skip to main content
Douglas M. Gibler
  • About
  • Territorial Peace
  • Research
  • MID Data
  • Alliance Data
  • Replication
  • Belgium Program
  • 2020 ISSR Intl Conflict Workshop Schedule
Examining the Development of Judicial Independence (with Kirk Randazzo and Rebecca Reid). pdf version

Abstract: Even our best theories of judicial independence do not explain well how the institution develops within the state. Generally thought to be a type of insurance for regimes who fear their majority status is in jeopardy, recent research suggests that insurance theory does not offer an adequate explanation until states democratize. We agree and develop a multidimensional theory of judicial independence that focuses on the interplay of the constraints facing ruling elites that derive from the levels of political competition within the government, the potential for social competition within the state, and the state’s regime type. We test our argument using a dataset of approximately 145 countries over 40 years, and our results support the argument that development of judicial independence is related to the political landscape encountered by the executive. Ethnic fractionalization in the state, political competition, and regime type each has a conditional effect on the observation of judicial independence.



Accessibility | Equal Opportunity | UA Disclaimer | Site Disclaimer | Privacy | Copyright © 2021
The University of Alabama | Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 | (205) 348-6010
Website provided by the Center for Instructional Technology, Office of Information Technology
  • About
  • Territorial Peace
  • Research
  • MID Data
  • Alliance Data
  • Replication
  • Belgium Program
  • 2020 ISSR Intl Conflict Workshop Schedule