The Missing Military:  How International Conflict Shapes Domestic Political Bargaining. pdf version.

Abstract: Most analyses of domestic bargaining only consider the military as a potential tool for elite-led repression of the population, but this misses the point that militaries are often institutions with interests of their own.  Militaries that develop to guard the territorial interests of the state against external threats are likely to institutionalize and become self-interested.  These militaries also have the greatest capacity for repression.  However, there are also conditions under which populist revolt will push these militaries to favor democracy or democratic reforms.  The interests of other military types are either time-sensitive or elite-responsive, depending on whether the regime had to bargain with the public in order to militarize.  These arguments together link the stimulus that creates or grows militarization with the repressive power of elites, their relative bargaining power within society, and the likelihood of and conditions for democratization. Tests using cross-national data from all available countries, 1960-2000, support these expectations.