on how the group was created. Militaries formed in response to territorial threats to the state create large, land-based armies to defend the state. Meanwhile, elites who

want to create or grow the military to respond to threats against their policies or interests must either find the resources necessary to pay the military or bargain with the public and exchange rights and institutional reform for an expanded force. As I describe here, the differences in these paths create implications for repression, regime control, wealth sharing, and democratization.

3.1 External Threats and State Repressive Strength

Most international relations theory suggests that states will seek arms for protection in an anarchic environment (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979). Few dispute this. Also generally acknowledged is the role that militarization has upon the state. For example, Tilly (1985) and others have argued that the quest for security has been instrumental in creating strong states domestically. As leaders prepare for war, they exchange protection of the public for extraction, develop bureaucracies to maintain the military, and generally increase the capacity of the government to rule. This story misses a key factor in domestic bargaining, however. The types of militaries that develop vary substantially across states, and these differences greatly affect domestic political bargains.

For example, armies increase the repressive strength of the state much more than navies or air forces do. Naval ships cannot patrol the interior of the state, and fighters or bombers cannot hold land. Foot soldiers are necessary to both find and quash opposition forces. Thus, while states will often find it necessary to arm against a rivalry, the nature of that rivalry—its location and the type of threat—will condition whether the state itself can then use the military to increase its repressive strength.

Territorial conflict, unlike other types of conflict, has the occupation of land as its primary goal. In order to occupy land, countries that initiate territorial conflicts must construct armies capable of defeating the enemy and holding the land once it has been taken. Note the differences across conflict types though, especially with regard to possession of the *status quo* in the dispute. Prior to challenge, the land is physically held by the targeted states. In most other types of disputes, the *status quo* is more ephemeral, relating to the stated policy position of the target. This position can be changed much more easily than possession of land, and policy positions can also be defended by means other than occupation. Simply increasing the costs of conflict often enables better defense of a policy position, and, if conflict does occur, the combat is not strictly land-based. Territorial issues, conversely, force defense by land possession, and this makes standing, land armies a necessary tool for this type of conflict.

Issue types are also likely to affect threat duration. States will often continue to fight over territorial issues until one side is decisively victorious and can claim the land or a compromise is negotiated that is acceptable to both parties (Vasquez 1993, 2009). Remaining are the cases of recurrent conflict, when one state tries to defeat the other but does so only nominally. These cases tend to fester. Short of decisive victory, the losing state has every incentive to maintain their army and attempt a challenge when the conditions best warrant such an attack. The winning state understands this logic and maintains its army's presence as well. Thus, territorial conflicts tend to recur (Hensel 1994), and the presence of militarized states across tense borders maintains.

These arguments suggest that elite repressive strength in the state will be highest during and following threats made to homeland territories by neighboring states. These are the conflicts that

build standing, land armies. While other types of conflicts increase militarization, these types of threats are most often met with changes in the military that are not well suited for keeping the elite's hold on the regime.

3.2 How Threat Type Affects Militarization

The repressive strength of the military is a separate question from whether the military has its own political interests within the state more generally. Nevertheless, threat type should also affect the pattern of bargaining between elites and public over militarization. For most conflicts elites must provide the public some good in order to militarize since it is taking the public's resources and some of its citizens for defense of state interests. However, territorial threats are again different. These threats are so dangerous to both public and elites that little bargaining takes place between the two, which privileges elites within society. Elites gain repressive strength for little cost through this type of militarization; this process also encourages the separate institutional interests of the military within the state as well. This new elite group can change the nature of elite/public bargaining for some time.

North and Weingast (1989) describe well how the Seventeenth Century English king had to bargain with Parliament in order to field an effective military force abroad. The Parliament secured rights and protections from the king in exchange for granting the monies and resources necessary for the military force, and these institutional changes led slowly to greater liberalization within the state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) tell a similar story but rely on a subtly different dynamic. They argue that the bargaining advantages afforded the population are time-limited, passing with the termination of the threat; further, the threat helps overcome the coordination problems associated with aggregating mass interests against the elites. This suggests that liberalization, suffrage extension, and democratization will be correlated with large conflicts that target the state.

Both of these explanations assume that the population cares more about their rights than about the conflict itself. Is that always true? Rights mean little if an individual is killed, and many citizens may tolerate mass injustices if it means defense against a threatening neighbor whose rule carries uncertain costs. This is the nature of threats to homeland territories. These threats tend to resonate more than other issues with individuals, eliciting fear among the population, and this fear negates much of the desire to bargain with elites. Thus, militarization follows without any institutional changes.

Territorial issues evoke fear and anxiety in targeted states for several reasons. In early, hunter-gatherer societies, land was the primary source of food, shelter, and other resources necessary for survival (John 1989, Vayda 1976, Wilson 1975), and in many ways that still holds true for individuals in developing countries. Competition for scarce resources means that groups who hold particular pieces of land thrive, while those who do not suffer. The problem of constantly worrying about survival has dwindled for most with modernization, but land ownership still comprises a key economic resource in even the most developed countries. Indeed, it oftentimes represents an individual's most valuable asset. Land still provides shelter, and with a strong legal system, private property can be leveraged into higher-order goods and services or the tools needed for personal wealth creation. Threats to the territories of the state therefore also

carry threats to individual property, which translates into threats to individual lives and livelihoods that are only mildly attenuated by the level of economic development within the state.

Territorial conflicts are often doubly dangerous because of their possible indirect effects on individual fortunes. For example, the likelihood of being proximate to active fighting is much higher for individuals in states targeted by territorial issues. This is just the nature of territorial conflict itself. Occupation and control of territory is the goal of the conflict, and, therefore, the targeted territory becomes a battleground itself. These effects will be exacerbated in those conflicts that use primitive supply techniques in which the army literally feeds off the land. Thus, the average individual residing in or near disputed territories has reason to fear the start of conflicts over their land since most status quos are better than the likely outcome of nearby conflicts.

Territory also holds more than economic value for most individuals. In many cases, one's identity—both individual and group identity—is often connected to territorial homelands. Many conceptualizations of group identity rely on the ability of cohesive groups to employ myths and legends, signs and symbols, education, and religion to attach the individual to particular lands associated with the group (Duchacek 1970, Paasi 1996, Tuan 1991). This is why diaspora groups often refer to traditional lands and ancestral homelands; missing an ownership of the soil, the group recalls formative events that are physically attached to particular places (Smith 1981). Numerous studies of civil conflict have also identified the importance of biological and socio-psychological attachments of individuals and groups to their land. In these studies the ethnic nature of the conflict is actually defined as such by the elites within the community.¹ Finally, in my own research, I have found that individuals in states targeted by territorial issues are much more likely to self-identify with their state rather than any particular group, village, or tribe (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller 2012). The territorial threat creates a clear differencing mechanism for identifying the “other” that is necessary for group cohesiveness, and state-based conflict leads individuals with pointed guns to seek group solidarity with their threatened country.

Quite simply, territorial threats matter more to individuals than other types of issues. Who derives their individual identity based upon their leaders' foreign policy choices? Many individuals would have an opinion on the normative rightness of each proposal, perhaps even based on empirical evidence, but, again, few would derive their personal identity choice from such policy decisions. Similarly, few would consider themselves intimately linked with their leaders, such that threats to the regimes that rule them also affect their own, individual identities.

This discussion implies that the exchange between elite and public for militarization is missing in states threatened by territorial conflict. The public feeds the military—both personnel and monies—while elites organize the institution to defend the state. Over time, a guardian institution develops out of the military, whose goal is to defend the state against territorial rivals. This institutionalization then becomes a powerful domestic force, especially when it is combined with the natural ability the land-based army has to repress.

¹For example, Brass (1997) makes this claim by showing how Indian elites frame violent incidents as “communal” when it serves their interest, thus conditioning publics to favor additional conflict (see also Brubaker and Laitin 1998, Brubaker 2004).

3.3 Military Interests and Domestic Bargaining

These differences have important consequences for the political power of the military within society. As both North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue, creating a strong military will often empower the population to seek political rights, suffrage, and institutional changes in exchange for the personnel needed to staff the military. However, this bargaining power of the public is time sensitive, so the exchange of political rights must be contemporaneous to the threat. The elites lose some institutional power in this bargain by increasing citizen rights but also gain either defense of the regime or the prosecution of the regime's policies.

The repressive strength of the military is weak during these periods, and the citizens are advocating for rights. Thus, even if the number of military personnel is high, the militarization remains populist by nature. Further, the military itself is able to pursue few political interests of its own since these types of threats tie the political power of the military to the bargain for rights during the threat against the state. Liberalization and possible democratization are possible, but the timing remains strictly limited to the initial period of the threat. There is no need for elites to bargain with the public once the regime threat passes.

Territorial threats lead to a different type of militarization. Since there is no elite-public bargain over rights when territory is threatened, this type of militarization increases elite repressive power substantially, without any consequent liberalization of state institutions. This implies that elites will remain institutionally strong following these threats, and their ability to repress will grow, especially after the threat is resolved and the focus of the military turns domestic. However, the composition of the elites is likely to change. The unique nature of territorial threats will create a politically strong military that can rival existing elites for regime control. Since militarization is not tied to elite or public bargains, political support for the military is also likely to be high within society because it serves as guardian for both elites and public. This support allows institutionalization of the military's political power, and, as with most bureaucratic units, the military develops a self-directed interest of its own.

Since elite groups are almost always well-mobilized, political bargaining in this environment will favor an alliance between elites and the military. These alliances are not guaranteed though. If the status of the military is threatened, or the population can mobilize in some way against the elites, the military has strong ties with the population and has no aversion to populism. Repression may still occur with strong, territorial-threat-derived militaries, but only if it reinforces the position of the military within the state, which is tied to its status as guardian. This may be why, for example, the Egyptian military refused to repress during the Arab Spring protests; it may also explain why the rationale of military coups so often mention state interests as a means of placating concerned citizens.

3.4 Fungible Resources and Militarization

Militarization is easier when the regime or state is threatened, but elites do sometimes have the ability to increase military personnel during peaceful periods. It all depends on the resources available to the regime. When there is a substantial source of income available to the regime—from oil, natural gas, and perhaps even drugs or similar illicit goods—then the regime

can use those resources to bypass the bargaining stage of growing a military. Whether citizens join the regime's military then turns on the elites' ability to pay competitive wages. Elites could also use mercenary forces from abroad.

These hired militaries are unlikely to develop interests of their own because the unifying factor is individual-based and wage-related. Since the regime controls the source of funds, the military is responsive to their interests. Instead of promoting institutional changes, resource-driven pay is only likely to reinforce status quo institutions and distributions of wealth and political power. To change this dynamic, the resources available to the elites would have to be exhausted or the public would have to unify and create a force more capable than the repressive power of the elites' military.

This has implications for the argument attributing causation to the correlation between authoritarianism and resource wealth. Placed within the larger context of elite/popular bargaining, it becomes clear that resources allow regimes to bypass the bargains made in other states for militarization to protect regime interests. States do not become authoritarian because of the resource wealth available to leaders; rather, the status quo distribution of bargaining power within the state is reinforced by the discovery of oil or other resources within the state. So long as the elites control these resources, a political stasis develops, with the military used to enforce regime preferences.

3.5 Expectations

These differences across threat types and resources used for militarization imply several expectations regarding the role of the military in the state. First, territorial threats to the state will be associated with high levels of state repressive power. This does not mean that repression follows militarization; rather, the potential for repression will exist within the state. This latent power to repress also increases the bargaining power of the military within the state, especially over time.

Second, non-territorial threats increase the bargaining power of the population but only for a limited time period—at the height of the threat to the regime. This increased leverage for the public creates incentives for regime elites to trade reforms for militarization, and, since the leverage is time-specific, self-enforcing institutional reforms that encourage democratization are more likely during these periods. Meanwhile, the self-interested military that develops in the shadow of territorial threats has little incentive to bargain for reforms. They protect their own interests and extract resources from the state through bargains with the elites. Only during periods of great unrest—when the population is organized and capable of mounting a challenge to the elites or when elites fail—will institutionalized militaries side with populist movements.

Finally, wealthy, resource-abundant states will have militaries that are highly responsive to the regime. These militaries can repress the population if their numbers are great enough. However, there are no independent interests for these organizations, and little elite-public bargaining takes place that involves the military.

4 Testing the Argument

My empirical strategy for testing these expectations relies on a common model of external threat across multiple dependent variables that are likely to be symptomatic of either intra-elite or elite-population bargaining. I operationalize the different paths to military power within the state using three variables. First are the militaries that are purchased by elites, with resource-based income. I proxy these militaries using total oil income per capita for each state year from Haber and Menaldo (2011). Their data sources are carefully described in the web appendix that supports their work.² The oil income data are expressed in constant (2007) \$US, divided by the population in that state during the observation year. In my sample, 3,029 state-years have no significant oil export income. Oil income for the remaining 2,918 state-years ranges from \$0.01 to \$78,589 per person, with a mean value of \$1,385 and a median value of \$50.54 per person.³

I argue that militaries are more commonly built in response to threats from other states, but I differentiate between types of threats based on the likely salience to the public. I identify non-territorial threats using Thompson's (2001) data and his definition of *positional* rivalries. Positional rivalries are "about status or pecking orders. Two or more states compete over who will predominate within a global, regional, or functional arena" (Thompson 1999, 16). Elites are more likely than the population to care about these goals.

As I argue above, individuals will feel threatened by *spatial* rivalries. These carry the territorial issues that may affect their lives and livelihoods, and, as such, these rivalries will make it easier for elites to populate an army without resorting to bargains with the population. I again use Thompson's (2001) rivalry data to identify these rivalries. Since domestic political bargaining may take time, I lag all three military proxies by one year. Analyses using two-, three-, and four-year lags demonstrate no substantive differences in the results, however.

I use a common set of controls for all analyses. First, I include the gross domestic product of each state-year. This data is also provided by Haber and Menaldo (2011) and uses International Dollars in 2000 constant prices. I control for the amount of military expenditures, which is taken from the components of the National Composite Index of Military Capabilities that is released by the Correlates of War Project (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). Finally, I identify the composition of the regime using Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2002) and code as missing any interregnum years in the data (codes -88, -77, and -66). Each of these control variables is lagged to one year prior to the observed state-year.

My sample is limited by data availability to span the years 1960 to 2001. Since my dependent variables vary substantially across tests, I describe each in the appropriate section below as I discuss the statistical model I use for each test.

5 Military Types, Elite Bargaining, and Democratization

I present three sets of tests in this section to determine (1) the effects of military type on elite power and the composition of elite governance, (2) the relationship between military type and

²See www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2011001

³Note that any type of resource wealth should be associated with mercenary-type militaries. I focus here on oil wealth as a proof of concept because of the large literature associating oil rents with deleterious institutional changes.

economic inequality, and, finally, (3) the effects of military type on democratization in the state. Within that last category, I also trace through several regime changes and the role the military has played in each of those transitions. The goal of these analyses is to demonstrate how military bargaining interests and strength covary with types of external threat and funding sources.

5.1 Elite Bargaining and the Military's Domestic Strength

I first begin with an analysis of the potential repressive strength of the elites using a simple measure of militarization within the state: the number of military personnel divided by the total population. This is an imperfect measure of actual repressive strength, but it will likely be correlated with most operationalizations of repressive power and presents a useful first cut for my argument about how militaries are constructed (for discussion of this measure, see Gibler 2012, Chapter 3). The results for the Generalized Least Squares regression with random effects by country are presented in column one of Table 1.⁴

Growing economies and more democratic states have less militarized, less repressive states, and it seems that economic growth matters more for predicting militarization than actual wealth levels. Note also in these results that there may be a substitution effect with military expenditures since regimes with substantial expenditures are less likely to have higher rates of military personnel per capita. This relationship holds even when controls are added for either the United States or all NATO-member countries.

Among the key variables of interest, spatial rivalries—or, those rivalries involving territorial issues—significantly increase militarization. A five-year rivalry, for example, will put an additional one-percent of the population into the military. The effect of oil income is statistically significant but substantively muted. Only very high levels of resource income are associated with increased militarization within the state. Finally, the estimates suggest that positional rivalries have no effect on militarization. These rivalries are less likely to be salient to the public and seem not to increase the repressive power of elites within the regime.

The second column in Table 1 presents an estimation of the likelihood that a regime is controlled by the military. Using logistic regression, again with random effects by country, the dependent variable is positive if the head of state is in the military or shares executive power with the military, according to Banks (2011). Standard errors are clustered by country.

The results in column two generally mimic the estimations of elite repressive power. First, military expenditures are again a substitute for domestic power, and, in this context, it would seem that fiscal measures of military bargaining strength may not provide good identifications of military political strength in many regimes. Democracies are seldom headed by the military, but economic development and growth have no effect in the model.⁵

The type of rivalry matters greatly for military control. Spatial rivalries increase the likelihood of military control substantially, but positional rivalries are associated with civilian governments. This is good evidence that military elites must bargain with citizens if the state is going to pursue

⁴I multiply the dependent variable by 1,000 to ease interpretation of substantive effects.

⁵I also estimated this model on a smaller sample of all non-democracies. The estimates and statistical significance of all variables remain substantively the same as those reported above.

Table 1: External Threats, Repressive Power, and Military Governments

Dependent Variable:	Repressive Power	Military Control
GDP per capita	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Economic Growth	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Military expenditures	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Polity IV	-0.172*** (0.000)	-0.266*** (0.017)
Oil income per capita	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Spatial rivalry	1.618*** (0.000)	1.575*** (0.251)
Positional rivalry	0.197 (0.000)	-1.326*** (0.353)
Constant	6.709*** (0.001)	-5.572*** (0.437)
<i>N</i>	5,287	5,288

Potential repressive power is defined as military personnel as a percentage of total population (multiplied by 1,000 for presentation). Military control is based on Banks (2011) data. Sample include all countries, 1960-2000; Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

issues unrelated to territorial defense. Civilian authority is conceded in order to prosecute these conflicts. However, territorial conflicts increase the likelihood of military control, and this is consistent with my argument that territorial threats are of such salience to the general population that less elite-citizen bargaining occurs when the state is targeted by these. Finally, oil income has no effect. Though column one establishes that repressive power increases with high levels of oil income, the money does not lead to control of the state by the military. This also is consistent with my argument that oil income produces a mercenary military with little independent bargaining power.

These variegated effects demonstrate the necessity of controlling for threat type when examining domestic-level processes. Only controlling for the presence of rivalry leads one to assume no effect, as the strong positive correlation between military control and territorial threat is conflated with the strong association between positional rivalries and civilian governance.

5.2 Economic Inequality: Bargaining between Elites and Public

Repressive ability and military control can be political manifestations of military interests within the state, but the dynamics of threat also affects bargaining within the state in other ways. For

example, a strong bargaining posture within the state is likely to bring greater wealth to those in the military and their supporters. Military elites and their supporters will use the political system to extract rents from society for their own benefit, just as other powerful actors are likely to do. The key difference here, however, is that threat type conditions who benefits when the military seeks rents.

To test this argument, I use comparable cross-country political inequality data in two forms: pre-tax/pre-transfer inequality and post-tax/post-transfer (or disposable income) inequality. Using a Gini coefficient that measures the inequality of values along a distribution of per capita incomes, these data are a standard way of determining income dispersion within a state (Solt 2009). Higher values are associated with higher inequality in income distributions.

Since an augmented Dickey-Fuller test confirmed a unit root for these data, the dependent variable for columns one and two in Table 2 represent changes in the Gini coefficient for each country. I use five-year changes (current year Gini minus the five-year lagged Gini) as inequality changes are likely to take time within society. This assumption is true empirically since three-year lags are not statistically significant for any of the variables, but longer lags do demonstrate a continued effect for both wealth and economic growth within the state. Higher levels of wealth within the state are modestly associated with increased levels of inequality. Economic growth changes this, as higher levels of growth lower inequality within the state for both measures. Repressive power also has an effect in the pre-tax/pre-transfer model at a lower significance threshold ($p < 0.10$).

In the first model in Table 2, spatial rivalries are associated with lower inequality in the pre-tax distribution of disposable income across the state. However, in the second model, spatial rivalries are not associated with higher levels of post-tax inequality at any conventional level of statistical significance. Instead, all years *following* a spatial rivalry are associated with decreases in both measures of inequality—as the military returns to society following conflict, its bargaining power within the state is felt. Neither oil income nor positional rivalries, contemporary or post-rivalry period, has an effect on inequality. Of course, this fits well the model of military power I am arguing. Spatial rivalries create strong, self-interested militaries within the state that are comprised of non-elites. Meanwhile, positional rivalries force elites to bargain with non-elites to field forces, which shifts bargaining timing to the buildup process. Long-term institutional changes are more likely to occur than economic leveling in the wake of these threats. Finally, oil has no effect on the distribution of wealth because elites are simply using resources to buy their own protection within the state.

These estimates of vertical inequality within society also have some important implications for the models of democratization that rely on distributions of wealth within the state. Note how poorly common predictors of economic performance do at affecting change in wealth distributions. Changes in inequality are not associated with oil income, level of democracy, military personnel or spending, or most forms of external threat. This overall lack of association for these variables implies that democratization may be a somewhat random event, *if* economic inequality plays a role in determining the regime type of the state.

Another explanation for the paucity of good predictors is that changes in economic inequality rarely occur. For example, the average change in inequality for the measure in my sample is 0.05, for a Gini coefficient whose mean is 37.5 with a range of 15 to over 71. The standard deviation of the change in inequality is relatively small at 1.58, so 95% of the changes to inequality in any

Table 2: External Threats and Vertical Inequalities

Dependent Variable:	Pre-Tax Gini	Post-Tax Gini
GDP per capita	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Economic Growth	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Military expenditures	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Repressive power	65.18† (36.78)	32.77 (32.20)
Polity IV	0.016 (0.026)	-0.031 (0.021)
Oil Income per capita	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000† (0.000)
Spatial rivalry	-1.427* (0.576)	-0.194 (0.483)
Post-spatial rivalry	-1.384* (0.620)	-1.564** (0.531)
Positional rivalry	-0.312 (0.792)	-0.591 (0.699)
Post-positional rivalry	1.100 (0.803)	0.735 (0.704)
Constant	-0.707 (0.465)	-0.014 (0.414)
<i>N</i>	2,331	2,396

Sample include all countries, 1960-2000; Standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

given state-year are less than 3.25, which is just under 6% of the entire scale. The Gini coefficient simply does not move that much in one given year. The five-year-difference has a much smaller mean of -0.02, but the standard deviation of this measure is much greater at 5.15, which suggests a 10% change in inequality occurs about one-third of the time.

Inequality, even at five year changes, still seems to be a relatively static condition for most states. If large inequality changes are infrequent, while the narrative of democratizations still includes popular revolts against unequal circumstances, then some other factor must make the population care about their position. As Boix (2003) suggests, the lower classes may gain new information about the actual weakness of the regime, or some new factor makes coordination among the masses easier. In either case, inequality alone cannot be a significant cause of this type of socio-political action (see Haggard and Kaufman 2012).

A Note on Horizontal Inequality and the Roots of Domestic Change

Recent research on civil wars suggests that horizontal or cross-group inequalities matter more than vertical inequality when predicting social conflict. As Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch

(2011) find, overall inequality does not correlate with civil conflict, but large disparities between ethnic group income and overall state income can promote the grievances that lead to civil wars. Using their data on ethnic group income, I also evaluated the role of external rivals and oil in changing the nature of horizontal economic inequalities in the state via the military.

Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) identify ethnic groups according to several categories, including whether the group is dominant politically in the state, excluded from the regime, or openly discriminated against. I analyzed whether horizontal inequalities change for each of these group types following conflict and found a strong association between changes among non-dominant groups within society and spatial rivalries. These rivalries over territorial issues lead to *increasing* per capita income among non-dominant groups relative to the overall income of the state. This is true for both groups that have lower average incomes than the state average and also for those groups with higher average incomes. To examine more closely the politics of these changes, I isolated the states that contained only non-dominant groups and found no effect for any of the predictors listed in Table 2. Instead, the only group-level effects can be found in non-dominant, minority ethnic groups. Spatial rivalries also had no effect on changes among dominant groups or those included in the regime.⁶

When examined in conjunction with the results in Table 2, the horizontal inequality changes describe a military that is quite strongly tied economically to the lower classes in the state. Military gains are associated with gains for disadvantaged groups, and this persists after rivalries have ended. The group-level changes are strong enough to affect the vertical inequalities within the state. Most likely, this association between wealth increases and militarization results from employment gains among the disadvantaged groups as well as some class association with the military. Fealty to these same groups explains continued economic increases for the disadvantaged following the settlement of the rivalry.

Meanwhile, positional rivalries have no effect on either vertical or horizontal inequality in the state. This is also consistent with my argument that bargaining between elites and public is focused on institutional change. The leverage afforded the public post-positional rivalry disappears once the elites no longer need militarization, and militarization and continued employment for these groups also ends.

Overall, my results thus far demonstrate a politically stronger set of elites within society when oil revenues are high as the regime uses resource money to purchase repressive power. However, oil wealth has no effect on inequality dynamics within the state. External threats increase the likelihood of immediate democratization, but there is little long-term institutional bargaining and wealth inequalities within society are not affected. Finally, rivalries over territorial issues increase both the repressive power of the state and also the power of the military as a political group within society. This has important implications for the wealth of groups who populate the military, as my assessments of inequality demonstrate, and it also controls what is likely to occur during periods of political instability such as democratization. In short, the military becomes a strong political force following territorial rivalries and has a closer affinity to disadvantaged groups than it does to other elite groups within the state. If threatened, it may be more likely to ally with popular groups and against the interests of other elites.

⁶Only one other variable included in Table 2 had any effect on horizontal inequality. Higher levels of wealth were associated with decreased inequality for non-dominant groups in the state in the pre-tax/pre-transfer model. This effect did not maintain in the post-tax/post-transfer model, and, again, no other variables had an effect on changes in horizontal inequalities.

5.3 The Military and Democratization

In this final section, I tie together the arguments thus far and analyze how the different types of militaries behave during transitional periods for the regime. My dependent variable is democratization, defined as present in any state that scored 6 to 10 according to the Polity IV combined score in a given year, after having scored between -10 and 5 the previous year. There are 78 democratic transitions in my sample, and I estimate each model with a random effects logit grouped by country.

In these models I also include two interactions and a dummy variable that indicates whether a country was previously a member of the Warsaw Pact. The breakup of the Soviet Union was the most significant geo-political event of the period, and these cases may skew relationships among military type, inequality, and democratization, since, in most cases, the regimes were kept communist-led by force and often by subsidy from the Soviet Union. The interactions of inequality with both Warsaw Pact countries and post-spatial rivalry countries are included to better understand how the wealth dynamics within the state interact with military type.⁷ The results are included in Table 3.

Once again, wealth and economic growth are statistically significant predictors of democratization. Wealthier states tend to have more democratizations, but autocrats overseeing growing economies tend to endure. These results are consistent with most previous studies (see, for example, Epstein et al. 2006, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Previous Polity IV score also matters, as democratic transitions are more likely when only small institutional changes are needed.

High levels of oil revenue are associated with a decreased likelihood of democratization in the state ($p < 0.08$). This is consistent with my argument that rentier militaries strengthen the repressive power of elite groups in the state. In fact, it may translate more directly to repressive power than larger militaries, since the militarization measure is not statistically significant in either model.

I again differentiate between states in rivalries and states post-rivalry in these estimates. This is an important distinction since, once again, spatial rivalries have strong post-rivalry effects in both models while positional rivalries matter only during the rivalry itself. This distinction again provides evidence that elites must bargain with the populace in order to staff armies during positional rivalries, and this bargaining makes institutional changes such as democratization more likely. Once the positional rivalry ends, the effects of these rivalries on democratization ends with the bargaining power of the population.

Territorial rivalries create strong military interests in the state, but those effects are limited to post-rivalry periods. During the rivalry, the military may have its troops positioned to defend the targeted lands, and, once the rivalry ends, the military then can pursue its own interests domestically. The association is substantively quite strong—democratizations are much less likely after states have experienced spatial rivalries—unless the level of inequality in the state is high. As inequality increases, a post-spatial-rivalry military *increases* the likelihood of democratization.

Finally, former Warsaw Pact countries are more likely than other states to experience transitions, even after controlling for wealth, growth, and prior Polity IV score. However, this changes, too, if inequality is high within the state. When inequality is high, former Warsaw Pact countries are

⁷Models interacting the Gini coefficient with post-positional rivalries had no effect in either model.

Table 3: External Threats and Vertical Inequalities

Dependent Variable:	Dem Transition	Dem Transition
GDP per capita	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)
Economic Growth	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Gini (pre-tax)	0.004 (0.026)	0.008 (0.026)
Military expenditures	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Repressive power	-62.76 (49.50)	-59.09 (49.26)
Polity IV	0.175*** (0.047)	0.190*** (0.048)
Oil Income per capita	-0.004† (0.002)	-0.004† (0.002)
Spatial rivalry	-0.458 (0.601)	-0.477 (0.601)
Post-spatial rivalry	-5.281* (2.468)	-5.779* (2.632)
Positional rivalry	1.642* (0.727)	1.646* (0.726)
Post-positional rivalry	0.313 (0.864)	0.607 (0.868)
Interact: Gini (pre-tax) X Post-spatial rivalry	0.136** (0.051)	0.144** (0.054)
Former Warsaw Pact Member	4.433*** (1.344)	7.380** (2.333)
Interact: Gini (pre-tax) X Former Warsaw Pact Member		-0.170* (0.085)
Constant	-3.989** (1.287)	-4.077** (1.268)
<i>N</i>	1,395	1,395

Sample include all countries, 1960-2000; Standard errors in parentheses.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

somewhat less likely to democratize, though the interaction term only slightly mutes the strong connection between post-Soviet control and democratization.

Overall, these results provide strong support for the theory linking the cause of militarization to the interests of the military that develops. Territorial threats, defined as spatial rivalries, hamper democratization, unless incomes are relatively equal across society. This is consistent with the argument that militaries will side with the citizenship when able to do so since income equality implies higher levels of political power for citizen groups. Spatial rivalries also tend to have a leveling influence on society as a whole. Meanwhile, positional rivalries promote democratization but have little effect on income equality. This, too, is consistent with the argument that the leverage afforded the population during these threats is time-limited and requires self-enforcing institutional changes. Last, and consistent with the resource curse literature, states are unlikely to democratize when oil income is substantial in the state. This reinforces the argument that oil income imposes a stultifying effect on institutional change.

5.4 A Note on Institutional Changes and the Role of the Military

The results thus far have confirmed a correlation between the military and repressive strength, inequality within the state, and regime changes such as democratization. In this section I take a closer look at those results, focusing on the cases of regime change in the data. Again, my argument is straightforward: the method used to build the military will have subsequent implications on the military's interests and behavior as an institution. Territorial threats will lead to a self-interested military that will join other groups during bargaining when it is expedient to do so, and this includes joining non-elite groups when they mobilize. External threats that are non-territorial provide leverage for the population only at the start of the threat, however; these militaries are similar to resource-driven militaries and seldom develop interests of their own.

This section draws from my earlier results but also from recent work by Haggard and Kaufman (2012) in which they find a mixed relationship between democratization and income inequality within the state. Their research provides assessments of the level of economic conflict within the state during the democratization process, and their narratives describe galvanizing events and oftentimes the role of the military during regime changes. In short, their research is excellent for examining whether the causal paths to democratization match well the correlations I found in the previous analyses.

Table 4 provides a list of all democratizations documented in the Haggard, Kaufman and Teo (2012) dataset that would apply to this military-centric argument.⁸ Their sample ranges between the years 1980 and 2000—the so-called third wave of democratization—and includes all democratizations and reversions in both the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) dataset and also the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The combined dataset provides details on whether the democratization involved distributive or non-distributive conflict and, for reversions, the type of reversion away from democracy. Their event narratives are extensive, and I code the role of the military in each regime change based primarily on these narratives.

The first column of Table 4 provides the state-year(s) of the democratization. Note that the two regime-change datasets do not always agree on the year of the transition; there are also cases when the datasets do not agree on whether a transition took place in the country. Therefore, to merge these datasets for the most inclusive analysis possible, I follow Haggard and Kaufman (2012) and code whether either dataset records a transition. Cases in which only one dataset includes the transition notes that dataset—either CGV or Polity. Different years across datasets are denoted by multiple year listings, with CGV always coming before Polity. The second column provides the Haggard and Kaufman (2012) assessments of whether the democratization involved conflict over distributive politics—cases in which non-elite unrest pushed elite power to democratize. The final column summarizes the galvanizing event for the democratization process from my coding of their narratives.

The third column provides the rationale that likely spurred militarization in the state. Listings that include country names and years denote the most prominent rivals for the state, within at

⁸Many democratizations remain unrelated to the argument tested here. These include thirteen cases of states democratizing after the breakup of the Soviet Union and another two cases that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. These state-dissolutions witnessed no military bargaining during the transition periods, which makes sense considering the military institutions were tied to the previous, larger states. Similarly, my argument suggests that territorial threats encourage the development of the military within the state, but that type of process is impossible for island states that have no threats to their borders. Another eleven cases of democratization happened on islands, rendering a total of 26 cases that are not particularly relevant for the discussion that follows.

most ten years from the democratization event—as well as the year that the rivalry ended. There are many cases in which a rivalry was not present immediately prior to the militarization; for these cases I examined the history of the military for that country and assessed the rationale for militarization in the state. Many militaries were created to provide internal security against insurgent and rebel groups, while other states had long-standing militaries that were built from past conflicts. These are all noted in Table 4, but they were not used in the aggregate analyses of the previous sections.

The fourth column begins the descriptions of military influence and behavior in the state during these events, beginning with the important questions of whether the military was asked to repress the population and also whether the military did so. I used only the Haggard, Kaufman and Teo (2012) narratives to code these decisions. Out of the sixty democratizations listed, the military was asked to repress in ten cases according to the narratives. The military expressly refused in four of these cases, and the command to repress caused splits or substantial defections in the military in another three cases. Only in Guatemala (1986), Nepal (1990), and Thailand (1992) were the military actively used to repress during or immediately prior to the democratization process.

Note, too, that these numbers are probably even more surprising when the logic of the decision to repress is considered. Strategic leaders are only likely to ask for military backing when they assume that the military will support them. This is probably why entrenched regimes so seldom asked for repression in this set of cases. There were three of sixty cases in which the military had little power to repress, but that leaves fifty-seven cases in which repression could have taken place. Again, the decision to repress via the military was only made in ten of these cases and was carried out by the military in only three instances.

The fifth column provides a glimpse into the relative capabilities of the military within the state by coding whether the regime in power prior to the democratization was led by the military. Many of the cases had coups that were temporally proximate to the democratization. These are noted with the coup listing.

The sixth column describes the role of the military during the democratization process and which side the military joined during the bargaining process. The military was active in domestic bargaining in thirty-three of the sixty cases. This is a slight undercount of the militaries' potential for bargaining since foreign intervention and pressure played a direct role in muting the capabilities of these institutions in at least four cases.⁹ A more substantial bias against finding a bargaining role for the military can be found when we consider that direct intervention or substantial international pressure stymied local militaries in eight cases: Haiti (1994), Nicaragua (1984 and 1990), Panama (1989), South Africa (1992), Suriname (1988 and 1991), and Uganda (1980). Putting an asterisk next to these cases, the military could have played a role in bargaining in three-quarters of the democratizations between 1980 and 2000 and actively did so approximately 55% of the time. The institution itself was seldom simply a tool of the elite but had its own interests.

⁹The Falklands/Malvinas war destroyed the power of the Argentine military (1983), and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia left the military powerless within the state by 2000, and the military regime in Sierra Leone was removed by outside intervention in 1998. Relatedly, a plane crash killed the military leadership in Pakistan (1988), muting its interests as democratization began.

Table 4: The Role of the Military during Democratizations, 1980-2000

State-year (CGV, Polity)	Distributive HK_2012	Rival, or [cause of militarization]	Refusal to Repress?	Military in Power?	Bargaining and Side Joined	Galvanizing Event of Democratization
Argentina 1983	Yes	Chile (1991)	N/A		Muted: N/A	Loss in war
Bangladesh 1986 (CGV)	Yes	[War with Pakistan 1971]	Yes	Military coup	Active: Populist	Military-led democratization
Bangladesh 1991 (Polity)	Yes	[Internal security]	Yes	Military-led	Active: Populist	Economic crisis
Bolivia 1982	Yes	Chile (ongoing)		Military coup	Active: Both	Military coup to democratization
Brazil 1985	Yes	Argentina (1985)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Electoral college vote
Burundi 1993 (CGV)	Yes	[regional conflict]			Active: Elite	Ethnic violence
CAR 1993 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]			Active: Elite	Pressure on military government
Chile 1990, 1989	Yes	Argentina (1991)			Active: Elite	Multiple
Congo 1992 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]			Active: Elite	Economic crisis with loss of Soviet aid
Croatia 2000 (Polity)	Yes	Serbia (1991)			Active: Elite	Leader's death
Dominican Rep 1996 (Polity)	Yes	[Internal security]				Aging leader allowed elections
El Salvador 1984	Yes	Honduras (1992)		Military coup	Active: Split	Inter-elite bargaining led to elections
Ghana 1993 (CGV)	Yes	Togo (1995)		Military coup	Active: Populist	Military leader allowed free elections and won
Guatemala 1986 (CGV)	Yes	Belize (1993)	No	Military-led	Active: Populist	Military called for elections
Guatemala 1996 (Polity)	Yes	Belize (1993)		Military-led	Active: Populist	Peace accord with insurgent groups
Guinea-Bissau 2000 (CGV)	Yes	Senegal (1993)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Military uprising and call for elections
Guyana 1992 (Polity)	Yes	Venezuela (1966)			Active: Elite	Gradual liberalization led to elections
Haiti 1990 (Polity)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military-led	Active: Elite	Retreat of military leader
Haiti 1994 (Polity)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military-led	Active: Elite	US-led force threatened ouster
Honduras 1982	Yes	El Salvador (1992)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Military regime allowed elections to avoid "contagion"
Honduras 1989 (Polity)	Yes	El Salvador (1992)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Military backing of civilian candidate in elections
Kenya 1998 (CGV)	Yes	Uganda (1995)			Active: Elite	Mass mobilizations and protests
Lesotho 1993 (Polity)	Yes	[South Africa]		Military coup	Active: Populist	Military-led democratization
Malawi 1994	Yes	Tanzania (1994)			Active: Populist	Protests led to referendum and call for elections
Mali 1992	Yes	Burkina Faso (1986)	Yes	Military coup	Active: Populist	Military-led democratization
Mexico 1997 (Polity)	Yes	[long-standing]			Active: Populist	Gradual liberalization led to elections
Mexico 2000 (CGV)	Yes	[long-standing]			Active: Populist	Gradual liberalization led to elections
Mongolia 1990, 1992	Yes	[War with Japan, 1938-1945]	No		Active: Populist	Leader resignation amid protests
Nepal 1990 (CGV)	Yes	[long-standing]			Active: Populist	King lifted ban on opposition parties
Nepal 1999 (Polity)	Yes	[long-standing]			Muted: N/A	Polity codes legislative elections
Nicaragua 1984 (CGV)	Yes	Colombia (1992)			Active: Populist	International pressure forced Sandinistas to hold elections
Nicaragua 1990 (Polity)	Yes	Colombia (1992)		Military-led	Active: Populist	International pressure forced Sandinistas to hold elections
Niger 1993, 1992	Yes	[Internal security-Taureg]		Military coup	Active: Populist	Military permitted National Conference amid protests
Niger 2000 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security-Taureg]		Military coup	Active: Populist	Military-led transition to democracy following coup
Nigeria 1999 (CGV)	Yes	Cameroon (ongoing)		Military-led	Active: Populist	Military-led transition to democracy following coup
Pakistan 1988	Yes	India (ongoing)	Yes		Muted: N/A	Plane crash decapitated military leadership
Panama 1989	Yes	[Internal security]	Mixed	Military coup	Active: Elite	US invasion removed military leader
Paraguay 1989 (CGV)	Yes	[long-standing]			Active: Elite	Military-led transition to democracy following coup
Paraguay 1992 (Polity)	Yes	[long-standing]			Active: Elite	National Constitutional Assembly elections
Peru 1980	Yes	Ecuador (1998)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Military called for elections amid labor protests
Romania 1996 (Polity)	Yes	[post-Soviet military gutted]			Active: Elite	Elections removed Communist successor
Russia 2000 (Polity)	Yes	China (1989)			Active: Elite	Elections led to first democratically-elected president
Senegal 2000	Yes	Mauritania (1995)			Muted: Populist	Incumbent party defeated in elections
Serbia 2000	Yes	Bosnia (ongoing)	Defections	Military coup	Active: Elite	Mass demonstrations forced leader ouster following elections
Sierra Leone 1996 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military coup	Active: Elite	Intra-Military coup led to peace proposal and elections
Sierra Leone 1998 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military coup	Muted: Elite	Intra-Military coup led to foreign intervention
South Africa 1992 (Polity)	Yes	Zimbabwe (1992)			Active: Elite	Internal and external pressure led to elections
South Korea 1988	Yes	North Korea (ongoing)			Active: Populist	Liberalization and then elections
Sudan 1986	Yes	Ethiopia (ongoing)	Mixed	Military coup	Active: Populist	Military-led transition to democracy following coup
Suriname 1988 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military-led	Active: Elite	Military agreed to elections following external pressure
Suriname 1991 (CGV)	Yes	[Internal security]		Military coup	Active: Elite	Military agreed to elections following external pressure
Taiwan 1992 (Polity)	Yes	China (ongoing)			Active: Elite	Liberalization and then elections
Taiwan 1996 (CGV)	Yes	China (ongoing)			Active: Elite	First direct elections of President
Thailand 1992	Yes	Vietnam (1988)	No	Military coup	Active: Elite	Military agreed to elections following pressure from king
Turkey 1983	Yes	Greece (ongoing)		Military coup	Active: Elite	Military-led transition to democracy following coup
Uganda 1980 (CGV)	Yes	Tanzania (1979)		Military coup	Active: Elite	International removal of dictator
Ukraine 1994 (Polity)	Yes	[post-Soviet military]			Active: Elite	Polity codes elections following institutional changes
Uruguay 1985	Yes	[Internal security]		Military coup	Active: Elite	Protests forced military-led to open elections
Zambia 1991 (Polity)	Yes	South Africa (1991)		Military-led	Active: Elite	Cabinet defections led to call for elections

These cases also demonstrate that the military often sided with populist movements over established elites in the country. Thirteen of thirty-five democratizations witnessed militaries joining populist mobilizations, and two more cases involved militaries siding with both sets of groups. In other words, forty-three percent of the time, in these selected cases, the military joined groups from the population in order to overthrow the existing regime, which was often one of their making. This does not mean that the military was always pro-democracy, even during the democratization process—far from it. Instead, in the bargaining game among elite groups within society, the military often worked to maintain its own interests and, next or equally, the interests of the state.

Some militaries went even further than the average reluctant democratizer. There are numerous cases of the military trying to institute democracy for what it believed to be the good of the population. Consider these quotes from the Haggard, Kaufman and Teo (2012) narratives:

[**Mali, 1992:**] “In March 1991, Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure led a coup ousting long-standing dictator Moussa Traore. The new military government appointed a transition committee, which drafted a new constitution that was subsequently reviewed by a National Conference and submitted to a referendum. Elections in 1992...”

[**Niger, 2000:**] “In 1999, authoritarian ruler Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declares a 9-month transition plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation. Following extensive debate over the nature of institutional arrangements—both within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and in the press—the military imposes a solution, which is validated in a referendum in 1999. Presidential and legislative elections were held in October and November 1999.”

[**Paraguay, 1989:**] “In 1989, General Andres Rodriguez, backed by a coalition of military officers and a ‘traditionalist’ faction of the ruling party, ousted aging dictator Alfredo Stroessner in a military coup. The coup marked the onset of a gradual regime transition: the election of a National Constituent Assembly in 1991, the promulgation of a new constitution in 1992, and a competitive presidential election in 1993.”

[**Sudan, 1986:**] “Following a coup in April 1985 that deposed President Numeiri, the military formed a Transitional Military Council, appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986... Following a coup in April 1985 that deposed President Numeiri, the military formed a Transitional Military Council, appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986.”

[**Turkey, 1983:**] “At the time of the coup in 1980, the military stated that its intervention would be of limited duration. In 1981, the junta appointed a Consultative Assembly charged with devising a new constitution. In 1982, this document was submitted to a referendum. The Consultative Assembly also wrote an electoral law that established new political parties. In October 1983, the military transferred power to the new government despite the defeat of its favored candidate.”

These are just the most prominent examples. There is ample evidence in the democratization narratives that militaries bargain hard for their own interests and those of their states. There is also evidence that how states militarized affected these institutions. Among the thirteen militaries (15 cases) that were active and populist or had populist leanings, eleven were preceded by substantial territorial threats. Only Benin (1991) and Niger (1992-93, 2000) had democratizations that were associated with populist militaries that were not built from external, territorial threats.

The military sided more often with elites in nineteen cases involving fifteen different militaries. Six of these cases probably would not have ended in democratization had external pressure not countered the strength of military control within the state. Among the remaining thirteen cases, there was inter-elite bargaining, but the military also often favored agreements that privileged outcomes that were beneficial for the masses—or at least what the military perceived as beneficial. The Paraguay (1989) and Turkey (1983) examples mentioned above are cases in point. Also included would be the cases of Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985), Guinea-Bissau (2000), Honduras (both 1982 and 1989), Paraguay (1992), and Sierra Leone (1996).

Overall, the sample of democratizations strongly supports the argument that external threats that target the whole state—territorial threats—create self-interested institutions that are politically powerful within the state. These militaries bargain hard, and they are not wedded to regime elites. They are also unlikely to repress the citizenry during these periods of change.

Not mentioned thus far is the role of oil and resource-built militaries in this sample. The reason is that there is a substantial selection effect in the dataset of democratizations. Among these sixty cases, only Russia (2000) has oil revenues that are above average for the time period, and its resource revenues at the time were only moderately above average. If oil and resource wealth stymie political change as I contend, then this is exactly what we should find.

Also not mentioned was the role of non-territorial threats in events that led to more immediate democratizations and bargaining between public and elites. Non-territorial rivals were present in three cases in this sample: South Africa (1992), Taiwan (1992), and Zambia (1991). The military was not active during the bargaining process of any of these three cases. Moreover, though economic pressure was pinpointed as a causal mechanism in the African cases, that pressure coincided with military buildups that could not be sustained by the states, who were rivals with each other. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, the long-term rivalry with China that instigated the authoritarian measures of party restrictions had to be eased after dissension grew with the costs of the rivalry. These cases do not provide the strongest support for the connection between elite-led rivalry and democratization, and are small in number, but there is evidence here that is consistent with the argument.

6 Implications

Let us return to the several cases I mentioned at the beginning of this paper. First is the example of the Egyptian army standing aside and defying civilian authority when they were asked to repress the population. The Egyptian army was created and institutionalized to guard against any threats from neighboring Israel. The rivalry lasted from Israel's system entry to 1979 and the Camp David Peace Accords, and the army still has a substantial influence on the economy and society. It refused to repress because doing so would affect its own interests and those of its

supporters within the state. This is the guardian mentality, combined with self-interest, that has also led the army to be leery of Muslim Brotherhood influences and democratic elections. Simply put, the spatial rivalry created an incredibly strong political and economic force within the Egyptian state.

Meanwhile, in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia's military was built using oil monies. It has had both positional and spatial rivalries with a host of neighboring countries, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, but the force was constructed using oil income, and the military remains loyal to the regime. Saudi Arabia used a combination of increased repression, the threat of additional repression, and increased subsidies to the population to maintain a restive state during the Arab Spring. It also exported some of its forces to Bahrain to help that regime put down any and all insurrections. Bahrain is a small, island country, and the regime had little ability to repress without the help of its neighbor.

The Iraqi military was built during rivalries with neighbors, and its structure under Saddam Hussein was institutionalized in the 1980s during the eight-year war with Iran. The army had strong institutional interests and was highly repressive. It also had a great deal of political influence. When the United States disbanded the military, those institutional interests remained and provided a catalyst for several insurgent groups. Those same army interests enabled easy coordination for reorganizing forces after the American withdrawal from the country.

These cases fit well the general theory linking territorial issues or rentier militaries to institutional interests, but there are few contemporary cases in which non-territorial rivalries can promote institutional changes. Democracies are already plentiful in the system, especially among major states, and most of the remaining rivalries are between smaller states, over territorial issues. This implies that the main distinction in years to come will be between militaries with guardian-type interests within the state and those countries whose militaries were bought with resource wealth. As the above cases imply, this is a useful distinction for those interested in political and economic development.

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